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THE WAR POWER AFTER 200 YEARS:
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
AT A CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE
WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITrEE ON WAR POWERS
OF THE CoMMITrEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 9:30 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Kerry, Simon, Adams, Moynihan, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, Trible, Evans,
and McConnell.
The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come
to order.
Today our committee commences work on a project of real significance, an effort to evaluate and improve the War Powers Resolutlon of 1973. Congress passed this law 15 years ago in the hope of
fostering constructive executive-legislative interaction in the decision to employ U.S. forces abroad.
Unfortunately, this intent has never been fulfilled. Indeed, from
the moment of its enactmen 0ver President Nixon's veto, the reso1 of dispute rather than an instrulution itself has been an object
mentality of cooperation.
This past year's contentious debate over the Resolution's applicability to the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf has served to underscore the irony that now surrounds this crucial law. For the motive
behind the War Powers Resolution was a determination to establish a procedure that would ensure national unity.
The aim was to devise a mechanism, consistent with the Constitution, through which Congress and the President would act together in the momentous decision to commit U.S. forces to hostilities.
Critics of the War Powers Resolution continue to characterize it
as an idiosyncratic product of its time, an effort to prevent another
Vietnam. But that involves a distortion.
The War Powers Resolution was not intended to prevent the necessary use of American military power, but rather to prevent the
commitment of power unaccompanied by careful analysis and the
commitment of national will.
The framers of the Constitution intended that Congress be an
active participant in the decision to commence hostilities. While
(1)
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the War Powers Resolution in its current form has failed, a way
must be found to give modern meaning to constitutional intent.
Pursuant to this purpose, the committee last December authorized the establishment of a Special Subcommittee on War Powers.
Today the subcommittee begins hearings that will provide for a full
airing of the constitutional dimensions of the question, while considering practicalities as well as principles.
The chairman of the subcommittee is Senator Biden our colleague, who is completing recuperation from surgery and for whom
I will sit in until he returns in a few weeks.
These hearings will extend through August and into September,
and will involve former and present Government officials, including President Ford and a number of eminent constitutional scholars.
And now the subcommittee is pleased to be able to commence its
hearings with testimony from four people who played a role in the
genesis of the law we have set ourselves to evaluate.
Chairman Fascell and Congressman Broomfield have since assumed the leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Senators Eagleton and Mathias have retired and graduat~ to new careers. All four have records of distinguished service to our country,
and the subcommittee is very pleased by their presence today.
I would ask Senator Pressler if he has an opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Senator Pell appears in the appendix.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR

PRESSLER

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.
I am pleased to serve as the ranking member on the Republican
side. This is the first, as you pointed out, in a lengthy series of
hearings on the War Powers Resolution, often referred to as the
War Powers Act. It has been a matter of major concern for the
Congress over the past 15 years, and each time there is a new
international crisis it is at the forefront. It may well be the subject
of debate for the next 15 years.
The administration opposes this legislation on constitutional and
practical grounds. I strongly support the administration's position.
Nevertheless, the reason we are meeting here this morning and
listening to the testimony of these distinguished witnesses is the
result of the continuing political controversy over that Resolution.
It is a political statute, pure and simple.
Weare inquiring not only into the nature and legality of the
War Powers Resolution, but we are also examining the war power
itself. Thus, we are exploring the isssue of the constitutional separation of powers at the very time we are celebrating the bicentennial anniversary of the U.S. Constitution.
This is a curious way to celebrate a document that is not only
the world's oldest written constitution, but also has made our
system of Government the political wonder of the world.
I have long been a critic of the War Powers Resolution. It is unconstitutional in law and politically unwise in fact. It has seriously
strained the relationship between the executive branch and the legislative branch at a time and under·circumstances when coopera-
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tion and not confrontation should be paramount for our own national interest.
I do not criticize, nor do I seek to undermine, the process of congressional oversight. The watchdog function of Congress with respect to the executive branch has been in place since the very first
Congress.
The way the Constitution was written and the way it was originally intended was that each branch of Government keep an eye
on the others. A cursory reading of the Federalist Papers, the best
commentary ever written on the U.S. Constitution, reveals a serious concern by the framers over the potential abuse and misuse of
power. James Madison warned specifically about that possibility in
Federalist No. 48.
The founding fathers intentionally blurred the edges of the separation of powers doctrine, well realizing that complete separation
might bring about stagnation and inflexibility. To quote the former
Chief Justice of the United States, Warren Burger, in his majority
opinion in the case of Bowsher v. Synar, 1986:
That system of division and separation of powers produces conflicts, confusion,
and discordance at times. But it was deliberately so structured to assare full, vigorous and open debate on the great issues affecting the people and to provide avenues
for the operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power.

The debate will be evident in the hearing that we are holding,
but the current conflict between thf'. legislative and the executive
on who controls foreign policy is quite another matter.
The issue is well stated in the very first paragraph of the recommendations section of the Tower Commission Report of 1987:
Whereas the ultimate power to formulate domestic policy resides in the Congress,
the primary responsibility for the formulation and implementation of national security policy falls on the President.

It then goes on to say:
It is the President who is the usual source of innovation and responsiveness in
this field.

This means quite simply that in foreign policy the President
leads. No one to my knowledge has maintained that the President
absolutely controls. Congress has the explicit power under the Constitution to declare war. The President has the constitutional explicit power to defend the national security interests of the United
States. I will have more to say about the Constitution's intentions
and obligations at our next hearing tomorrow afternoon.
Only 2 weeks ago, the Chief Justice of the United States, William
Rehnquist, wrote in his majority opinion in Morrison v. Olson that:
Time and again we have reaffirmed the importance in our constitutional scheme
of the separation of powers into the three coordinate branches.

This is why the Supreme Court has held the one-house veto to be
unconstitutional in the Bowsher case and in INS v. Chadha, 1983.
Indeed, several Justices in both cases have indicated that a twohouse legislative veto is also of dubious constitutionality.
I believe without question that section 5(c) of the War Powers
Resolution of 1973, providing for removal of U.S. forces from any
theater of conflict, if Congress approves a concurrent resolution to
that effect, is a clear violation of the presentment clause of the
U.S. Constitution, found in article I, section 7, clause 3.

j

4

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I welcome these hearings as an opportunity to reacquaint ourselvs with the Constitution and with
constitutional theory in this bicentennial anniversary year of the
ratification of that great document.
It is particularly important, I believe, to get things straight in
this Presidential election year. The great issues of war, peace, and
national security should be debated in this Congress and in the
public arena. That is what democracy is all about. When we do
this, we demonstrate to the world the openness of our system and
the strengths of the democratic process.
But debate is one thing. "Constitutional encroachment," as Madison warned, is quite another. I find myself in rare agreement, Mr.
Chairman, with the distinguished speaker of the House when he
wrote in another context:
What people really mean when they say "the system is not working" is simply
that they are not getting their way.

The Congress is trying too hard to get its way.
Congressman John Marshall declared on the floor of the House
of Representatives at the beginning of the last century that "The
President is the sole organ of the Nation in its external relations."
The future Chief Justice of the United States spoke clearly then,
and his words should be equally clear today. Congress has the
power to declare war. It has the power to support, or to withdraw
support, from the Armed Forces of the United States.
The President is Commander in Chief, as laid out by the Constitution, and he is charged with defending the national security interests of the United States.
The War Powers Resolution was a legacy of the political turmoil
caused by the Vietnam war, a war in which I served and which I
still remember. But that war ended almost 15 years ago. It is time
to set the ship of state back on course, and to discard the War
Powers Act as a faded relic of that contentious era.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pressler.
Senator Simon.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SIMON
Senator SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased these
hearings are being held and I commend you for your leadership on
this.
Just a couple of observations. One is the constitutional provision
that we declare war is something that is probably never going to be
used again. The formal declaration of war in the world in which we
live is probably a thing of the past.
What can substitute for that in part is a genuine bipartisan foreign policy. Unfortunately, that has almost not existed in recent
years. I think that has been one of the deficiencies of this administration.
The War Powers Act seems to me to be the sensible provision to
provide restraint. But if the War Powers Act cannot be imposed,
for example, in the Persian Gulf situation, I do not know where we
will ever use the War Powers Act.
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It clearly ought to be applicable to that situation. And so I hope
out of these hearings we can fmd some mechanism that can provide the congressional restraint that was intended by those who
wrote the Constitution.
And let me just add, Mr. Chairman, I welcome our first two witnesses. I remember being on a trip with Senator Mathias. He was
reading a biography of Boswell. How many times have you been on
a trip where a Member of Congress has been reading a biography
of Boswell? He is a Jeffersonian-type, and we welcome him.
And Senator Eagleton of course has contributed also in a variety
of ways. I remember when we had the unfortunate duty to consider
an impeachment of a judge, and the best analysis by far was the
statement by Senator Eagleton summing up where we were.
He does lack, Mr. Chairman, a sense of humor. But other than
that, he has been an outstanding member in this body.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SARBANES
Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I will not speak to the substance of our hearings at this time, but
I simply want to underscore my delight in having two of our
former colleagues, Senator Eagleton and Senator Mathias, here
today to lead off our set of hearings.
I cannot imagine two better qualified people for us to hear from.
The Nation has benefited greatly by their very able and distinguished public service over the years, and in particular their incisive work in this specific area. I look forward to hearing their testimony.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
I would add here that this legislation that will be coming before
us is before our committee. For example, Senate Joint Resolution
323, which is the War Powers Resolution introduced by Senators
Byrd, Nunn, Warner, and Mitchell, and probably there will be
other thoughts that we will be considering as we move along.
I would like to apologize, incidentally, to our visitors because this
is going to be a rather sporadic, interrupted morning. We have a
vote at 10 o'clock and then we have a caucus for Governor Dukakis
at 11 :45. So, there will be some moving back and forth.
Congressman Broomfield has indicated he will not be able to be
with us, but his testimony will be included in the record in full.
And I would also say how much I, speaking as an individual,
have missed Senators Eagleton and Mathias, and how much less
agreeable a place the Senate is since their departure. And I only
wish they were still here.
Senator Eagleton, would you care to lead off!
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Our first panel consists of Prof. Edwin B. Firmage, University of
Utah, College of Law, in Salt Lake City, UT; Prof. Michael J. Glennon, University of California, Davis, Law School, Davis, CA; William Taylor Reveley III, Esquire, practicing attorney and author
from Richmond, VA; and Prof. Robert F. Turner, Associate Director, Center for Law and National Security, University of Virginia
Law School, Charlottesville, VA.
Gentlemen, welcome to you all.
Why don't we begin in the order that your names were called,
unless you all have decided there is a more rational way to proceed.
Professor, welcome.
STATEMENT OF EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, COLLEGE OF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, SALT LAKE CITY, UT

Mr. FiRMAGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me simply summarize very quickly a much longer paper in
six quick points.
Senator BIDEN. By the way, before we begin, I would like your
entire paper placed in the record.
Mr. FIRMAGE. Of course. Thank you very much.
The war power of Congress is complete. The war power of the
United States, in the sense of the decision for war or peace, is entirely in the Congress of the United States.
The sole exception to this is the power of the President to respond to sudden attack upon the United States.
The text makes this abundantly clear, the power to declare war
and grant letters of marque and reprisal.
The first century of our history bore out this interpretation.
There were exceptions, as Presidents exceeded the empowerment of
statutes of Congress, but never until Korea and Vietnam did you
have an effort to justify, under the Commander in Chief clause, a
separate base of power to decide for war.
The Commander in Chief clause in the original ur. . d~rstanding
simply made the President Congress' general. These were the
terms of Alexander Hamilton, a proponent of strong Presidential
power. He, nevertheless, saw the paradigm shift from a European
model of a monarchical power to decide for war to a congressional
power to decide for war or peace.
Thomas Jefferson, though not present at the Philadelphia convention, where the Constitution was struck, rejoiced at this change,
and he noted that they had gone a long way toward chaining the
"dog of war."
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The power over foreign relations, the matrix within which the
war power sits at the heart of congressional power, was clearly
meant to be collegially conducted and determined by the Congress
and the President. The treaty power, I think, as Louis Henkin demonstrated a decade ago, gives us this insight.
Unlike the present time, in the 18th century, foreign relations
would have been conducted dominantly through the treaty power,
and there, with the Sen.ate and the President joining together, we
see the original idea.
A relevant question, nevertheless, after any analysis of original
intent, is whether two centuries' experience and radical changes in
technology make that original understanding insufficient.
1 believe quite the contrary.
As one looks at ICBM technology and at the power of thermonuclear weapons, I see nothing so enticing in nuclear war as to encourage us to make war more easily accomplished, rather than
less.
I think, quite the contrary, that every restraint of law on Government and diplomacy should be placed upon the inclination to go
~ war that posaibly can be.
While one thinks, perhaps loosely without thinking it through,
that ICBM time of 15 minutes, or 20, or 25 minutes, might make a
quick decision absolutely necessary, when you stop and think about
the actual situations where nuclear weapons could possibly be
used, if, in fact, deterrence fails, what's the hurry?
If you think through the scenarios of the likely use, or first use,
particularly, of nuclear weapons, I see no reason to drop restraints
of the Congress of the United States upon a decision for war or
peace, but enormous reasons to do just precisely the opposite.
Beyond the question of the use of nuclear weapons, I would like
to address two more issues.
I believe that covert war has come to be the type of war of our
time. I would hope that in some manner the War Powers Resolution can be strengthened to cover covert war.
Two factors, I believe, combined to make covert war the form of
international violence of our time. First, the enormous power of
nuclear weapons, paradoxically, limited the likelihood that they
would ever be used. Second, a Manichaean world view-seeing the
world in an absolutist vision of good and evil-grew understandably out of our experience in World War II. In that war, far more
than in World War I, Vietnam, the Korean war, or the War of
1870, totalitarian dictatorships made war against nations at peace.
But it would be disastrous to adopt this black-and-white world view
as the paradigm rather than the exception. We emerged from
World War II, nevertheless, with the view that we were continuing
to fight against unadulterated evil, therefore excusing what ever
vicious means we chose to employ.
We have been so totally assured of our own righteousness and
yet deterred from all-out war in the model of World War II that we
have waged covert action, and done so, I think, with great harm to
others and to ourselves.
I think we have had short-term embarrassment and long-term
disaster consistently in our use of covert action and covert war.
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Congress is responsible for this form of war not one whit less
than for overt war. The term "grant letters of marque and reprisal" in the 18th century was a way of saying Congress has the total
war power, announced, declared or undeclared, public or private,
fought by the official forces of this country in uniform or by mercenaries, done by whatever means. If one wanted to make Francis
Drake, pirate, who was preying upon Spanish shipping and who
might be hanged as a criminal if caught, into Sir Francis Drake,
confidant of the Queen, empowered and authorized by the state,
one granted letters of marque and reprisal.
When we see mercenaries not authorized by the Congress of the
United States fighting war or committing acts of war, we see abuse
of the war power of Congress by the President.
Finally, how do we go about remedying these things?
I think the reality is that the view that the courts are the least
dangerous branch is most surely true here. They are the least dangerous and the least helpful. They have the least power.
I hope that there are ways, probably peripheral, that the courts
can come into play, and I have proposed this in my testimony. I
have slight hope, really, that the central issues will be resolved
there. The only other big guy on the block with the President of
the United States is the U.S. Congress, where the war power was
originally reposited and where it should remain.
I support the War Powers Resolution with great reluctance. I
think it is simply the least worst way we have practically available
now of going about things.
It assumes continued Presidential initiative in committing American troops into hostilities or situations where hostilities are likely,
and it assumes congressional subservience in this process, both in
reporting and consulting roles.
In the original understanding-and in my view, nothing has happened since then to change the wisdom of that understanding-we
should be speaking of congressional authorization, not consultation
and of censure or impeachment, not reporting, for Presidential violation of congressional power over the decision for peace or war.
I support strongly the War Powers Resolution but only because
practically I do not see at this present time how to restore congressional virtue that was lost, I think tragically, in Korea and Vietnam.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of l\lr. Firmage appears in the appendix.]
Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Professor.
Professor Glennon.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GLENNON, PROFESSOR OF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, LAW SCHOOL, DAVIS, CA

Mr. GLENNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by thanking the subcommittee for inviting me to be
here today.
I wish to note at the outset. that, although I serve as counsel to
the congressional plaintiffs in Lowry v. Reagan, the views that I ex-
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press here today do not necessarily represent those of my clients in
that case.
My remarks will be directed to the constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution and also to the Use of Force Act set forth in
Committee Print No. 1.
I understand that Committee Print No.1 is intended not as a
proposal but, rather, as a focal point for analysis. I believe that
each of its provisions is constitutional; but I am less convinced that
certain of those provisions are wise from a policy perspective. I
would thus suggest that primary consideration be devoted to policy
considerations in Committee Print No. 1.
In discussing issues of constitutionality, it seems appropriate to
begin with a comment upon the September 14 testimony of the
State Department Legal Adviser, Abraham Sofaer. In that testimony and in his answers to the chairman's written questions, Mr.
Sofaer launched a broad attack upon the congressional warmaking
power, referring throughout to "independent" power conferred
upon the President by the Constitution and reiterating the proposition, transposed in various forms, that independent Presidential
power is not subject to statutory limitation.
The observation is, of course, true and, indeed, truistic: What his
claim comes down to is that Congress cannot act unconstitutionally.
Yet, Mr. Sofaer repeatedly overlooks the fact that there is a
second category of Presidential power that is subject to congressional regulation: concurrent power. This is constitutional power
that may be exercised initially by the President in the face of congressional silence, but which Congress may, nonetheless, subsequently choose to restrict.
It is this class of power to which Justice Jackson referred in his
famous concurring opinion in the 1952 Steel Seizure case.
In that case, in which the Supreme Court struck down the seizure of the steel mills during the Korean war by President Harry
Truman, Jackson wrote: "Presidential powers are not fIxed, but
fluctuate, dependin? upon their disjunction or conjunction with
those of Congress.' He continued, "When the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon
his own constitutional powers, minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential
control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting
upon the subject."
The Supreme Court formally adopted Justice Jackson's mode of
analysis in Dames & Moore v. Regan, in which Justice William
Rehnquist applied Jackson's approach to uphold President Jimmy
Carter's Iranian hostage settlement agreement as having been authorized by Congress. In so doing, Rehnquist wrote that Jackson's
opinion "brings together as much combination of analysis and commonsense as there is in this area."
Rehnquist then quoted from Jackson a passage that, today, in
this context, is as significant as it is timely. He said: "The example
of such unlimited Executive power that must have most impressed
the Forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and
the description of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads
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me to doubt that they were creating their new Executive in his
image."
The War Powers Resolution, therefore, placed certain Presidential use of armed force in this third category of Justice Jackson's
analysis, where his power is at its lowest ebb. Under this analytical
approach, the time limits of the War Powers Resolution, as well as
the "prior restraints" set forth in the earlier Senate version, seem
clearly constitutional. The scope of the President's concurrent
power is a function of the concurrence or nonconcurrence of the
Congress; once Congress acts, its negative provides "the rule for the
case."
Mr. Sofaer ignores the learning of the Steel Seizure case, however, and can barely list the parade of horribles set to march by the
time limits: They interfere with the "successful completion" of the
President's initiative; they "may signal a divided nation, giving adversaries a basis for hoping that the President may be forced to
desist"; they provide "an undesirable occasion for interbranch or
partisan rivalry."
The curious thing about these arguments, Mr. Chairman, is that
every one of them is an argument not against the War Powers Resolution but against constitutional limitations on Presidential warmaking power. Every one of these arguments is an argument for
untrammeled Presidential discretion to use the Armed Forces
whenever, wherever, and for whatever purposes the President may
choose.
Indeed, on close analysis, it becomes clear that this is precisely
Mr. Sofaer's view: "Explicit legislative approval for particular uses
of force has never been necessary," he candidly said.
The President thus could have used armed force in World War I,
World War II, or Vietnam without any declaration of war or any
other legislative approval.
This view of warmaking power is, of course, not new. But it
should suffice to say at this point in our history that the divine
right of kings approach was ventilated and rejected in 1789, and I
see no point in reopening that debate today.
The constitutional theory underpinning the War Powers Resolution is different from that underpinning the Use of Force Act. The
War Powers Resolution confers no authority upon the President; as
section 8 makes clear, it merely places limits upon the use of authority that otherwise might lay unregulated.
The Use of Force Act, on the other hand, afTrrmatively delegates
power to the President to use armed force in certain specified instances. That distinction is critical. As early cases demonstrate,
where Congress delegates authority, limits imposed incident to that
delegation are constitutionally valid.
This important premise undergirds the approach of the Use of
Force Act.
Mr. Chairman, a number of proposed modifications of the War
Powers Resolution are before the subcommittee, ranging from the
Byrd-Nunn proposals and Committee Print No.1, to the De Fazio
approach to simple repeal.
I would simply say, in concluding, that none of these modifications of the Resolution will, in themselves, to quote the War
Powers Resolution, "erusure that the collective judgment of both
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the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of
U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities."
Fifteen years after the War Powers Resolution's enactment, it
has become clear that the Resolution's sponsors were naive to believe that any law could achieve that objective. The most that a
statute can do, however artfully drawn, is to facilitate the efforts of
individual Members of Congress to carry out their responsibilities
under the Constitution.
To do that requires understanding and it also requires courage.
It demands a insight into the delicacy with which our separated
powers are balanced and the fortitude to stand up to those who
would equate criticism with lack of patriotism.
For a Congress comprised of such Members, no War Powers Resolution would be necessary. For a Congress without them, no War
Powers Resolution will be sufficient.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Glennon appears in the appendix.]
Senator BIDEN . Thank you.
Professor Turner.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT F. TURNER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,
CENTER FOR LA\V AND NATIONAL SECURITY, UNIVERSITY OF
VIRGINIA LAW SCHOOL, CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is a great pleasure to be back here. I spent 5 years sitting on
the other side of your bench, in the back row, when I was working
for a member of the committee. It is good to see the committee is
still as active and as effective as it was in the old days.
Senator BIDEN. Which is easier?
Mr. TURNER. Ask me that in 10 minutes.
Senator BIDEN. All right.
[General laughter.]
Mr. TURNER. I have a rather lengthy statement that-Senator BIDEN. Excuse me. Would you start the clock for this
witness again.
.
Professor Glennon has been here so often and back here, too,
that he didn't even use his 10 minutes, which means he didn't
learn any of the lessons Senators taught hinl.
Mr. TURNER. How long a warning is there?
Senator BIDEN. We always go over 10 minutes.
Mr. TURNER. How long a warning do we have on the yellow
light?
Senator BIDEN. I think it is 1 minute and then your seat is ejected.
[General laughter.]
Mr. TuRNER. I was wondering. I thought the device beneath the
lights might be some sort of laser weapon.
I have a rather lengthy statement, Mr. Chairman, which I would
like to submit for the record.
Senator BIDEN. The entire statement will be placed in the record.
Also, I ask unanimous consent--that Professor Glennon's statement be placed in the record.
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Mr. TURNER. I would also like to emphasize that the views I express this morning are my own and not those of the University of
Virginia, the Center for Law and National Security, the ABA or
any other group with which I am associated.
This is a very important issue, and I am determined to be as
candid and as honest as I can with the committee.
It is appropriate to notethat we meet here today on the 50th anniversary of the opening of the 1938 Munich Conference; because,
in my view, the War Powers Resolution stems from the same intellectual tradition which led Neville Chamberlain to think he could
promote "peace for our time" by appeasing aggression, and which
led Senator Nye and other isolationists during the same era to pass
statute after statute, tying the President's hands, in an effort to
legislate peace.
In the interest of time, I would like to focus primarily on the separation of powers issue. I want to help you "break the code" on
how the Founding Fathers sought to separate powers between the
President and the Congress.
Before doing that, I would like to make a few brief statements
that are discussed at great length in my prepared testimony, which
might provide the subject for discussion during the question-andanswer period.
First of all, as I testified last month at length in the House, the
Congress was a full partner in getting the United States involved
in Vietnam. The suggestion that it was not is not in my view unsupportable. I believe, in essence, the War Powers Resolution was a
political fraud aimed at persuading the American people that Congress had had no role in that unpopular war.
Among the things which lead me to this conclusion are, first of
all, the Senate, in 1955, consented to the ratification, with only one
dissenting vote, of the SEATO Treaty. It created a legal obligation
for the United States to go to the defense of certain countries in
Southeast Asia that were victims of aggression, in response to their
request, and, of course, acting pursuant to our constitutional process.
In carrying out those constitutional process in August 1964, by a
vote of 416 to 0 in the House and 88 to 2 in the Senate, Congress
enacted statutory authorization empowering the President to use
armed force in Indochina.
Senator Javits said that this made Congress a full partner in the
commitment. During the debate prior to passage, a colloquy took
place between the chairman and ranking minority member of this
committee, in which Senator John Sherman Cooper said that
"Looking ahead, Mr. Chairman, if the President determined it
were necessary to use such force as could lead into war, we will be
giving that authority by this Resolution."
Chairman Fulbright responded, "That is the way I would interpret it."
Later, in 1970, Senator Sam Ervin, a very distinguished constitutional scholar, said that in his view, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
represented "a declaration of war in a constitutional sense."
In 1967, when this committee issued its report on the national
commitments resolution, it stressed that such resolutions as the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution were "a full alternative to a declaration
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of war and were an appropriate means of Congress giving authority
for hostilities."
Section 2(cX2) of the War Powers Resolution expressly recognizes
the legality of the Commander in Chief using armed forces pursuant to "specific statutory authority." That's exactly the situation
we had in Vietnam.
Before the public turned against the war, Congress, for several
years, appropriated tens of billions of dollars for the war, often by
90 percent or greater majorities. During the month surrounding
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, President Johnson's popul8.l-ity shot
up not 30 percent, but 30 points-30 percentage points-an inc~
ble increase, all attributed to the popularity of the Vietnam war in
the early days.
My second conclusion is that Congress, in reacting to the implementation of the legislation, has been guided by political expedient
rather than constitutional principle.
Let me illustrate by mentioning just three examples. When
President Ford rescued the crew of the Mayaguez, he violated article 2(cXC) and article 3 of the Resolution-not to mention the
Cooper-Church amendment, which prohibited spending funds to
send combat troops into that region. And yet, this committee
passed a unanimous resolution praising his action and saying it
was in full compliance with the War Powers Resolution.
In contrast, when President Carter tried to rescue endangered
American citizens in Iran, under very similar circumstances-but
in the absence of a statutory prohibition against sending troops
into the area-the chairman and ranking minority member of this
committee denounced his action as being in violation of the War
Powers Resolution.
To me, the only clear distinction is that the public supported the
successful Ford operation; they opposed the unsuccessful Carter operation.
Grenada is even a clearer example, because people like House
Speaker Tip O'Neill stood up immediately and denounced the
President upon learning of the operation. The House Foreign Mfairs Committee called a hearing to investigate the legal aspects.
Later that afternoon, students landed at the airport, kissed the
ground, and praised Ronald Reagan. The polls that came in overnight showed better than a 90-percent support for the operation,
both within the United States and among the people of Grenada.
House Speaker O'Neill announced that he had "reconsidered" the
operation and had decided the President was fully justified. The
House Foreign Affairs Committee decided to "postpone" their hearing on the legal issues, and those hearings still have not been rescheduled.
In essence, what Members of Congress have been doing is using
the War Powers Resolution as cover. If there is a crisis, if there is a
risk of the use of force, they shout "Fire" and run to the hills.
If the President, with the adversary knowing the country is divided, nevertheless succeeds, they come down from the hills, pick
up a flag, and walk in the victory parade-saying that of course
they supported the President from the begitming. If there is a failure, as occurred in Iran and Beirut, they solemnly come down from
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the hills, charge that the President "broke the law," and then
shoot the wounded.
These divisive congressional debates have done a great deal to increase the likelihood of war and to harm the cause of peace.
Today, the Nobel Prize Committee awarded the 1988 Nobel Peace
Prize to U.N. peacekeeping forces. The United States, in 1982 and
1983, tried to participate in a very similar peacekeeping effort in
Lebanon. By no strain of the imagination could it be said that
sending American Marines to Beirut as part of an international
peacekeeping force-at the request of all the governments in the
area-constituted either an act of war or an infringement upon the
power of the Congress to declare war. And yet, I think in large part
because of the divisive debates in the Senate, President Assad of
Syria concluded the Americans were "short of breath."
Right after the Senate debate, less than a week before the bombing of the Marines, the American press quoted intelligence accounts of intercepted Moslem militia messages that said, and I
quote, "If we kill 15 Marines, the rest will leave."
A few days later, terrorists killed 241 Marin~ I believe the U.S.
Congress, and especially the Senate, deserves a great deal of ;:-esponsihility for that tragedy.
In essence, by passing a War Powers Resolution that says any
time a terrorist anywhere in the world takes a shot at an American soldier, that will start a clock and the President will have to
withdraw all U.S. forces within 60 or 90 days, you have surrendered the initiative to the terrorist-and in the process you have
placed a bounty on the lives of American servicemen.
Mr. Chairman, my final conclusion is suggested by the title of
my paper, "Restoring the Rule of Law: Reflections 011 the War
Powers Resolution at Fifteen."
Although some of you may not believe it, Congress can violate
the law. Each of you took an oath of office to support the Constitution, and when -you pass a law that seeks to take away from the
President part of the Commander in Chief power vested in him by
the American people through the Constitution-the essence of
which is the control of t.} ~- deployment of armed forces-you are
violating the law.
Let me turn briefly to the question of "breaking the code" of separation of powers.
There is a theory today that perhaps the F'ounding Fathers
didn't really think ah{. . t~t separation of powers, or perhaps they
couldn't decide how tv dtvide them, so they decided to just leave
the two .parties to struggle. That is not in my view an accurate account of what happened.
To really .understand what the Founding Fathers intended, first
of' all; y?u have to understand the views of John Locke, Mqntesquieu, ;;uld Blackston~the primary theorists who influenced the
, constitutional -Framers on separation of pwers matters.
They all argued that legislative bodies were not competent to
-handle · foreign afthlrs because battles would quickly change,
'princes would die, and it was necessary to be able to act with
speed, dispatch, and secrecy-and for a variety of other reasons
having to do with the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the
two political branches.
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Locke used the term "federative power" to refer to the power of
controlling "leagues and alliances, war, peace, and all transactions
with all persons and communities without the commonwealth."
But he said the federative power required the same attributes for
its execution as the power to execute the municipal laws passed by
the legislative branch and, thus, both should be placed in the same
hands.
Montesquieu distinguished between "the Executive in respect of
things dependent upon the laws of nations" and "the Executive in
regard to matters that depend upon civil law."
One you understand the 1787 meaning of "Executive power," you
understand why, when the Founding Fathers in article 2, section 1,
vested "the Executive power" in the President, as Quincy Wright
said in his classic 1922 study, "The Control of American Foreign
Relations," and I quote, "When the Constitutional Convention gave
Executive power to the President, the foreign relations power was
the essential element of the grant."
I would like to close with just two other quotat.i.ons to show that
both Jefferson and Hamilton, two arch rivals in tne initial Government, strongly agreed on this subject.
Jefferson, in 1790, said, "The transaction of business with foreign
nations is executive altogether. It belongs, then. to the head of that
department, except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted to the Senate. The exceptions are to be construed strictly." The
same theme of exceptions to Executive power being construed
strictly was picked up by Madison.
If I might conclude with an almost identical statement 3 years
later by Alexander Hamilton, he wrote in his first "Pacificus"
letter, "It deserves to be remarked that, as the participation of the
Senate in the making of treaties and the power of the Legislature
to declare war are exceptions out of the general 'Executive Power'
vested in the President, they are to be construed strictly and ought
to be extended no further than is essential to their execution."
So, what I am suggesting is that the Founding Fathers vested in
Congress a power of veto-a n~gative-over a decision by the President to launch a war, an offensive war, the kind of war for which a
formnl declaration would historically be associated. Short of that,
the deployment of military forces, the entire question of what vie
do with our military and also how we fight wars either authorized
by Congress or initiated by a foreign government, is left entirely to
the discretion of the President under the Constitution.
The War Powers Resolution conflicts with this theory.
Senator BIDEN. Excuse me. I want you to keep going, but I want
to make sure that I heard you correctly.
Did you say the Constitution vests in the Congress a veto power?
Is that what you said?
Mr. TURNER. I used the term "veto," or "negative" which is exactly the term that Jefferson used.
Senator BIDEN. I understand. I just want to make sure that I
heard what you said. It's a veto power.
Mr. TuRNER. Yes, OVPl" a decision by the President to launch an
offensive war.
The classic case of the proper congressional role occurred under
Andrew Jackson, when the President decided he wanted to launch
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a war against France because the French had not made good on
their promise to repay certain debts owed to the United States
from Napoleon's seizure of American merchant ships. Jackson
went to the Congress and said in essence "I'm going to send the
Navy over there and chastise the French and they will pay their
debts." But Henry Clay, the chairman of this committee, said "No
you're not," for a variety of reasons, and Congress blocked the
President.
That was exactly the kind of adventuristic Executive initiative
that the Founding Fathers were trying to guard against by the
"declaration of war" clause.
It is a very important clause. But the critical point I am making
is that that clause was not violated in Vietnam. The constitutional
system was not broken. What happened in Vietnam was that Congress, after initially strongly supporting the war-and, indeed,
many of the people who pushed the War Powers Resolution in 1973
had in the early 1960's denounced President Kennedy and President Johnson for not doing more, for not sending combat troops to
Vietnam. A classic example was Representative Paul Findley.
At any rate, my bottomline is that the War Powers Resolution
was a fraud. It exceeds the constitutional powers of the Congress. I '
strongly believe that it should be repealed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner appears in the appendix.]
Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Reveley, please pro" ceed.
STATEMENT OF W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, ESQUIRE, PRACTICING
ATTORNEY AND AUTHOR, RICHMOND, VA

Mr. REVELEY. I have a long statement that I would appreciate
being included in the record.
Senator BIDEN. It will be.
Mr. REVELEY. I will orally cover only the first 5 pages of it.
The theme of my remarks, Mr. Chairman, is let's be practical.
In my judgment, the country does need war powers legislation.
We need it to help solve the severe, debilitating war powers problem that afflicts us.
The problem is not that the President is deliberately, wickedly,
usurping ancient congressional prerogatives over war and peace.
Nor is the problem that Congress is deliberately, wickedly, invading hereditary powers of the President over the use of force.
The problem is that the country lacks a constitutional consensus
about the process by which the President and Congress are to
share authority over American decisions to use force.
We continue to bicker over which branch gets to decide what and
when. This bickering occurs at profound cost to the country. Four
sorts of harm come quickly to mind.
First, the bickering poisons relations between the President and
Congress. To be accused of constitutional usurpation is simply no
fun. It engenders anger, fear, defensiveness, countercharges.
Constitutional theologians from both sides, the President's and
Congress', insist with passion of truly religious intensity that their
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view of the Constitution is the "only true view," that all others are
heresy.
The fate of heretics in the hands of the righteous is well-known.
Second, the bickering undermines public confidence in the rule
of law and in the legitimacy of both the President and Congress.
The political branches of Government cannot go on year after
year accusing one another of illegality in one of the most sensitive
areas of American life, war and peace, without seriously eroding
the faith of the people in both of these branches of Government.
Third, the bickering prevents focused attention to policy; that is,
focused inquiry into what the United States ought to do about particular foreign and military situations, what our realistic alternatives are for dealing with them, what the costs and benefits of
these alternatives are, and which alternatives we ought to pursue
to maximize our national interest.
Rather than focusing on these policy issues, the debate all too
often focuses on process issues, on which branch is constitutionally
entitled to decide what and when. Focused attention on whether
the United States ought in the national interest to commit troops
abroad is sacrificed to bickering over the precise way in which the
President and Congress are to make whatever decision is ultimately to be made.
Fourth and finally, the bickering denies American war and peace
decisions the wisdom and the staying power that can come only
from having both the President and Congress meaningfully involved in our decisions to use force. It is unavoidable that the Constitution divides the war powers between the two branches. Thus, it
is inescapable that for American foreign and military policy to
work, the two branches must cooperate in the exercise of their
overlapping prerogatives.
But wait, some people say, these sorts of harms occur not because we lack a constitutional consensus on process but simply because the country lacks a current consensus on policy. We had a
policy consensus from the end of World War II to sometime in the
mid-1960's, they say, but now we've lost it and that's the problem.
Well, of course, when people can easily agree on what policy to
adopt-whether these people are spouses dealing with one another,
parents and children, university faculties and administrators, corporate officers and directors, litigants, voters, or Presidents and
Congresses-when consensus on policy does exist, then little attention is paid to the nature of the decisionmaking process.
But how often do people agree easily about difficult and important issues? History suggests not all that often, and the more difficult it is to get agreement on policy, the more important it becomes
to have agreement on process.
There are two reasons. First, when people agree on how a decision should be made-that is, when they accept that a particular
person or group is entitled to make a particular sort of decisionthen they are far more likely to accept the decision that is ultimately made, even if they disagree with it as a matter of policy,
than they are likely to accept such a decision if they believe it was
made by people not authorized to decide.
Every day, in countless contexts, people accept and support decisions whether they like them or not because the decisions have
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been made by a process that people thought was legitimate. In
other words, agreement on process helps produce agreement on
policy.
When we disagree over both process and policy-over who gets to
decide as well as over what the decision ought to be-a two-front
struggle results, with dismal effect for focused inquiry into what
we ought to do in the national interest. Sound policy suffers.
In short, process matters. We badly need a constitutional consensus on how the President and Congress are to go about making war
and peace decisions.
To reach at least minimal agreement on process, all the crucial
constitutional threads must be drawn together. The President's
constitutional theologians must stop ignoring the fact that the language of tbe Constitution and its Framers' and Ratifiers' purposes
create an enduring role for Congress in American decisions to use
force.
At the same time, Congress' constitutional theologians must stop
ignoring 200 years of practice under the Constitution. From George
Washington's administration to date, practice also has been central
to this country's constitutional journey. War powers practice indicates that, when Congress has provided the necessary tools to the
President-men, money, and materiel, for instance-and when
Congress has not previously banned a particular use of force, then
the President may begin it on his own initiative. Two hundred
years of practice make that clear.
It is essential that we weave these threads together in war
powers legislation.
We might just as well howl into the wind as try to put into place
. a process that ignores either the country's deep rooted constitutional expectation of congressional involvement on the one hand, or
the country's equally deeprooted constitutional expectation of Presidential initiative on the other.
Both expectations must be met if we are to develop a war powers
process that actually works.
For now, we should focus on the irreducible constitutional minimum, on the "nothing less" bedrock that must exist if Congress is
to be involved consistently in decisions about the use of force and if
the President is to retain the initiative that practice has given him
and that he will exercise, in light of the hazard, pace, and complexity of foreign and military affairs and his greater capability than
Congress, to deal quickly and quietly with these affairs.
What is the irreducible minimum? In my view, it is this:
First, means to encourage the President and Congress to consult
meaningfully together before and during moments of truth;
Second, recognition that, informed by this consultation, the
President may act alone if he thinks it in the national interest, for
instance, because he believes speed or secrecy is crucial to U.S. success; and
Third, recognition that, when the President alone does initiate
the use of force, it thereafter is for Congress to approve, disapprove, or limit the use if Congress chooses to act.
The irreducible minimum does not include time limits within
which Congress must act either to approve, or be deemed to have
disapproved, Presidential initiatives. It is far from clear that disap-
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proval by inaction is constitutional; an.d it is quite clear that the
President, all Presidents, will resist such a concept relentlessly and
that Congress will rarely try to enforce it. Time limits won't work
in the real world.
Is disapproval by concurrent resolution part of the irreducible
constitutional minimum? In my opinion, it can go either way. After
Chadha, Presidents will also probably resist relentlessly the concept that concurrent resolutions can constitutionally curb their initiatives.
But, as a practical matter, if the President commits troops who
remain in the field a week, 2 weeks, 3 weeks, 2 months after their
initial commitment, and Congress, by majority vote in both Houses,
acts to limit or end the use of force, it is most unlikely that the
President will simply disregard such an expression of congressional
will. If he did, Congress has remedies, easy remedies-for instance,
the power of the purse.
In sum, the War Powers Resolution, as passed in 1973, has not
succeeded. It needs to be reduced to its most basic and workable
elements. These elements, together, can lead the way to the constitutional consensus we so desperately lack. The consensus would involve less than either Presidential or congressional theologians
insist is their branch's constitutional due. But the consensus would
work.
One final note.
Some people say, if war powers legislation is to be so reduced,
why bother to have it? Better to kill the 1973 resolution outright
and thereby vindicate the Presidential view of the Constitution; or
better to beef up the Resolution to require Congress' prior approval
for any use of force, except for a few specified sorts, and, thereby,
enshrine the congressional view of the Constitution. And, anyway,
the irreducible minimum just described already exists. The President and Congress do not need a War Powers Resolution in order
to consult one another. The President has been acting alone and
reporting to Congress from time to time without such legislation,
and Congress can already act before or during Presidential initiatives to block, limit, or end them in a variety of ways.
True, but simply because most of us could exercise daily, eat
sparingly and otherwise see to our bodies does not mean that most
of us do it. V!e are more likely to do it when pushed by an actionforcing regimen.
The War Powers Resolution is an action-forcing regimen for both
the President and Congress. It hasn't worked well so far because it
carries too much baggage, such as sections 2(c) and 5(b).
Stripped to its irreducible minimum, however, the Resolution
just might bring the President and CongTess to engage one another
constructively on questions of war and peace-to consult, let the
President act first if he feels so compelled, but then force the President to report and let Congress act second to approve or disapprove
his initiative, if it feels so compelled.
To repeal the War Powers Resolution, leave it as it is, or amend
it to impose more restraints on the President would do nothing for
constitutional consensus. Repealed, the Resolution would greatly
disappoint expectations that Congress must play a sustained, meaningful role in use of force decisions. Left as it is, the Resolution
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would continue to work so fecklessly as to suggest that consistent
collaboration between the two branches on the use of force is hopeless. Amended to try to restrain further the President, the Resolution would surely be ignored by just about everyone.
Cut to its irreducible minimum, however, the Resolution could
lead us to constitutional consensus.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reveley appears in-the appendix.]
Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.
We thank all of you for very concise and well-reasoned statements, close to within the time limit.
I have a number of questions. But let me begin in a slightly unorthodox way.
Would any of you like to raise questions about anything any of
your colleagues have said?
Mr. FIRMAGE. I have two points in regard to comments that have
been made regarding Vietnam and foreign policy generally.
The point of Vietnam that was so disastrous is' not that Congress
didn't have an input into the decision, much to its regret, I believe.
I think the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was, in effect, an unconstitutional attempt to delegate the warmaking power of Congress to the
President.
I think that the Congress may well have been deliberately misled
by the President in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, too.
Nevertheless, I agree with my colleagues that Congress had an
input in that decision to go to war. The problem that is even more
disastrous than the disaster of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution itself is
that Presidents made an argument that they didn't need it
anyway, that, through the Commander in Chief clause, the President had the power to go to war and Congress could "go fIsh."
That argument, following the same argument from Korea, is,
what I think, represents a vast difference from the past.
Of course we have had a checkered history. Of course Presidents
have exceeded power given them. They have done things that perhaps they should not have done, and exigencies will arise when a
President perhaps should cross a constitutional line, to be later,
retrospectively, saved by Congress.
But what is very dangerous is an argument that the President
has the power, under the Commander in Chief clause, to ignore
any need of authorization from Congress and decide for war or
peace. That does not have precedent in the past and it has no text
to support it, either.
In regard to power over foreign relations, no doubt the transaction of foreign business is to be done by the President, as John
Marshall noted before Congress. John Marshall speaking before the
House of Representatives in defense of a controversial action taken
by President John Adams, fIrSt described the President as "The
sole organ of the Nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." What Mr. Marshall meant, of
course, was that the President is our singular voice in the conduct
of foreign relations-see Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage,
"To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History
and Law" 181, 1986. But the determination of that foreign policy
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and the author$tion of that policy, as well as the funding of that
policy, is in the congressional bailiwick. There, I think, along with
the general intent that we see from the treaty power, that foreign
policy be conducted collegially, places Congress squarely in the role
of determining the nature of, and then authorizing our foreign
policy. This power collegially to help determine the content of our
foreign policy is a separate empowerment of Congress, expressed in
a multitude of constitutional texts, apart from the congressional
power exclusively to decide for war or peace, absent a sudden
attack upon this country.
Senator BIDEN. Would anyone else like to make a comment.?
Mr. TURNER. I could easily go on for 20 minutes, Mr. Chairman,
but I will not. I will make just one point.
.
Professor Glennon, an old colleague from our years with the committee, made reference to the Steel Seizure case. It is very common
for people analyzing the separation of powers issue to do that. I
think it is an error, however, with respect to foreign affairs.
I would note that Prof. Louis Henkin, who testified here recently, I understand-though I have not seen his testimony-notes in
his book, "Foreign Affairs and the Constitution," that the Steel Seizure case is not generally viewed as a foreign relations case. In the
case of Goldwater v. Carter in 1979, four members of the Supreme
Court, including the current and immediate past Chief Justices,
distinguished that case from Steel Seizure, arguing that-unlike
Goldwater and Curtiss- Wright- Steel Seizure was not a foreign affairs case. And, if you read both Justice Black's majority opinion
and the famous Jackson concurring opinion in }Toungstown-which,
at the time, of course, was joined by not one other member-they
both stressed that at issue in Steel Seizure was a President who,
although he made reference to his Commander in Chief power, was
trying to seize privately owned steel mills. Under the fifth amendment, the President is not empowered to seize privately owned
property of U.S. citizens for any purpose without due process of
law, and certainly the Commander in Chief power has to be exercised pursuant to all of the other constraints in the Constitution.
So, I would argue that relying upon the language in the Steel
Seizure case is a serious error in · trying to understand foreign affairs powers; because, in that case, the President was not exercising
his Executive power of general control over foreign relations; but,
rather, he was infringing upon the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens.
Senator BIDEN. I assume, Professor Glennon, that you would like
to say something.
Mr. GLENNON. Mr. Chairman, I think that Mr. Turner's theory
concerning the irrelevance of the Steel Seizure case is belied by the
facts of the Steel Seizure case, the analysis of the Court in the Steel
Seizure case, and the subsequent analysis of the Supreme Court in
Dames & Moore v. Regan.
In the Steel Seizure case, President Truman argued that seizure
of the · steel mills was permitted under his independent power as
Commander in Chief because of the indispensibility of steel as an
element in the war effort to prosecute the war in Korea.
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The Supreme Court held that that was not so; that his independent power as Commander in Chief did not support the seizure of
the steel mills.
In 1981, the issue of the validity of the Iranian hostage settlement agreement confronted the Supreme Court, and the Court had
to decide what analytical framework was to be applied to resolve
that dispute. Justice Rehnquist wrote, in speaking for a majority of
the Court, that the analysis of Jackson in the Steel Seizure case
"brings together as much combination of analysis and commonsense as there is in this area." He proceeded to apply the analysis
of the Steel Seizure case to resolve the validity of this international
agreement.
•
Mr. Turner might be right, but I would be inclined to agree with
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Mr. TuRNER. This is very important, so let me try to be precise.
I think in both the Iran Claims case and in the Steel Seizure case
the facts involved the property rights of individual American citizens. They were in that respect essentially domestic disputes. All
powers of the Constitution have to be exercised consistent with all
of the constraints of the Constitution.
If the President decided that he was angry at Canada, and
wanted to send the Army up td launch an invasion of CanadR over
some economic or political grievance, before he could do that-and
in this case, I might disagree with my dear friend, Taylor Reveley;
what Taylor said was ambiguous-but if he meant to say that the
President could essentially launch a war if he felt it were an emergency and then to go Congress, I would disagree.
I think the President can only launch a war, the kind of war
with which declarations of war have historically been associatedwhich excludes a defensive war-after he has to come to Congress
and obtained approval from both Houses.
But short of that, in Justice Jackson's opinion-Senator BIDEN. Let me stop you there.
How about if the President of the United States concluded that
he wished to send troops into Mexico because he believed that,
absent doing so, the Communist Sandinistas would take control of
Mexico City? Would he be able to do that without the consent of
Congress?
Mr. TURNER. I would argue that if the Government of Mexico
asked him to come in, he might well be able to do it, but-Senator BIDEN. Without Congress' approval?
Mr. TURNER. Well, it depends upon the specific circumstances.
If he is going in for the purpose of engaging in war or in sustained hostilities, I would argue that he should: ideally, come to
Congress first. But there are some 'c ases where, for example, under
a treaty, I can make an argument that the President-let's say if
the Soviets invaded Germany tomorrow-I could make you a constitutional case that the President could respond to that immediately, even ignoring the fact that \ve've got tripwire troops there
that he would also be permitted to protect.
But, my own judgment is, which is in part based on constitutional and in part political consideration, that he ought to get the approval of Congress as quickly as possible, if not in advance.
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Senator BIDEN. Professor Turner, I think there is no one who
would disagree that it would be better if the President and the
Congress agreed. But the key question is, If the President concludes
that he needs to project U.S. forces into an area where any reasonable person woulds-expect that there would be a resistance to those
forces being placed there, does he need congressional approval to
do that.
.
Mr. TURNER. I would argue in general "No," but in some specific
cases, he might.
The reality is that many decisions of how the military forces of
the country are deployed during peacetime run the risk of another
country getting angry and attacking or declaring war against us.
The question of whether the President may use the Navy to
convoy merchant ships first came up in 1798, when Congress was
passing a law in the House that had a provision "authorizing" the
President to use the Navy to convoy ships. Speaker of the House
John Dayton, the youngest man to sign the Constitution, said "We
can't have this clause in here because the President already has
the authority to use the Navy to convoy ships, and to put this language in the bill might someday be viewed as a precedent to argue
that he did not get that power from the Constitution."
Now, what you are suggesting-deploying the ,Army into a foreign country against that Government's will-the only justification
for that would be if the President could argue it were necessary for
a real defensive purpose; for example, if that country had seized
American civilians.
Senator BmEN. Take Nicaragua.
Mr. TURNER. First let's take Iran and Mayaguez.
I think the President had the right to send United States forces
into Iran and into Cambodian territory to rescue endangered
Americans without congressional authorization.
Nicaragua is a more difficult case. The Congress itself has found,
by law, that Nicaragua is engaged in a flagrant violation of the
rules of international law contained in article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, article 18 of the OAS Charter, and other legal instruments. They have clearly been engaged in armed aggression
against their neighbors, and the United States does have some
treaty commitments to assist victims of armed aggression in the
region.
My preference would be for the President to come to the Congress if he felt we should use armed force against Nicaragua.
Senator BIDEN. I understand your preference. But I am trying to
establish clearly what the issue here is. I was here when we passed
the War Powers Resolution, and we all have varying opinions on
why we p~ it. But rather than go back and argue why we did,
our task now is to determine whether to keep it, throw it out, put
in a new vehicle, or amend the existing vehicle.
So, let's not argue about Vietnam. and what got us where we are
today. Weare revisiting this now in a different atmosphere.
The real issue up here is that many of us in Congress are . coneemled that any President, Democrat or Republican, will, under a
- stated authority, the Commander in Chief clause, decide to cOlnmit
U.s. forces into a situation that establishes a substantially neV'7 fore·
policYeF,w ithout any participation by the Congress. The concern
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is that the President, essentially by the projection of forces, can
make new policy. And, in the nuclear age and given the complexity
of the world, those hostilities could quickly widen with potentially
dire consequences.
We are not worried about 1898 or in 1798.
The stakes were not as high then.
But if a President sends forces into a half dozen regions of the
world, it has the potential to produce a showdown between the
Soviet Union and the United States of America. Any showdown between the Soviet Union and the United States of America has the
potential for nuclear annihilation.
So, that is one important and practical reason why everybody is
either arguing the President should have the authority to act unilaterally or should not. But the issue also applies to situations
where the scope of hostilities would in all probablity remain limited but where there are fundamental issues of policy involved. For
example absent the existence of an emergency which involves
clearly visible U.S. interests relating to American military personnel or American citizenry abroad, does the President without consulting Congress have the constitutional authority to say tomorrow
"Because I believe that the Sandinistas are a destabilizing threat to
the Western Hemisphere, 75,000 American troops have invaded
Nicaragua for the purpose of restoring democracy and stabilizing
the hemisphere." Does the President have the authority to do that?
Mr. TURNER. The answer depends upon the specific factual circumstances, Senator, but the Nicaraguan case is obviously the one
you have in mind. But let's look at it more broadly.
Senator BIDEN. No, no. Let's look at that one. If you don't have
an answer to that one, let's pass.
Mr. TURNER. Let me have just a moment.
As Commander in Chief, the President has the power to deploy
the military forces of the country anywhere he deems necessary
short of engaging in \\Tar, and if that includes sending them where
another country may be tempted to launch a war against us, that
power has ooen conveyed to him.
Senator BIDEN. If, in fact, that country would resist, is that
launching against us?
.
Mr. TURNER. I'm not talking about invading countries.
If he goes into a country at the request of the government, as in
Beirut-many of you all complained, if you remember, that he was
infringing the prerogatives-Senator BIDEN. I understand all that. I'm trying to deal with
your expertise here.
.
Mr. TURNER. The strongest legal case in which a President could
order U.S. forces to invade another country would be if he could
justify the action as defensive-for example, in response to armed
aggression against this country, its citizens, or arguably an ally.
For example, if Nicaragua continued its aggression against EI Salvador-again, it is the kind of situation he ought to come to Congress on, but I am not prepared to say that under no circumstances
could the President legally use force against Nicaragua.
On the other side, if I were talking to Abe Sofaer, I would strongly urge him before advising the President that it was legal to
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commit American forces to invade Nicaragua, to advise that he go
to Congress and get affirmative authorization.
I agree with Hamilton. In a case, the consequences of which
could involve war, the President ought to exercise no doubtful authority. But, in particular, if you have a regional treaty, if you
have a clear case of armed aggression by one party against others,
certainly the President ought to be able to "rattle the saber" if you
will, as a means of trying to deter agression and restore peace.
Whether or not he can go further than that, I think the best
answer to that question is a political one, and that is he ought to
come to Congress and get your approval-as occurred in Vietnam. I
don't want to say as a matter of law that he can't do it.
Senator BIDEN. I have one last question for you and then I will
let all of the panelists comment on both of these and I 'Hill let my
colleague interject.
If we don't satisfactorily negotiate a base agreement with the
Philippines, can the President say-without the authority of Congress-"Mrs. Aquino, tough luck, we're staying, we're moving in,
we're going back to the old days"?
I'm serious. Can the President do that, because those are clearly
the most important bases in the entire Pacific Basin and critical
for American security interests. If the Filipinos say "Get out," can
the President say "No way, we're staying, I don't care what the
Congress says, and, by the way, we're moving into Manila';?
Mr. TURNER. I would say "No."
Senator BIDEN. OK.
Now, would you like to comment?
Senator ADAMS. I wanted to ask a question on this.
Senator BIDEN. As long as you don't take them off this area.
Senator ADAMS. No. I want to stay on this question.
You mentioned that if we have a treaty or a series of treaty commitments and one of the parties to that feels threatened-the example used by the chairman. Are you stating that the President
can invade another country that threatens one of the signatory
countries to those treaties, and commit our Armed Forces to war
without a declaration of war?
Can we do it? This is a practical question. Could we invade Nicaragua based on the fact that we felt that Nicaragua was invading
EI Salvador?
Mr. TURNER. This is extremely important and I don't want to
mislead you. Let me give you a couple of examples.
Senator ADAMS. No. Could we first, Mr. Turner. Then give me examples.
Mr. TuRNER. But it is such a complex area-Senator ADAMS. No, it's not complex. It could happen tomorrow.
I mean, we have the situation and we want to know what the
power is of the President.
We have had people up here say that the President can do anything in committing troops. We have had some testify that no, if
there is an offensive war and you go into somebody else's territory,
you're sending troops, and that probably requires a declaration of
war.
Mr. TuRNER. I agree it requires prior congressional authorization.
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Senator ADAMS. I think I have heard you say that if there is
some kind of treaty and we are indirectly threatened, the President
can move troops in and can attack. The chairman used the example of 75,000 troops into Nicaragua if there were a Nica!'aguan incursion or attack on EI Salvador.
Can he do that without a declaration of war?
Mr. TURNER. I would want to look very carefully again at the Rio
Treaty before making such an argument-but it is theoretically
possible.
The basic argument would be that if the treaty makes an attack
on a treaty partner an attack on the United States as a matter of
law, since treaties are part of the supreme law of the land and the
President is required by the Constitution to faithfully execute the
law of the land, and the President, as Commander in Chief, is authorized to act defensively to an attack on the United States, he
could in such circumstances act without further authority.
Senator ADAMS. Wait a minute. You also have a law of the land,
which is ignored, in the War Powers Resolution. It says that the
President should be doing certain things, and certainly most scholars have said that these cover offensive land actions. And those offensive land actions can be categorized that we will go ahead.
You forget, I think, one portion of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
I came to Congress just after it. I was here during the time of enactment of the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution was in part a result of the invasion of Cambodia by President
Nixon which meant that it fit the dermition that some of the scholars have given. Some scholars have said that the only time you declare war is when you are going to create a world war. I believe
that is correct, is it not, Mr. Chairman?
Senator BIDEN. If the Senator would yield, he is forgetting that I
still have the floor. I think this is a worthwhile area to go off on.
Senator ADAMS. I don't want to go off on anything. I want to stay
on the point.
Senator BIDEN. My point was, absent a war powers act, under the
Constitution, does the President have the authority to deploy
troops in the examples I have raised?
I pursue this because the Secretary of Defense, accompanied by
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a number of other
people have come up here and said there is no restriction on the
President being able to do these things. In fairness, I don't think I
mentioned the Philippines then-but there was no restriction, they
said, on the ability of the President to do the kind of thing I have
suggested.
So, it is not just idle discussion that is interesting at a cocktail
party.
But I would like to let the others make comments here on the
questions that I have just asked.
Mr. REVELEY. On the Philippines, Senator, I think probably
there, by any reasonable defInition, you would be into aggressive
war. In my judgment, the President cannot, unilaterally, by himself, engage in an aggressive use of force. It is not even clear to me
that the President and Congress together can.
Senator BIDEN. So, the key is not U.S. interests, but aggressive.
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. Mr. REVELEY. Yes, but I don't think that is very helpful. As a
practical matter, if the President does commit troops, he and his
. lawyers and his political aiders and abettors will argue that the
use of force is defensive.
Senator BIDEN. Let's look at this as a practical matter, and I am
a practical politician-with all due respect, I think the people sitting up here, including my friends on the Republican side of the
committee,-are probably more aware of what .practically motivates
politicians than you all who are sitting down there.
Mr. REVELEY. You are right about that.
Senator BIDEN. One of the practical facts of life is that Presidents
or Members of Congress or anyone else-and one of you mentioned
this before-are reluctant to do things that have already been defined as out of bounds.
The issue that I am trying to narrow down is under what circumstances the President is able, under his own authority, to project
American forces into a situation-whether it be the Philippines or
Nicaragua-where any reasonable person would expect armed ·resistance.
Mr. REVELEY. The Philippine example, Senator, is seems to me is
clearly an aggressive use of force. Just because we want a base in
somebody else's country and it's in our national interest to have a
base there does not give us a right under international law to
invade that country and take a base. We would like to have lots of
Japanese yen, too. But we can't go and seize Japan to get the yen.
If most reasonable people agree that a particular use of force is
"aggressive" under international law, then I don't think you are
going to find many constitutional scholars saying that the President alone may commit troops.
But that is a rare situ,ation. That is at an extreme end of the continuum.
The far more difficult questions are Cuban missile crises and Nicaraguas, and there you inescapably confront disagreement on the
constitutional score. The language of the Constitution and its
Framers' and Ratifiers' debates, strongly suggest that in the Cuban
missile crises and Nicaraguas you need prior congressional approval for American use of force. Two hundred years of practice suggest
the opposite.
Senator BIDEN. I would argue that we have taken care of the
Nicaraguan situation, short of the use of American forces, through
the Intelligence Committees and the Intelligence Act. We disagree.
We fight about it. It does not always work. But we have reached a
ground upon which we mediate, negotiate, and constrain, or promote Presidential action with regard to use of non-American
forces; that is, forces other than American troops.
Professor Glennon, would you like to comment, and then Professor Firmage, and then I will yield the floor.
Mr. GLENNON. Senator, I think the answer that the Senate gave
to ·your question in 1973 is probably the best answer that has been
formulated, and that is the dermition of the President's exclusive
powers set forth in the Senate version of the War Powers Resolution which, in addition to those situations set forth in section 2 of
the current version of the War Powers Resolution, recognizes Presidential power to introduce the Armed Forces into hostilities to
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forestall an imminent threat of attack on the United States, and
also to rescue endangered U.S. citizens and nationals located
abroad.
The whole theory of this approach is one of emergency power,
which derives from the intent of the Framers, from constitutional
custom since the earliest days of the Republic, and from the functional attributes of the two branches. The theory is that, where
Congress has time to act and an underlying policy judgment has to
be made about whether we should invade Japan to get more yen or
the Philippines to get bases, that is a judgment for the elected leepresentatives of the people.
It seems to me that to argue that in those circumstances that the
President can use armed force without congressional consent would
be to rob the congressional war power of any meaning.
Now, Senator Adams raised a separate question and that is
whether under such circumstances the President might infer authority to use the Armed Forces in hostilities from any treaty.
There are 7 mutual security treaties now in existence with 26 different countries. If one of those countries is attacked, can the
President, relying on a treaty, respond to a real or purported request from one of those countries to introduce the Armed Forces
into hostilities?
The answer is "Absolutely not."
None of those treaties in existence gives the President an iota of
war power that he would not have had in the absence of those treaties. Every one of those treaties makes clear-and the legislative
history is abundantly clear, established by this committee-that
the allocation of constitutional power to make war between the
President and the Senate that existed prior to the ratification of
those treaties was not affected by the Act of ratification.
If the President needed to come back to Congress for authority
prior to ratification, he still needs to after the Act of ratification.
I might point out to the committee that I have written an article
for the Columbia Journal of International Law on precisely this
subject, which I will make available to the committee, if it wishes.
Senator BIDEN. Yes, thank you.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Senator BIDEN. Professor Firmage.
Mr. FIRMAGE. I agree fully with what Professor Glennon has just
said and would underline his last point particularly.
I think there is no base to hoist yourself up by treaty to have a
war power that the President simply lacks. That is the power of
the U.S. Congress. No treaty grants that. No treaty can constitutionally bind a Congress and an administration not then in existence to go to war at some time in the future. Reid v. Covert laid to
rest the notion, inferentially suggested by Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, that the treaty power was somehow beyond the
bounds of the Constitution. Only the Congress of the United States
poSsesses the war power. Only a sitting Congress can finally, absolutely commit us to war.
I would quickly tick off my response to your central questions.
The President, in my opinion, must have congressional authorization to place troops in any situation that would likely involve
hostilities.
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Second, no request of a host state changes that in the least. That
has some relevance to the question of whether or not we are violating international law. It has no relevance that I can see to the
question of the constitutional allocation of power between the Congress and the President.
Third, I do not think-I will go beyond your hypothetical situation-I do not think that the protection of U.S. citizens abroad
gives any such right of intervention. I think that is highly suspect
in international law and without any base in constitutional law.
The protection of U.S. warships, U.S. forces, and other public forces
provides a far different and stronger basis for claiming a Presidential responsive act of defense, analogous to a surprise attack upon
our country.
U.S. citizens abroad place themselves there under the sovereignty of another state. They can never legitimately be used as the
basis of Presidential war.
Your other point regarding base agreements: absent base agreements in the Philippines, the President of the United States possesses no right to maintain troops there. No amount of supposed
U.S. interest creates that constitutional power, absent action by the
Congress of the United States authorizing such a base agreement
with subsequent acceptance by the Government of the Philippines.
Finally, regarding the hypothetical invasion of Nicaragua, no
notion of preemptive action can be allowed to justify such an invasion or the idea of self-defense, which is rightly in the Constitution,
simply eats up the rule of who has the war power, and that is the
United States Congress, not the President of the United States.
Senator BIDEN. I thank you and I yield to my colleague from
North Carolina, Senator Helms.
Senator HELMS. I will yield to Senator Pressler because he has
another meeting.
Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.
I shall just ask one question and put the rest of my questions
into the record.
I thank my colleague for yielding.
I might say that I have just been informed that the Discovery
has been successfully launched and is going very, very well. I think
that is good news.
I v{ant to compliment this panel. I especially want to compliment
Professor Turner for his "Restoring the Rule of Law." I am one
who believes the War Powers Resolution should be repealed and I
think this is an excellent study.
I also apologize for not hearing all of the testimony this morning.
We have had a caucus, plus I have another committee meeting.
We cannot anticipate all of the circumstances that might arise.
Also, it seems to me that we already have the appropriations process to help Congress in its relationship with the President.
I certainly agree we should have consensus and consultation. I
think in some ways the war powers legislation actually causes
more of a strained relationship between the two branches of Government.
In a ~peech at Oklahoma University recently, Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in referring to the problems relating
to the separation of powers said that each of the three branches of
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Government has its hands in each other's pockets. I think our
Framers did a pretty good job with that Constitution, and I see the
War Powers Resolution as an infringement on that.
My suggestion is that we repeal the War Powers Resolution.
Very frankly, that probably will not happen. But I hope that in
amending it or whatever we do, we take very careful consideration
of Justice O'Connor's speech.
I am intrigued with all of the other legislation in the mid-1970's
that also struck at the President's powers. Why do you think-and
I will address this to any panelist-why do you think it took until
1973 before Congress legislated on the war power?
Before that time and since that time, the Executive had used
force abroad in one way or another approximately 200 times in the
200 years of the Republic. Surely practice has made precedent.
Why did it take until 1973 before Congress legislated on the war
power, do you think? I might just ask each of you for your assessment.
Mr. FIRMAGE. I would contest your conclusion regarding 200 incidents. I think when you begin to analyze those 200 incidents, which
I have done in each case, you find that they collect into different
groups, in the main, with maybe a dozen exceptions, into very understandable, justifiable interventions where the Commander in
Chief clause is not really at issue.
. In 1967 the State Department compiled an official list of 137 instances where it asserted that the President, as the Commander in
Chief of the _Armed Forces, committed acts of war on his own authority beyond the borders of the United States. Careful scrutiny of
the examples provided by the Government belies this assertion; 8
of the Acts involved enforcement of the law against piracy, for
which no congresional authorization is required; 69 were landings
to protect American citizens, many of which were statutorily authorized; 20 concerned invasions of foreign or disputed territories, '
which, although illegal, were not acts of war if the United States
claimed the territory; 6 were minatory demonstrations without
combat; another 6 involved protracted occupations of various Caribbean states, which occupations were authorized by treaty; and at
least 1 was an act of naval self-defense, which is justified by both
international and municipal law. Even in the one or two dozen instances when the President has acted without congressional authorization, he has done so by relying falsely on either a statute, a
treaty, or international law, never on his power as the Commander
in Chief or the Chief Executive. Clearly, neither the Constitution
nor historical precedent empower the President to initiate a state
of war or engage in an act of war on his own authority beyond the
borders of the United States. The Presidential warmaking power is
strictly limited to defending against sudden attack-see F. Wormuth and E. Firmage, uTo Chain the Dog of War: The War Power
of Congress in History and Law, pages 133 to 149, 1986.
Presidential action aimed directly against the sovereignty of another state, whether or not done under the subterfuge of acting to
protect U.S. citizens abroad, is a very different and far more dangerous and utterly aggressive action, with no conceivable justification or authorization in the U.S. Constitution.
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Mr. GLENNON~I think that ProfesSor Firmage's analysis is absolutely correct. In fact, his excellent book, "To Chain the Dog of
War," contains an analysis of those L"lcidents. I believe the current
number cited by the State Department is 132.
The point that he and Professor Wormuth make is that, if you
analyze them closely, it turns out that most of them are relatively
minor uses of force~ involving chasing bandits across the border,
clashing with pirates, et cetera-not sustained, large-scale involvement of U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities abroad, not instances in
which the state of the Nation was changed from peace to war.
It really is a fairly recent phenomenon that Presidents have
claimed authority to do that without congressional consent-beginning, really, as Professor Henkin has pointed out, with the Korean
war. It was, as Professor Firmage said, the tragedy of Vietnam that
crystallized congressional thinking on this subject.
So, I think that is the answer to Senator Pressler's question.
Mr. TURNER. I would arglJe that the real distinction here is
whether it is an operation that would historically require a declaration of war, or is it something like going after pirates or some
similar use of force. In the old days, before the U.N. Charter outlawed aggressive war, Presidents often authorized force against
such small states that there was really no likelihood of any kind of
serious response. In most of those cases, Congress did not question
such uses of force.
I agree that Korea was the first major exception. I personally
think Truman was wrong in Korea. I think he should have gone to
Congress.
I would note that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Henry Steele Commager, and others strongly defended Truman's use of force in
Korea in those days. But I disagree with that view.
Your real question is why did they do it in 1973. I argued in my
House testimony last month that Congress was a full partner in
getting us into Vietnam and overwhelmingly supported the war
until about 1967 or 1968, v/hen the public turned against it.
Why they passed the Resolution in 1973 is, first of all, because
public opinion did shift against the donflict, and they were trying
to cover their tails, if you will Second, it was because of Watergate. The veto override came right after the "Saturday Night Massacre," and I think there is a general consensus among people who
have studied this that the Resolution's supporters would not have
had the votes to override had it not been for the anger at President
Nixon over Watergate.
Mr. RE"ELEY. Three quick points, Senator.
First, I think you are absolutely correct that practice over 200
years-as well as the language of the Constitution and Framers'
and Ratifiers' debates-has to be taken into account if we are to
reach a constitutional consensus on the war powers. You can't
ignore practice any more than you can ignore the Framers and
Ratifiers or the text of the document.
Second, I think the War Powers Resolution was passed in 1973
for two reasons. The first was a reaction against a period of unusually vigorous Presidential assertion of war powers, assertion that
had gone beyond the sorts of claims to use force that the President
had made successfully in the 19th century and the early 20th.
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Second, and far more important, the Resolution came up for a fmal
vote in the context of Watergate. But for Watergate at white heat,
I don't think the Resolution ever would have passed.
Senator PRESSLER. I have some additional questions.
I ask unanimous consent toO insert an article by John Silber,
president of Boston University, which appeared in the New Republic on the War Powers Act.
I also ask unanimous consent to ask several questions for the
record, and I apologize for my departure.
Senator BmEN. Without objection.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Senator BIDEN. I have been told that Schlesinger, when he testified, and Commager, have since recanted their philosophy as "highflying prerogative men."
I guess we learn, or, hopefully, I will learn from them.
Senator Adams.
Senator ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the panel for their discussion. I want to go oock
to the particular point on consensus and whether or not something
can be done when there is or is not a consensus. I am going to give
you three examples, and these are not far-fetched. They are in the
world that we have all lived in.
As the chairman stated earlier, we are not interested in just examining history but in trying to live in a world where we are now
a superpower. We are confronting a superpower and maybe other
growing superpowers in areas of smaller countries that can rapidly
escalate. After all, World War I started in very small countries;
World War IT started in small countries.
I would say particularly let's take, as a first example, Korea,
which has been talked about.
What if we had not had a president that pulled back the general
that brought us to a point where the Chinese entered into that conflict? Would that not have required a declaration of war at some
point, if we were engaged with the Republic of China in Korea, as
opposed to what we are doing.
Professor Glennon.
Mr. GLENNON. Senator Adams, I think you have raised a point
that answers the objections to the time limits in the War Powers
Resolution, because it highlights the fact that what the critics of
the time limits really object to is constitutional constraints on Presidential use of the Armed Forces. Forget about the War Powers
Resolution: When the President puts t.he Armed Forces into hostilities abroad, at some point, as the magnitude of hostilities . increases, the President constitutionally has to get congressional consent.
Senator ADAMS. Let me follow through with that. The other
members of the panel can comment afterward.
That is the problem, and I am prepared to work with the chairman and others to make this act more workable. But in each of
these cases, we have the beginning of a hostility, generally in a
small country, and then an escalation that goes to what would ordinary be acts of war.
I mentioned Vietnam. We were movillg then on Cambodia, another nation, which, as it turns out, we probably ended up causing
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the destruction of that nation. That was beyond what was contemplated certainly in any Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
Even though our debates up here were unsuccessful in triggering
the Act in the Persian Gulf, we did prevent what many of us were
concerned about, which was a land invasion of the Iranian area because of the Silkworm missiles and our ships being there, with no
congressional policy, but just a Presidential policy.
It started first with some Kuwaiti tankers; then went to freedom
of navigation; then all vessels; then an offensive action against the
Iranian Navy, which was believed to be attacking. I am just thankful that we did not arrive at the point of the Silkworm missiles
ashore.
So, the problem we are talking about up here is not theoretical.
It is continual movement up, and at some point you cross the line.
Now, my question is if you don't have consensus in a democracy,
you've got to have process. Process is the only means by which you
divide a majority from a minority; then establish a majority position, so that the U.S. people, through their representatives, have
said we are a majority committed to this military action.
That's the declaration of war power, and it is clear, through all
the constitutional debates and down through the areas of these incidents, that it is a marshalling of major forces.
What did not happen in the Vietnam war was the Reserves were
not called up, we did not go into a taxation program, and we never
called it a "war." It was always an "incident."
But it marshalled U.S. powers. And those who could not be involved in that-the 18-year-olds and their families and the otherswent to the streets because the consensus had not formed.
Now I don't know whether we want to call it a "declaration of
war" or a "special authorization," but I would like to have anyone
of you tell me the process on the executive branch side and the
congressional side that authorizes actions. Appropriations won't do
it unless we put in a special provision in this law that says you
can't have any money for any operation after so many days. You
can operate on O&M a long time. I want the process that says
we're in this, we're prepared to go to the next step, the minority
has had its say, the majority has voted it, and the country is
moving forward.
That is what we want.
You had your hand up first, Professor Turner, and then anybody
else who wishes to respond, and I will ask no other questions.
Mr. TURNER. I .think the process was established very well by the
Founding Fathers, and that is the President, as Commander in
Chief, can deploy whatever military force Congress gives him anywhere up to the point that he cannot launch a war. By that I mean
that if you have a situation where a declaration of war would historically be necessary, the President must come to Congress.
Now, LBJ did that in Indochina after Congress pushed him into
deeper involvement.
If you go back and look at the record of the 1950's, you fmd Senators like Hubert Humphrey, John Kennedy, and J. William Fulbright saying that the United States had to defend South Vietnam.
First the Senate approves a treaty that covered both Cambodia and
South Vietnam. Second, Congress passed a joint resolution-by a
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vote of more than 500 to 2-saying the United States was prepared
to resist aggression in this area, using such measures as the ·President determined, including the use of armed force; and it included
in its parameters all of the SEATO countries and protocol states,
which included Cambodia.
% e Government of Cambodia, the Lon Nol Government, made a
public plea in 1970 at the United Nations for help in defending
it~lf against North Vietnamese aggression. We responded to that
by sending in troops. The conflict was fully authorized by ~e
SEATO Treaty, as implemented by the Southeast Asian joint resohition.
But, returning to the process itself, the key consideration for the
Founding Fathers was the knowledge that you can't fight a war or
even defend the country by antecedent laws-you can't have a law
that says put the First Platoon on Hill 401 but keep Congress informed so it can pass another law in 30 days if the troops need to
move, if the other side sends a larger force to the hill.
The command of military forces is a very important power. But
by our Constitution we confme it in our Commander in Chief, who
is elect.ed by the people.
Now what you are saying is that times have changed. Today,
there is a risk that if you even send a small unit out, the Soviets
may decide to get involved-and it could get us into World War III.
What you are saying is that time has created a need for greater
constraints, but even if you are right, you still can't amend the
Constitution by law. You have to have a constitutional amendment
to change that power.
Senator ADAMS. No, no, no. I am not saying that the time has
cha nged to add greater constraints. I am stating that we already
have the constraints and that there needs to be a process for using
them so we don't declare war each time.
Mr. TURNER. Of what sort?
Senator ADAMS. Like in the War Powers Resolution, where you
have the President say "I'm going to the Persian Gulf, I want the
Kuwaiti tankers, here is what I want voted. Vote it or not."
Then, if there is a decision that we're going to invade Iran, that
is a different kind of operation. It could be included in the first one
if the President wanted to do it, or not.
But there must be a way of communicating with the Congress
when you are in a major, sustained operation.
Professor, I'll state to you that we h ave been in the Persian Gulf
for over a year and a half. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said to me that
it was costing us $50 million a month, and this may well be supported by the Congress. But the Congress has never been involved
in what is a sustained operation, which included offensive operations at certain points.
I think the Congress would have authorized those. I don't know
whether they would have authorized an invasion of Iran.
That kind of use of the power to declare war and the powers
which are connected in it-to take prizes and all of the other constitutional powers, which are carefully separated, so that we didn't
have a king-from the Presidential power of Commander in
Chief-why nobody in this Congress ever has tried to say to the
President how many ships you fire and which fires where and
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effort by an individual Member of Congress, such as Mike Lowry,
to go to court and get a declaratory judgment or injunctive relief
from a court in the event a President declines to comply with the
Act, as he has in the case of the Persian Gulf.
Senator BIDEN [presiding]. Thank you very much.
Senator Helms.
Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.
As I listen to various comments by various panels and various
witnesses, on this question, I am reminded of the three blind men
of Hindustan, who paraded loud and long, "Aween," about an elephant not one of them had seen.
Now, Professor Turner, I ha.ppen to agree with you and I sympathize that you are outnumbered three to one this morning. But one
thing is inescapable in all of the discussion: The War Powers Resolution was passed in a highly charged political atmosphere. And it
was highly charged because of the emotionalism that had been
whipped up by politicians and by the liberal-media of this country.
The Vietnam war was probably the first war ever fought on the
television screens of America.
I have often said to the boredom of my colleagues that if Franklin Roosevelt had to fight, had to prosecute World War II under the
same restrictions and conditions that prevailed, that war would
have been lost. And probably the French people would be making
their vichyssoise out of sauerkraut today.
But there is no question about this thing being the bastard child
of politics. There is no question about that.
It's just the same as we hear today about the "Reagan deficits,"
and all of the spending. Well, it was the Congress of the United
States that passed the Impoundment Act, prohibiting the President
from saving any money. It also completely ignored the news media,
saying that no President can spend a dime, that has not been authorized and appropriated by the Congress of the United States.
So, just like the War Powers Act, the Federal debt and the Federal deficits are the handiwork of Congress. The dead cat is lying
on the doorstep of Congress.
Now, as for the Vietnam war, it was protracted t hrough several
administrations, through several Presidents, and the reason it
became such a bitter, open sore is that we sent hundreds of thou~
sands of men around the world to fight a war we ould not let
them win.
The American people got sick of it. The news medi portra
it
in their own way. And we lost that war.
Here, again, it was the Congress of the United States~
Now, Mr. Turner, since you are outnumbered three to one~ _I.am
going to confine my one question to you because I 1 eel over your
text, and I noted that you urged there be consultatia
tw
President and the Congress. That's the way it has al ys
heretofore.
This hostility between the executive branch and the 1 . tive
branch never existed before.
At the same time, you appear to oppose quite vigorously
agree with you-that there should not be any formal requiY'Gll'lP'IIDn
for consultation because that is a can of worms that will be
up politically again.
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, I would like for you to elaborate for just a minute or two
view that such formal requirements would be an unconsti.tu1w.w infringement on the Executive's prerogatives.
TuRNER. Senator, I would be quite pleased to do that.
Is.leJltially, what I am arguing is that the Founding Fathers cree two political branches as coequal representatives of the
&JI!UpIe.
~IJBl;or

HELMS. Absolutely.
TuRNER. As coequal representatives, they each have a great
a utonomy.
e argued that in all of these areas, it is very important that
genuine consultation. During my service in the State Depa:t.1.ent, when people came to me and said to consult with Conut a decision made a day earlier, I would say to them
. _~ if you'd come to me 2 weeks ago, I could have consulted;
_ u are telling me simply to 'inform' Congress of a decision
all:eady made" -and that's not the way the system ought to work.
a big believer in genuine consultation and not just notificat what I'm saying is that when you put it into law and
.I..A..IoO:I~ by law, that the President must consult when you tell him
re, that is comparable to the President, as Commander in
-.......--..... .calling up General Gray and saying "Send a battalion of Maer and bring the Speaker of the House to the White House,
bee&:~ I want to consult with him."
· unseemly, it is improper, it is not the way that coequal
1t:::l1DC=tre:S of a sovereign government ought to deal with each other.
principle behind setting up what I used to call a joint com'I Ill::tl!e on national security-and the concept predates my entry
. field by many years-to engage in consultation, is a won-......-u idea. But you don't put it in a law saying that whenever
ey congressional leaders blow a whistle, the President"must
rw"t"'''''~'w.nl:l.r and salute, or sit down and consult. That is not the proper
_ .'1" .-...._ the two branches to deal with each other.
ere the President's counsel and you tried it, I would advise
t to go lest it be understood from this that he was now the
CC;lmlrn of the Congress and not the great coequal representative of
.__ .___erican people.
tor HELMS. I thank you.
· Chairman, I have some questions that I wish to submit to
of these gentlemen in writing, so that they can respond in
W%jttDJ~., and particularly to Professor Glennon.
't want to develop a subject in public that I want to be made
of the record. So, I am going to provide you, sir, with some
.qJJlI!Stmns, which I would appreciate your answering.
that, I think we ought to move to the second panel. But
~belOl:e you do that, Mr. Chairman, I don't know any of the second
.~~ personally except Charlie Rice. I have known Charlie Rice
long time, and his advice and counsel have meant a very
I e - ' - deal to me. He is a professor of law at Notre Dame.
. ht ask Charlie if he likes Lou Holtz as the football coach
· RICE. Very much.
tor HELMS. Very

much. Well, Lou is also a good friend of

322

}.

I welcome Charlie.
I'm going to have to leave, but I think it would perhaps be good
to move on to the second panel. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator BIDEN. Gentlemen, before you get up, I would like to
note for my colleague from North Carolina that I really think it
has been more two an.d one-half to one and one-half.
Mr. Reveley was, I think, somewhere between Glennon and
Turner, leaning to Turner on two points, and somewhere between
Firmage and Turner, leaning to Firmage on one point.
Gentlemen, all of your testimony was extremely helpful. You all
made .very concise, straightforward statements, and the disagreement is helpful to this committee, not harmful.
I sincerely appreciate your time and your efforts in being here.
Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I did not imply any derogation of
anybody.
Senator BIDEN. Oh, not at all.
Senator HELMS. Everybody has to be somewhere on every issue.
Senator BIDEN. I realize that, and I think Mr. Reveley is a little
more conservative than you gave him credit for. I don't know.
Mr. REVELEY. It varies with the time and the moment.
Senator BIDEN. I want to thank you all again. Seriously, thank
you all very much.
I will now call our next panel, and I understand that some of my
colleagues will have to leave. I apologize that we have kept you all
for so long. But, as you can see, this is an area of great interest to
many of us.
We truly aDDreciate your testimony.
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PREPARED STATKMRNT OF WILLIAM TAYLOR REVELEY III

I.

A.
In my judgment, the country needs war powers leCiSlation. We need it to help

solve the severe, debilitating war powers problem that afflicts us.
The problem is not thar the President is deliberately, wickedly

usurpq ancient

congressional prerogatives over war and peace. Nor is the problem that Conrress is deliberately, wickedly invading hereditary powers of the President over the use of force.
The problem is that the country lacks a comtltutional consensus about the
process by which the President and
cisiorlS to use force.

Congrt:- ~-:';

are to share authority over American de-

We continue to bicker over which branch gets to decide what,

when. This bickering occurs at profound cost to the country. Four sorts of harm come
quickly to mind:
(1)

The bickering poisons relations between the President
and Congress. To be aceused of constitutional usurpation ~ no fun. It enpnders anpr, fear, defensiveness, countercllarges. Constitutional theologians
from both sides - the President'S aDd
insist with passioD of truly reJJcious Intemlty that their
view of the Constltution b the Only True View, that
all others are beresy. The fate of heretics in the
hard of the rlchteous Is well known.

eoncress' -

(2)

Tbe bieker1nr UDderm1Des publie eonfldence In the
rule of law aDd in the leIItlmaey of both the President and Concress. The polltleal branebes of KOvemment cannot 10 on year after year accusing one another of Werality in one of tbe m~t sensitive areas
of Amer!can life - war and peace - without seriOUSly
eroc:ti.ng the faith of the people in both of tbese
branches of IOvernment.

(3)

The bickering prevents focused attention to ~,
tbat is, focused inquiry into wbat the United States
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oueht to do about particular foreiln and military situations, what our reallstic alternatives ue for cIeal.1ng
With them, what the costs and benefits of these alter. natives are, and wbleb. alternatives we OUIht to pursue to maximize our natJonallDterest. Rather than
foamnc on these ~ Issues. the debate all too
often focuses on ~ Jssues, on Which branch 15
constitutionally entitled to dee1de what, when. FaclLWCl attention on whether the United States OlIIht in
the national interest to commit troops abroad is sacrificed to bickering over the precise way in which the
President and Coneress are to make whatever decision is ultimately to be made.
(4)

The bickering denies American war and peace decisions, first, the wisdom and, second, the staying
power that can come only from having both the President and Congress meaningfully involved in our decisions to use force. It is unavoidable that the Constitution divides the war powers ~tween the two
branches; thus It is inescapable that for American
foreign and military policy to work, the two branches
must cooperate in the exercise of their overlapping
prerogatives.

But wait, some soy, these sorts of harm occur not because we lack a constitutional consensus on process but simply because the country lacks a current consenCius on
~.

We had a policy consensus from the end of World War n to sometime in the

1960'S, they say, but now we've lost it and that's the problem. Well, of course, when

people can agree easUy on what policy to adopt (whether these people are spouses dealiDi With one another, parents and chUdren, university faculties and administrators, corporate officers and directors, litigants, voters, or Presidents and Coragresses} - when
consensus on policy does exist. then little attention is paid to the nature of the
decision-making process. But how often do people

acree easily about dftficult and im-

portant issues? History suaests DOt all tbat orten. ADd the more difficult it Is to get
agreement on policy the more important it becomes to have agreement on process.
. Why? Two reasons:
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(1)

When people acre on bow deeisions should be made.
that is. when they accept that a particular person or
croup is entitled to make a partleular sort of deelslon.
then they are far more Ukely to aeeept the deeIs10n
that is ultimately made, even If they dI.saIree with It
u a matter a polley. tban they are Ukely to aeeept
such a deelsl.on if they beJleve It was made by people
not authorized to deelde. Every day in eountles& contexts people aeeept and support deeisIons Whether
they like them or not beeause the deeIs10ns have been
made by a proeess that people tboucht was legitimate. In other WCH"Cl;. agreement on proeess helps
produce agreement on poIiey.

(2)

When we disagree over both proeess and poIiey over who gets to deeide as well as over what the deeision ought to be - a two-front Strucrle results. with
dismal effeet for focused inq.pry into what we ought
to do in our best interest. Sound polley suffers.

In short, process matters. We badly need a constitutional eonsensus on how the
President and Congress are to go about making war and peace deeisions.

B.
'ro reach at least minimal agreement on process. all the erueial constitutional
threads must be drawn together. The President's eonstitutional theologians must stop
ignoring the faet that the language of the Constitution and its Framers' and Ratifiers'
purposes ereate an enduring role for Congress in Ameriean deeisions to use force. At
the same time, Congress' constitutional theologians must stop iCnorlnr 200 years of
practlce under the Constitution. From George WashiDCton'S administration to date.
practice also has been central to this country'S constitutional journey. War powers
prcctlce indicates that. when CODIress bas provlded the neeessary toolS to the President - men. money and materiel -

and when Concress bas not prevl<xwy banned a

particular use of force. then the President may begin it on his own

initi~tive.

Two hun-

dred years of practice make that elear.
It is essential that we weave these

threa~

together in war powers legislation.
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We might just as well howl into the wind as try to put in place a process that ignores either the country's deep-rooted constitutional expectation of congressional involvement,
on the one hand, or the country'S equally deep-rooted constitutional expectation of
presidential initiative, on the other. Both expectations must be met if we are to develop a war powers process that actually works.
For now, we should focus on the irreducible constitutional minimum: on the
"nothing less" bedrock that must exist if Congress is to be involved consistently in decisions about the use of force and if the President i-; to retain the initiative that practice
has given him and that he will exercise in light of the hazard, pace and complexity of
foreign and military affairs and his greater capability than Congress to deal quickly and
quietly with these affairs.
What is the irreducible minimum? In my view, it is:
(1)

Means to encourage the President and Congress to
consult meaningfully together before and during moments of truth;

(2)

Recognition that, informed by this consultation, ttle
President may act alone if he thinkS It in the national
interest, for instance, because he believes speed or
secrecy is crucial to U.S. success; and

(3)

Recognition that, when the President alone Initiates
the use of force, it thereafter is for Congress to approve, disapprove or limit the use if Congress chooses
to act.

The Irreducible minimum does not lnelude time llmlts within which Congress
must either act to approve, or be deemed to have disapproved, presidential initiatives.
It is far from clear that disapproval by lDaetion is constitutional; it is quite clear that
Presidents will resist such a concept relentlessly and that Congress will rarely try to
enforce it. Time limits won't work in the real world.
~

cHsapproval by concurrent resolution part of the irreducible minimum? It can

go either way. A.fter Chadha, Presidents will alsO resist releptlessly the concept that
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concurrent resolutions can constitutionally curb their initiatives. But as a practical
matter, U the President commits troops who remain in the field a week. two weeks.
three weeks, two months after the

ln1~

commitment, and Concress by majority vote

in both Houses acts to l1mit or end the use of foree, it Is most unlikely that the Presi-

dent will simply disrecard such an expression of COI'lIressiOnal will. If he did. Concress
has remedles. for instance, the power of the purse.
In sum. the War Powers Resolution as passed in 1973 has not succeeded. It needs

to be reduced to its most basic and workable elements. These elements, together. can
lead the way to the constitutional consensus we so desperately lack. The consensus
would involve less than either presidential or congressional theologians insist is their
branch'S constitutional due, But the consensus WOUld work.
One final note: Some people say. if war powers legislation is to be so reduced.
why bother to have it? Better to kill the 1973 Resolution outright and thereby vindicate the presidential view of the Constitution, or better to beef up the Resolution to
require Congress' prior approval for any use of force, except for a few specified sorts,
and thereby enshrine the congressional view of the Constitution. And. anyway. the irreducible minimum just described already exists.

The President and Congress don't

need a War Powers Resolution in order to consult one anothf!r. The President has been

acting alone and reporting to Congress from time to time without such leciSlation, and
Concress ean already act before or durinr presidential initiatives to block. l1m1t or end
them In a variety of ways, such as euttlnc their funds.
True, but simply beeause most of us eould exere1se dally, eat sparincly and otherwise see to our bodies doesn't mean that most of us do. We are more likely to do it

.

when pushed by an aetion-fore1nc feiElmen.

The War Powers Resolution is an

action-forcing !'eIimen. It hasn't worked well so far because it carries too much baglare, sueh as SS 2(c) and S(b).

Stripped to its irreducible minimum. however. the
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Resolution just might bring the President and Congress to engage one another constructively on questions of war and peace - to

co~t,

let the President act first if he feelS

so compelled, but then report and let Concress go second, to approve or disapprove his
initiative if it feels so compelled.
To repeal the War Powers Resolution, leave it as it is, or amend it to impose
more restraints on the President would do nothing for constitutional consensus. Repealed, the Resolution would greatly disappoint expectations that Concress must playa
sustained, meaningful role in use of force decisions. Left as it is, the Resolution would
continue to work so fecklessly as to suggest that consistent collaboration between the
two branches on the use of force is hopeless. Amended to try to restrain further the
President, the Resolution would surely be ignored by just about everyone. Cut to its irreducible minimum, however, the Resolution could lead us to constitutional consensus.

C.
The rest of my testimony is in two parts. The first puts flesh on the conclusions
above at'O!jt wba 't the text of the Constitution, the Framers and Ratifiersl purposes and
two centuries of practice have to tell us. Part m is a detailed analysis of the War Powers Resolution that first appeared in my book War Powers of the President and
Congress: Who Holm the Arrows and Ollve Branch? Though completed in 1981, the
analysis remains teWnc in most respects today.
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u.
OLD CONTROVERSIES OF NEW IMPORTANCE
For nearly two centuries the war powers have bedevUed a host of Pres1dents.
Concressmen. and those tew JudIes w1111nI to deal with them In court. ThrouIh all. the
nature ot these powers has remained more unsettled perhaps than any other maInstream ot American constitutional law.
The respective constitutional prel"Olatives ot ·the President and Collll'e5S over
war and peace were ot consuminr concern to Americans whlle Washinlton, John Adams
and Madison held ofnce.

Nor have there been any administrations since in which the

nature ot -these prerogatives has not been

debat~

With some heat. Controversy has

persisted in part because Americans have frequently had to decide whether to fight.
Decisions to use armed force have been made well over a hundred times since 1789, and
decisions arainst its use at least as orten. Persistence also reflects the weirhty nature
of the subject. Profound consequences may accompany the use or non-use of armed
force. Disputes of corresponding intensity have arisen over the extent to which each
branch is entitled to set poUcy.
Passion and dorged adherence to positions aroused on this account have been
liven new edre precisely because the disputes have concerned separation ot powers.
Presidential and

conrressi~nal

zeal In defense of real or imalined

prel'Olativ~

is tradi-

tionallyacute. And a!'lument over the allocation of war powers conjures up two ot our
most cherished political bulbears:

the fear that American democracy will perish.

choked by presidential tyranny, and the obverse dread that it will smother amid con,ress1onal1ndectslon and paroehia1ism. With stakes so hirh. partisans have been loath
to leave the constitutional tray.

498
-8-

Persistence has resulted, too, from the accumulation of unresolved controversies. Constitutional uncertainties about the cIlvision of the war powers between the
President IDd Conrress have not been cured by formal amendment, and, unlike most
other areas af constitutional confusion, there has been very little 11cht shed bere by jucIlcial deeJslom. Moreover, pest-1789 practice reprdlnc the cIlvision Is often inconsistent. Most plausible and many quaint allocations of the war powers between the two
branches are supported by ODe bit of precedent or another. Contrary cIlvisions of con-

trol have existed in fact. and contradictory statements have been made by cIlfferent
people about what sorts of allocatlons are required.

With unsett1lnc frequency the

same 1umJnar1es (Madison, Hamilton and Fulbright, for example) have varied their constitutional conclusions with changiJll times.
Such flux has been encouraged by our I8Deral tendency to collapse the constitutional question of where decision-making control ties into the policy question of what
we would Wee the President or Congress to do about a pending situation. This emphasis
on immediate result rather than on long-term constitutional structure has been with us
since 1789, but never so emphatically as when the Cold War went sour in Indochina,
curdllng the prevaWng taste for presidentlal·prerogative. Inevitably, then, recurrent
disputes over the war powers ot the two branches have fueled future controversy almost as often as they have resulted in case-by-case definition of how authority Is to be
split between them.
While the war powers present no novel constitutional
World, w.ar they have presented issues of wholly

~

1ssu~,

since the Second

dlmeRSlons. True, foreign relations

were central to survival during the first leneration under the Constitution. European
intervention in American affairs was an armed reality thr'ouIh the War of 1812. At
times

durinr the balance of the nineteenth century, the United States was internation-

ally threatened, acutely during the CivU War. But throuih most of the 180OS, security
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wu an easy outtrowth of rising American strenrtb. reorraphlcallsolation. modest

mil1-

tary techno101Y, and European balance of power. Secw1ty problems abroad centered on
the protection of Americans from pirates, pr1m1tives. or weak states and on the conse-

quences of manifest destiny in North America.
Times chaDpd with the Spanish-American War.

MlUtarUy, politically.

ideo1cC1cally, economically, and lep1ly the country bas found itself lncreaslnily
threatened since 1900. and increasingly forcecl to react to developments more numerous, rapidly evolvlnr. and compUcated than before. The cbanCecllnternational environment hal placed a new premium on Informed. expert dec1s1om made in accord with
overall American objectives. It has valued rapid. flexible action and a w1J.11nrness to
make hard ·choices.
Especially durinr the last three decades. we have had a threefold change 10 circumstances: in our capacity and in our will to use force abroad and in the consequences
of that use. The purely physical ab1llty of postwar America to ccmmtt its mllitary
abroad in larea or small numbers. swiftly or slowly. for days or years. vastly exceeds the
country's conflict capacity before 1941. America's willingness to intervene abroad also
stands in revolutionary contrast to a previous tradition of non-involvement except to
trade. defend American citizens and property beset abroad. expand our boundaries. and
police the Caribbean .
. Ironically coupled with this new capacity and will to use force abroad are consequences of intervention that defy prediction and risk catastrophe more relentlessly
than ever before. Since 1945 the pace. complexity, and hazard of forei(n affairs have-

,",wn exponentially. A misstep lnvites troubles unimagined when the United States
was safe behind its ocean moats. Even the time when weak states mirht be "poUced"
with little risk of violating international law and polltical sensibilities has passed. No

more with relative impunity may the American m1,lltary punish baCkwarctpeoples who
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have attacked our citizens and property, or pursue crlminals acrass the borders of weak

states. or occupy and aclm1n1ster dissolute Caribbean countries. Tbe war powers do indeed pose old controversies of new importance. More than at any time since 1189. we
~

to understand and order the process by wb1cb tb1s country decides when and how

to . . its m111tary abroad.
~NSTITUTIONAL

DETERMINANTS

Tbere have been four main influences on the dlvision_of authority over war and
peace between the President and Conrress:
w~PJWer

provisions,

(2)

(1) the text of the Constitution's

the purposes of those who wrote and ratified the text in

1187-18, (3) evolving beilefs since 1789 about what1he Constitution requires, and - ir-

respective of text, purposes. and evolving beliefs -

(4)

the various allocations of con-

trol over the war powers tha t have existed in ract between the President arid Congress
during the past two centuries.

Determinants
interpretation.

(1)

and (2) are reasonably straightforward guides for constitutional

Determ lna r.~s

what is leneraliy termed ",..

3} a nd ( 4) are more convoluted. Together they make up
~~ce .~

or "usage." Practice has been shaped not only by

the constitutional text and oeca:e:s but also by factors of three other sorts: the hazard,

pace, and complexity

of

America's international circumstances at any particular time;

the respective institutional capa.bJl1ties of the President and Conlress to cope with
thai

cbanf1nc circumstances;

and

the shUt1ng balance of political strength between

the two branehes, which has helped the President at times and Congress at others to

creater control over war and peace. It is historical fact that all of these factors have
contributed to the allocation of the war powers between the Pre&1dent and Congress.

More important, they will all continue to contribute, barring a radical change 1n Ameriean babits.
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The Text

of the Constitution

U we could flnd a man in the state of nature and have him first scan the
war-power provls1oDS of the Constitution and then look at war-power practice since

nl9, be would marvel at how much Presidents have spun out so little. On its face, the
tat diU dec!ts1ve1y toward Concress. comparison of Articles I and IV with Article U
Ibows that mOlt of the specUlc (rants of authority run to Concress.

ReadlnI them

straJcht throuIh provides an lnsliht that nothlng else can into how the Constitution
itself dlvides the war powers. The sequence in whlcb the text asstcns authority to each
br'aneb t the location of certain provtslons relative to others, and the simple .weliht of

the words devoted to COI1(l'eSS as opposed to the President are as teW.nr as is the precise Iancuace of the rrants.
In addition. provision for suspending habeas corpus during military emeE'lency is

set out in the lerislatlve, not the executive. article of the Constitution. And state war
powers are placed with the congressional rrants, rather than in Article IV with other
state concerns.
Moreover.ot the tew specific rrants ot power given to the President, two ot the
mast important (over treaties and major federal appointments) he shares with the Senate. Thus the text supports arrument that, in those areas ot torelrn aftairs where mak-

tnr poUey and provldinc tools to implement it are not committed to the l~lative proces, tbey are held jointly by the President and the Senate (the executive element ot
Co.....), except for certain ministerial functions mast efficiently lett to one person.

tor inltance, mWtary command and law enforcement. and. except for powers of limited
war or peace importance. such as rranttnc pardons and commissions.
Prov1s1ons livinr Congress and the President weapons with which to coerce one
another limn run heavUy toward the lertslators. Under Articles I and U the Executive
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can try to mold Concress tbroUCh information and recommendations, by the veto, and

thrOuIb call1nI or not call1nl special sessions. He can attack the leciSlators in his

pu~

Uc statements but lacks authority to remove them from office. The text, on the other

hand, allows Conaress to Depte all of these executive spurs, and the President with
them. UDder its Article 118l1Slative authority, Concress may supply its own information aDd recommendations and override presidential vetoes. It may also refuse to pass

lectstatlon dear to the Executive, ancIlt can investigate other branches of rovemment
preparatory to lawmakinr or while overseeing the execution of

ex1sttnr acts.

Either or

both houses may pass resolutions censurtnr the President, and torether they can dispose
of blJD "and all CivU Officers of the United States" throuih lmpeactunent.
But more important in the real world than the coDiress1onal dominance sug,ested by the text has been the fact that the lanrua,e does not unavoidably preclude
broad presidential prerogative. Con,ressional control 15 not established beyond a reasonable doubt. There are three

,roun~

for uncertainty about the textls meaning.

First, many words and phrases in the Constitution's provisions on war and peace
are pnerality itself - for instance "declare war" and "commander in chief." They are
neither seU-detiniDi nor susceptible to one meanin, applicable in all circumstances.
Each pnerallty, accordin,ly, can be made concrete in many ways. And whether expanlively or narrowly construted, each has a number of dlfferent meanings, retlectiDi
the factual dltferences in the war-power contexts that It ,overns. Thus, whether an
ample

readlnc of

the declaration-of-war clause Is linked with a spare interpretation of

tbe commander-ln-cblef proviso, or vin-versa, the meanlnc riven both provisions wUl

vary with the type of action in question, its purpose and costs, whether there Is a need
for tpeed or secrecy, the tools required to implement it, and so on. tlA word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged," Mr. Justice Holmes suggestecl.

Rat~er,

he said, "it

is the skin of a livtnr thoucht and may vary ,reatly in color and content accord1nrr to
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the clrcwDStancel and the time In Wbleb It Is ...... 1fbIIe dI1s eaDDOt fairly be said of

second, doubt alSO exists becaIa tile tat
aDd

p_ eertaID ~ to tile Plilltdeut

otlMn to Concress tbat can be ....s to . . . . tile _ _ _ _ III .maalIJ ueIuIlft

f.......

n.e compedDC

puts permit . . . . bnDCb 1D eIaIIIl _tbarltJ ewer ....,

common III*ts of the war powers. Edward S. CarwID spaD of -qIal .......~tIbIII""
aDd aid that the "ConsdtuUoo, eonslde" GDlJ for Its

amnaatlft paDlS of paINI'S ca-

pable of Iffecttnc the Issue. b an inYitatloD to stftIIIIe for the prlYillp of

dlreetlDC

American foreicn polley."
In falmess to the tat. Woc1e aDd stftIIIIe do DDt ..... to ebanetertze lIS .,far-

madye

crants.

Strua1e rises to fever plteb GDl1 wbeD apuslve radIIIp are liven to

W-deflned Artiele

n powers of

the President. tbat is. wMD the

~

cIeal1nc with ex-

ecudve power, law enforeement. and IIlllltary eomm&IMI are eaastnIed to lDYolve the
Pres1dent in areas oyer wbieh Artlele I has liven

Concnss more ezpUcit crelS of au-

thority. Compedtlon Is rreatly lessened when COOCresslooal authority Is read pner-

ously and presidential spartncly, for the CoDstitutkJn provides the Exeeutive with far
fewer elearly defined respocmbUlt1es than It does Cqress..

Third, in addition to W-defined. frequently eompetitive provisions. there are also
DUmenus

pps in the war-power pI"OYislom.. Thou&b the text deals directly with SQIIle

of the Issues. it conspleuausly falls to speD to ottas. It says
IbOut whieb branc:h controls deployiDI sbIps em the

DOtblnr. for IDstanee.

bleb seas. statiaDIDC

tI'OOpi on far-

eip soU or deelarlnc neutrality in other _dons'struales.
The Constitution does lJDpose

ODe

ir'OD demaDd

OIl

that they cooperate If any sustained venture far war or

the President and Coap'ess;

~

Is to sueeeed. Even If

CODCiesstonal authorlty Is mast broadly eoastn8i. COlllJ"8SS mtBl work lIS will tbrouIb
the tectslatlYe proeess, and the President Is very mudl part of tbat proeess.

Under
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Article II. SeetIaD 3,-be de~ wIleD to call eoncr-lDto spRIal ~ sbau1d It
DOt be slttlDr. aD "UUaunIIDary

0eaIiaGs.. AJID UDder SeetIaD S . . . ., provide COD-

INa with lDfonutIaD aD die state of die UIdaD aDd ,..... . . . 1IICb _____ . . .
rJ aDd e&Il8'I"t.· ADd UDdIr Artiele I. Sec:tIaD .,. . . . ., veto . ,
m-.re !bat dlelllltSlators wtIb to . . . . . . . . . 1aW of dlelaDd. AcearcIIDClJ. die
text llmtts ~ CGDtrol bJ die PrIilkllD~ dlseNtIoD ..... speeiIll

" . ., bIs

rtcbt to Importune die JIIl$IatorS. aDd Ids capaellJ to faree .... to nile a two-tbIrdI
vote In both bauses to overeome IUs opposltIarL. 1be eoastlbldaaal role of die EDcu-

ttve In tile leIISIattve process bas been spIU'iDcly eonsu.d at tIlDes. but lIS pI-.ce Is
textually assured. Too. be bas at least

ments aDd treaties. ADd even were

seen as

those of •

aD equal

YOiee with die SeDate

die bulk of·1ds

ower ~t

rem·,m,. eoastltutloaal powers

c:oncressioDal -cent. tile Il'dlspeDsabIlllJ of aD . . .t lrows with tile

ponderousness of his master and the seope of IUs assipIDents.

On the otbel' band. II ueeutive autborlty Is read to take lllUimum adYantace of
pnerallty. competition amonc ennts. and pps.lt still eannot live the President total
control over Ameriean war and peace. Tbere are many important matters - trade eootroJs and

money. to eite an important area of

concressional consent UDder the unav

readlncs of

tile

C~tltution.

61 eourse. the

polley and • erueial tool Ierms of the text.

that require

With less extreme

utual dependenee of the two branebes be-

comes more prooouneed.

Dnrr!!r Revealed by Debates of die Framers aDd Ratlfiers
The Constitutional Fathers spent preelouS Uttle tilDe OIl What autbodty the Pres-

ident sbould bave over foreiCn affairs. war aDd peace ineluded. A t issue in 1787-11

were far more baste questlom about

what sort Of aeeuttve to earve out of

exIst1Dr

concresstonal aovernment - would it be single or' plural. aet with or' without a couneil,
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bave veto power, bow would It be cbcan, for What term and with what pcalbWty of

,....tIoD,

~

tile PnIIdInt
tMy

~

__

were rarely CODIlderw:I with an .,. to tbe respectiye rola 01

Concr-ln deterJD1nlnc AlI*'lcan foretp poney. To alarp atent

were merely another manifestation of tbe eaofUet over the- power of the eentral

IOftI'DIMOt, the federaUsts favortac altl"OlJlW EDcuttYe tban the Itat. ricin....

That eontllct

wu

the transcendent problem for the Framers and . .rulen. In

1117 It took elChteen days to move from Bolton to

GeortIa. Economic and pemmen-

tal dlv1s1ori further separated the American people. Their eonstltut1ona.l neeeII1t1es

were. first. an alloeat101l of autborlty betweeD the nationallOyernment and Itates that
wOUld erat. a viable union, and. seeood•• dlvtston of national authority bitween the
repNleDtattves of the larp and small states that would ensure ratUlcat10n cf the new
plan of IOvernment.
Not surpr1s1nc1y. when the f ramers and RatUlers felt they had to crappie with
quest10ns of w·ar and peace, the emphasis was on the states. not on

concress1onal and

executive powers. Dancer to the nation from state exeesses in forelln affairs had
vided Important impetus to the Constitutlonal Con\'ention.

pr0-

Since colonial days the

states had been loath to subordinate their immediate indtvidualinterests to the common
lood. They were reluetant to bear their fair share of mllltary burdens unless actually

attacked. but prone themselves to !nette Indlans. European powers, and their sister
states. Separate dlplomatic activity by them and tbelr Ylolartons of national treaties
were frequent. Jefferson wrote Wash1nCton early to the Pt1Uadelphta Convention about
the need "to make our states as one to all torelcn concerns," and Madison conchJded
that "[1]t we are to be one nation in any respeet, it clearly oucht to be in respect to
other nations."
8y the same token the Constitutional Fathers found the 5upremacy of nattonal

treatia over state law far more troublesome than the manner in which the federal
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covernment Itself would make treaties. They . . . alSO vastly more eoneemed to define nat10nal autbority over war and peace. aue.Iy peat 1D tta.Jry UDder the Coafeder-

atloo, than to spUt the war powers between the PreIIdeot and

cancress.

ADd tbey felt

It D8ClSsary to crant emerpney mUitary powers apUeltly to the states rather t.baD to
the Presldent, probably

OIl

the assumption that state mWtla would bear the first brunt

of repeW.nr sudden attack.

The sldmpy attention liven CODilessloDa1 aDd executive war powers 1D 1117-11

was a byproduct as well of the relatively sbort sbrUt liven forellD affalrs

IS

a wbole.

They were rarely mentioned in dlreet terms in either the Pb1Iadelpbia or stata debates.

The only aspects that recelved real debate were war and treaty

maJdnc. Empbasis

went to treaties, though the two merced whenaver ~ Constitutional Fathers turned to
the termil";a tion of bostill ties.
Predominant attention could CO to treaties, because peace was expected to be
the customary state of the new nation. America ~d avoid agressive war abroad and
~njoy

in turn "an insulated situation" from the If'Ut powers of Europe. In Alexander

Hamilton's words: "Europe is at creat distance from us. Her colonies in our vlc1n1ty will
be likely to continue too much disproportioned in Strenrth to be able to live us any dan-

rerous annoyance.
sary to

Extensive military establishments canDO_t In this pos1tion be neces-

our seeurity." this placid view or forelp relatioDs precluded any explicit

c0n-

sideration of the use 01 American force abroad, Beept for defensive Daval action to
protect the Atlantic coat and Amerlcan

COIDIIler'Ce. OOIy

Hamilton sugested that it

m.tcht be well to intervene in the Caribbean stnJRles of the Old World powers. Commercial relations were to characterize American relations abroad. Contacts of other
sorts. not much desired. would be discouraged by hobblinC treaty making. Gouverneur
Morris opined that "[Un pneraJ. he was not soUcitous to multiply c!c facilitate
Treaties." The isolationist mood was perhaps a reaction to the trials of the Revolution.
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It clearly fed on fear of IIUt-power Interference In the domestic poUtics of the fledr-

11nc state, espeeia1ly tbrouch bribery 01 federal polltielaDs. Whatever

eause. a

DO-

come so tar
to sugest dIsbandlnc the foreip service or remaetnc It from its already meacer pro-

t100 of peaceful retreat did

•

the

lrip Americans In the late 1TIOs -

.Job.n Adams

portiOIW.

Arain, not SUpris1nrly. it was the needs

of

domestic order. not forelp interven-

tion. that provided the lncentive for an uecutive Wbo could IUd the Datloaal army aDd
navy. The demons arisinr out of that eommaDd for the Framers and Ratlflers were
tbose of 1787-88. not ours. Their

abtdlnC fear was that the Executive would use

the

mUitary for tyrannical purposes at boDle. passlbly to make blmself a beredltary prince.
not that he would Wie it for W-advised foreJp adVentures. Controversy centered on
whether it was sate to allow exeeutive command In

~

field. whetbel' standlDc armieS

might be used by the President for domestic s.of;,version. and whether be should be allowed to pardon traitors, since their cr.mes c1Uld stem from efforts to help him usu.-p
power. For some o! the Constitutional Father.i. the demons lurkinr In military .atters
were not executive but conrressional: the tf!lislatOlS were said to hold both the purse
and the sword, and thus feared as Incipient military despots. For these Framers and
RaWiers the remedy wOUld have been a national military tboroughly dependent on state
militia, state officers, and state mllltary appropriations.
In short, American problems and assumptions in 1TIT-81 did not anticipate all of

ours. They were those of a small, d!vidad people apr for national unity but fearful of
federal tyranny. Domestic rebellion and foreip invasion were their "War" cooeems.
More important for them were safepanS apinst military usurpation at home than mU-

ltary preparedness c:Iurinr peace. Greatly more than we, they valued state authority
over national, lertslative power over executive. They preferred peace and poUtlcal
Isolation to a world made sate for America. The institutional arranpments developed
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in 1717-11 reflected

u.e vaw.

aDd aeecls. A small, eIlte braneb of

eoacr- WIll

pWmed .. a plenary partie1paDt with the President In wbatfter American

at ..doaa1 dIt....

JDiCbt arise. State m1l1tia were to .. tile brkll DG8
arbiter

at m1l1tary polley,

by

tbeIr COIDJDltment to CODfUct.

IOftrDIDI

clpIoID~

emcr- tile

tile . . . . . . at AJDeI1eaD arwaed fareas aDd

n. statal aDd Prllllidaut WGIId 181ft •

IDtmID dlfeld-

ers apIDIt sudden attaek, peodInr opportuDItJ far COIIII_&Nl cIIe1sl9ni aDd tile Ez-

eeutive would act as first PMl'al aDd .aIra1 sbauId tile ~tan . . . . . to npt.
The Framers aDd aat1f1en dld Inled a . . . eft_tift DatloDal aecudft dam
bad prevtously emted In the Coafederadoll CcJape& ~ by tbeIr UDderstaDdIDc
of European practice and political tbax'y, by prIor ......1lft Gelllilin America. aDd

caar.....dan JIIIsIa~ TbaJ

by the dismal executive record of RevoluttoaarJ aDd

wanted presidential aid In

tnc

eonduetinc neaotiat1ons. PtMrInC IDteIlIpnee. aDd In fram-

recommendations essential to poIicymaldJlc. They boped

to obtain

an eDeutlve

cheek on foolish or venal legislators. and tbey SOUCbt presidential aeeutlon of aat10aal

poUey. B:ut with rare exception tbe Framers and RaWIers did

concresstOnal control over 5ettlnc American polley

DDt

mean to surrender

aDd provldlnc tools for Its imple-

mentation. Thus. they rejected executive bepmony over forelp and military affairs.
as seen in European practice and political tbeory.

Their model . . Parllament'S

seventeenth-century steps to curb the BrltlsllldDr, and tbnJuIbout their deba~ ran a
persistent fear of ezeeutive despodsm.

Several eaveats are overGie. A constant of buIDan ezpertenee Is that our eon-

clusloos aboUt desirable anoeattons of power c:baa&e with sluns ·in tbe t.ic facts

OIl

which those alloeattons are premised. 1be Framers aDd Rat1fiers acted on the bUIs of

many assumptions about reality that

DD

lonpr bold. and they often seemed obs!!sncl

with epbemeral economic and security eooeerm.

What the ComtitutioDal Fathers

wOUld have thoucht ctven late twent1eth-century reaUties often cannot be confidently
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lSIiWDed from what they said amid the etrcumstaDC!eS of the late 1780's. What If they
bad reaUzed that peace aDd DODlDvolvement with the rest of the world

~

DOt be

America'S customary state: that die bazards. pace, and complezlty 01 lnta'Dat1oaal affairs would bw'poD,

aIonC with the country's eapae1ty and need to work lis will aoad;

that treat1es would Iwdly prove to be tile lUIS of Amerlean fondp relatloas; tbat from
the outset the Senate could DOt keep step with die President In,dIplomaeJ. and tile mill-

tta could DOt replace federal forces; tbat die replar mUltary would pow blip and
stand during peace, Utt1e restrained by the need for

coacress to raise and support It;

and that the loyalty of naturallzed c:1ttzer.. the naviptlon of the Mississippi, and other

compell1nl issues of the late eiChteenth eentury would quleldy fade!
.There

are, of course, aspects of the 1787-8i purposes DOt tainted by the passlDc

assumptions and problems of thOse years. But cy attempt to move from the speelfles
of the Framers' and Ratifiers' debates to resolve contemporary war-power Issues must
have its adequacy measured by reference to questio.ras such as those above, and It must
convincingly rebut the pDSSibiUty that the extrapolation Is tao speeulative to be meaningful.
Th~

other factors contribute to the hazards of extrapolating from 1787-88.

First, records of the drafting and ratifying conventions come in fralments. The Framers did have an official secretary. WWiam Jackson, but be restricted himself Jariely to
reeordlDc motions and votes.

Even these spotty DOtes were "carelessly kept." The

Framers debated In secret, and Jaeksonts Journal remained undisclosed. first In the
hands of Geofle Washinrton and then in the Department of State. until it was published
by an order of Concress in 1819. fOllOWing the deaths of IIKISt of the ConventioD dele-

rates. At that point. it was larrety beyond verification or correction.
In subsequent years other accounts of the Framers' Philadelphia proceedinp
were publ1!hed. most importantly the notes of James Madison in 1840. But Madison as
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an old

maD bad dublously revised his

account after the appearance of the JoumaL HIs

attempt to reconstruct events of more tbaD tbIrty ,.us before
by tile pMIIp Of time. Slmllarly.

copy of the plan that be bad

w.

neces&lrUy eJouded

Char_ PIDckDey. attelDptlDc In 1119 to procIuee a

~ted

tile CGaventkJa. could DDt N"MHllber widell 01

four or flv. papers In his bands was tile eorreet ftnIon..

Even When the ava1lable If cbeckered aeeounts of tile

PbUIIdelpbla praNell,.

are mustered. their overlappq dIscusslon eomes to very little for a COIlventkJD that

met steadlly for almost four months. Tbe standard compUation 01 the debates nms to
less than 1,300 paces: the verbatim trlDSertpt of a pro~ .. of slm11ar

Jenrth

could

easl1y reach twenty times that volume. Records of IDOIt 01 the state ratUytDc conventions are even more modest than tbase of PbUadelpbla. When aecutive and CODIres
sional preroptives clashed In the Steel Seizure Case. Mr. Justice JaekSOn lamented the
"poverty of really useful and unamblpous authority appUcable to eoncrete problems of
executive power • • •• Just what our forefathers did envtslon. or would have envisioned
had they foreseen modem conditions." be said. "must be divined from materials almost

as entematle as the dreams Joseph was called upon to Interpret for Pharaoh." The situation is not that crim, but available records are poor.
Second, thourh attendance varied. a total of fifty-five men participated in the

four months of deliberation In Pb1Iadelpbla. and many more toc:* part in the state ratifytnc conventions. Diverpnt positions had to be compromised
the ConttitutioD.

cb1.nr

the

drafttnc of

Compromise on one provIslon did DDt prevent efforts to reassert

more utreme positions In later provisions. Interpretation of speeific Jancuace varied
amone deleptes. Because the Ph1ladelpbla Convention met In secret and its participants said Utne about its deUberatiom

c:turInc ratUleat1on" deJeptes

to the state

c0n-

ventions were larply unaware of the previously expressed views of the Framers. Even
those Framers who were also RatUiers and c:hose to tell tbeir coneaeues of the
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Pb11adelpb1a debates did not always recall them with preclslon. Under the c1reumstances it is not Uke1y that a majority, mueb less all, of those who voted in the federal
and state conventions for the Constitution'S war power provisions bald a flDely drawn.

common "iDtent" about their meanlnc.
Tblrd, evidence of several sorts sugestS that the Framers may bave drafted with

a measure of cIe11berate ambicu1ty. Any constltut1oDal scbeme that depends OIl separation of powers and on cheekS aDd balances DeC

rJly a.Docatel amonc tbe braDcbes of

IOvemment competinl powers with vacueIY deflnecl frontiers or authority. Also apparent on the face of the Constitution Is a draftlnr technique that esehewecl detal! for
terse statement, leavtnc much to be assumed.
The Constitutional Fathers were praettcal

nique may well have reflected awareness

men, and tbelr 1aeoDlc draftlnc tech-

or the diffiCUlty or Jaytnc down rules to ~

em situations whose dimensions are at best (!tmly rrasped. James Madison in remarkS
to the VlrIiDla ratifying convention was quite expUcit about the need for upertence,
statilli that "the organization of the gt!.i'"lerallOvemmeot of the United States was, in
all its parts, very difficult. There was a peculiar dlffteulty in that of the executive.

Everythinr incident to it must have participated in that difficulty. That mode whleh
was judced most expedient was adopted, till experience should point-out one more eliCible." As Washinrton noted, "Time and babtt are nee 5 ry to fix the true character of
IOvernm.ents." And thOUCh not a Framer, Thomas J

erson suaested in 1816 what

they "would say themselves" about the need for expedaIce, "were they to rise from the
dead."

Some men look at constitutions _ Ill smetimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of tbe CDftD&Dt, too sacred to be toucbed. They ISedbe to U.
a( the ~
lnr ... a wisdom more than twmao, aad suppIa what they
did to be beyond amendment. I ImeW dial ... well; I belonpd to It, and labored with It.
well of Its
country. It wa very like the
wi1bDut tbe experience of the present; and forty
aperleDce In
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pvemment Is worth a century of boc*-radlnI; and this
they would say tbemselves. were they to rile from the dead •
• • • Let us •.• avall ourselv. Of our ruson and experience.
to correet tbe erude "'15 Of our flnt and unaperleneed.
a1~ wise, v1rtuouI. aDd well-mea.nIDc couneUs.
DelIberate IJDbICUlty may also bave . . . a ..... of produclnC acreement &mone

fractious deleptes. ao.r.vemeur Moms. very lDfhaldalln ~t1Dc tbe final version of
tbe document. ap1alned that "It became oec.ssary to select pbrases whlch. ezpnsstnc

my own DDtions, wOUld DDt alarm otbers ••••" For men wbaIe overr1dlDc objective was
ratification of a Constitution promis1ne a more vlable union. the precise meantnc to be
liven &mtJtcuous but cenerally aeeeptable Iancuace COUld awalt resolution In practice.
It follows that all Judrments about the Constitutional Fathers' purposes must be
viewed with a COld. and suspiclous eye. Fracmentarf evidence of tbe debates. the l1mlted eztent to which there Is ever common purpose In any process as lone. contentious.

and complex as the drattlni and ratlfying of the Constitution, the chance that the text
includes del1berately

amtncuous language

to be shaped by experience. the presence of

raps in intent ca~ by assumptions and problems pecul1ar to

the late 1780's. and the

danlers of extendlili what was said then about the war powers. in respeet to concrete
problems of that era. to unforeseen issues in unforeseen times - all these call for restraint about what the Framers and Ratiflers really had in mind.
With trepidation it can be said that tbere do seem to be certain lone-term ends
that the Constitutional Fathers SOUCht by the way In which they divided authority over
war and peace between the President and COIJI'l'eSS. They were:
1.

To ensure national defense

2.

To hinder the use of the mUltary for domestic tyranny

3.

To hinder its use for agress10n abroad

4.

To create and maintain consensus behind American
action for war and peace

5.

To ensure democratic control over policy about these
matters
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6.

To enmurace rational war and peaC!e deels10ns

1.

To permit continuity in American polley when desirable and its revislon as necessary

8.

To permit emerpney action for war or peace that
has not yet been blessed by national consensus or
democratic control

9.

To ensure American capacity to move toward war and
peace rapidly or secretly when necessary, and flexibly
and proportionately always

10.

To permit the efficient settine and executing of war
and peace pollcy.

Practice since 1789
Ronald Reagan enjoys far more sweeping CORtrol over American war and peace
than George Washington did, and Washington came to wield str1k1nlly rreater authority
than had been expected for the President during the constitutional convention of
1787-88. The dominant trend in war-power practice has been presidential argrandlze-

mente True, the process has not been linear between administrations or even within
them - compare lincoln'S war powers with those of Andrew Johnson or the preroga~

tives ot the early Nixon presidency with those of his last year In the White House. But
over the course of nearly two hundred years, presidential war powers have grown radically.
The growth of presidential authority over war and peace has stemmed largefy
from three factors:

the evolving nature of those institutional characteristics of the

presidency and Congress pertinent to the war powers; certain historical developments
that have favored the Executive's characteristics over those of Congress; and, finally.
the wUllngness of many Presidents. greater than that of Congress, to exercise their
constitutional authority to the fullest and beyond.
During Ameri:c an ret rea t from Indochina. however. congressional Influence over
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,

war aDd peace C!ame into flood tide atter a period of unpl'8C!8dented ebb. The lertsla-

tors c:ballenpd the President's C!Ontrol over a

ranee of action that seemed about to be-

come permanently bJs by virtue of repeated C!Oncresstonal aC!qU1esC!enC!e. At the C!Ore of
~

matters was the (!Ommltment of American forces to undeclared C!Ombat on a larp

or small seale, openly or (!Overtly. The (!Onstitutional text aDd debates acc:ount for
mucb of this C!Oncresstonal resUienC!e. They estabUsh C!ef'taln bard-eore IerISlative powers aDd rtve rise to proconcresstonal expectations wb1C!h, in conC!ert, create an endur'lnl
base from whiC!h the legislators C!an reassert their hold ever war and peaC!e from time

to time.
In areas of hard-core C!OngresstOnal authority, Presidents have usually felt them-

selves able only to recommend aC!tion, sign or veto I:eSUlting lectsIation, and reC!eive any
deleration of authority that Congress offered. While these areas do not include most
typeS

ot military aC!t1on, they

do cover most types of nonmilitary action with C!Onse-

quenC!es for war or peaC!e and most of the tools vital to implement polley of any sort.
Beyond these hard-core powers there has aJso been persistent popular feeUng
that the Constitution requires legislative approval of American use of forC!e.
Twentieth-century Presidents (unlike their predecessors) have rarely said that explicit
C!Ongress1onal approval is needed for most military action, but the view has tl1een
pressed with vigor by others during thLs C!entury. Even during the 19505 a re
COn(1'eSS kept the faith,
The lec1S1ators'

~nator

~enC!e

t in

Talt being their leading apostle.
aJso reflects the fact that C!Ongressional intI

be kept alive even thOUih Congress as a whole decllnes to vote on the merits,

a

Ucular pollcy. The power.of C!Ongressional C!ommittees to investigate and oveaae
vides a mdns of spar'.clng national debate, mOldlng opinion, and thereby inO.mm~

presidential action. Activity by indlvidual Senators and Representatives can
litical pressure already ex:1sting outside Congress and bring it to bear on the E.J EeI::att.
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J.ecislators can work privately too, communlcat1Dl quietly with the President to persuade blm

that his plans are W-advised or subject to crest potential opposition. Lects-

laton can alsO work in tandem with rebeWous elements in the bureaucracy to thwart

presldent1al policy.
Flnally, the door Is kept further ajar for COQln!lSS by the restraints imposed on
an EDcutive by his own capacity to persuade others to take steps he wishes taken.
Other centers of power within the country - the bureaucracy, courts, aDd medla In
particular

~

lessen his freedom of maneuver. And the electorate stancZ ready to turn

aplDst him if his policies are perceived to be unresponsive to popular neecm or, worse,
Weclt1mate. Intenttfying these restraints Is fear of the President as a potential despot,
a fear with us since 1787-88. In Arthur Schestnaer'S terms: "The theory .•• of the
President as the great moloch generating its own div1n1ty and about to swallow all
power can be reproduced at every stage in our history, beginnt.nc with those who •••
complained against the presidency of General Washington. Anti-Moloch pressures have
as their by-product an opportunity for Congress to reassert its Influence when in the

mood."
To date, however, the legislators have proved unable to reassert themselves once
and for all by establishing enduring channels for a congressional voice in deCisions about
war and peace. Like most of the rest of us, legislators tend to be result-oriented. Their
concern with the particulars of policy often overshadows their concern with the institutional process by which it Is made.

Prt..DCipal interest Ioe5 to what we should do

(whether to intervene in Nicaragua) rather than to how we should go about decidlnl
what to do (whether by executive fiat announced to coDiress1onalleaders shortly before
the fact, by prior conlresslonal approval, or by some Intermecl1ate method). Accordingly, mast leciSlators become seriOUSly solicitous of their prerogatives only when they dis8INe with executive pollcy.

Then no oar Is spared to set to rilhts presidential
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"USUrpation." But once the tempest over polley has passed, concern with the tmtinationa! aspects of decis10n maJdnC fades also, to aWalt tha nut tempest. The War P0w-

ers a.olutlon of 1913 may have slpaled. chanp In concresslOnal bablts.
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War Powers of the President and Congress:
Who Holds the Arrows and Olive Branch?
(By William Taylor Reveley)

IN THE spring of 1965 the United States sent troops a short distance into the Dominican Republic. Although desiring to protect Americans threatened there by civil strife, President Johnson also feared that the Dominicans might be about to go the
way of Castro's Cubans. His prophylactic intervention in Dominican affairs provided the catalyst for recent struggles between the Executive and Congress over the war powersChainnan J. William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee ended 1965 actively disillusioned with-presidential
direction of American foreign policy. The Indochina War massively spread his disillusionment. Spurred especially by the
Fulbright Committee, many legislators began to reconsider
Cold War assumptions about the proper roles of the President
and Congress in controlling American use of force abroad.
That reconsideration peaked only when President Nixon resigned.
Although attention -focused on military action in Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia, Congress was busy on related fronts as
well. Legislators demanded that the President disclose all existing executive agreements with other states, and they moved to
enlarge congressional control over future American commitments abroad, especially those with war and peace consequences. Efforts were made to cut foreign aid radically, including grants for military purposes, and to reduce spending
by the Defense Department for weapons and overseas bases.
Steps were taken to winnow the huge emergency authority
delegated to the Executive by statutes passed and left standing
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over the prior forty years (for instance, authority over the economy and the size of the armed forces). Legislators also tried to
prevent the President from either impounding congressional
appropriations, on the one hand, or spending monies not appropriated (particularly for military ends), on the other. Congress sought to pry information from the Executive branch on
a timely and comprehensive basis, vigorously rejecting claims
of executive privilege even as to matters said to involve national
defense. There were attempts to ensure congressional oversight of covert actions, whether intelligence and military operations abroad or security measures at home. Senate confirmation was demanded "for appointees to a number of newly
crucial executive posts, and Senate review of nominees was
taken as an opportunity to scrutinize and limit executive policy.
Then, too~ the legislators moved to lessen presidential influence by improving their own decision-making procedures,
especially committee and budgetary practices.
All of this ferment was important to the division of the war
powers between the two branches. Most telling were two of its
aspects. First, Congress ended American involvement in the
Indochina War by refusing to fund it any longer. The final in
a series of fiscal restraints came in the Church-Case Amendment to the Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 1974,
which banned outright the use of federal funds for any ··military or paramilitary operations'" uin;" ··over" or ··off the shores
of9 the whole of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. l Never befure
had Congress used its appropriations power to withdraw the
United States from a major conflict. Equally novel was the War
Powers Resolution of 1973. Again, never before had Congress
set out procedures for how the President and legislators are to
go .about deciding whether to fight. Together, these unprecedented developments offer Congress the best chance it has
had since 1789 for an assured voice in war and peace decisions.
Of the two, the appropriations ban suggests that the legislators
will command the Executive"s attention whenever they be. come restless, but the War Powers Resolution has the greater
potential for long-term legislative influence. Cutting off funds
is a drastic remedy not easily adopted even in extreme circum-

519
The War Powers Resolution of 1973

stances and one rarely conducive to thorough debate about
policy. Systematic legislative influence is more likely to flow
from procedures which cover mild as well as severe cases,
which direct debate to the policy merits without fiscal distractions, and which provide unavoidable channels for communication between the Executive and Congress.
The Constitution's necessary-and-proper clause permits
Congress to adopt measures such as the War Powers Resolution, which reiterate constitutional requirements and define
procedures for their implementation. 2 Section 2(b) of the Resolution duly recites: &"U nder article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the
power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers
vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any department or officer hereof."3
Congress's authority to reiterate constitutional requirements,
however, is far narrower than its power to define how they are
to be implemented. No congressional discretion exists concerning the nature of the constitutional requirements (for example,
under what circumstances the President may commit troops
withou t prior legislative approval). So far as the necessary-andproper clause is concerned, Congress's only option is to reiterate the Constitution, elaborating perhaps but not changing it.
W ide legislative discretion exists, on the other hand, over the
choice of means: The President can be ordered to give up old
methods of implementation (for instance, episodic, often untimely reporting of troop commitments) and adopt new ones
(complete, prompt reporting).
As a practical matter, of course, the legislators do have some
leeway with respect to the nature of the constitutional requirements. It comes from the same source as the President'suncertainty as to what the Constitution means. The greater the
ambiguity, the greater the difficulty in separating a definition
of constitutional requirements from the adoption of means to
implement the Constitution. War-power legislation simply
requiring the President to report his commitment of troops to
combat seems to involve means" alone. But such legislation
&C
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moves toward constitutional ··definition" if it requires prior
congressional approval for American use of force except on
certain occasions defined in the statute; or if it puts a deadline
on any use of force begun by the President alone unless Congress subsequently approves the venture; or if it pennits Congress to end an executive use of force by concurrent resolution,
that is, by a measure not subject to veto.
Once war-power legislation moves beyond means to definition, it has no more right to automatic acceptance by the President than his constitutional claims have to automatic acceptance by Congress. If the President signs the act, he concedes its
claims, opening the way to consensus. If he vetoes it and is
upheld, then no law fonnally exists, but prudence may lead the
Executive to accept many of the measure's would-be requirements, and the le~~lators will have a concrete notion of the war
powers that they think are constitutionally theirs. If the President's veto is overridden, he may still refuse to acknowledge
the legislation, unless the courts tell him to do so. Prudence,
however, will dictate even more strongly his acqJ].iescence in
the act's reQuirements, and Congress will be even more confident of its war-power role. Still, if the legislation strongly
offends the President's understanding of his constitutional
powers or of the national good, he may defy it. And he almost
surely will obey only the narrow letter of the law. In other
words, a war-power statute is most likely to foster a clear, enforceable division of authority between the two branches if it
is signed by the President. Thus, if there are a few basics on
which the two branches can agree, the legislation ought to stick
to them, leaving other aspects of the division of authority to
evolve from these basics.
It comes as no surprise, then, that the War Powers Resolution
of 1973 and its proponents took care to stress that they were
not engaged in constitutional definition. As Section 2(a) of the
meaSure chastely states: &&It is the purpose of this joint resolution
to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution . . . ." Or
in the words of Senator Muskie:
.
The bill does not undertake to impose on the President a modification
of bis constitutional powers. It does not undertake to assert a restate-

521
The War Powers Resolution of 1973

229

ment of Congress' view as to the President's role with respect to the
warmaking power.
""hat it undertakes to do is to establish a procedure for comity as to
different views in the future, so that Congress can be brought in from
the periphery of the warmaking power to its center in order to exercise its proper role,"

The Executive disagreed. President Nixon felt that "the restrictions which this resolution would impose upon the authority of
the President are . . . unconstitutional," adding that "[t]he
only w~y in which the constitutional powers of a branch of the
Government can be altered is by amending the Constitutionand any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone
is clearly \vithout force."5 While it grates to hear a President
say that constitutional change may come only -by formal
amendment in light of our Executives' historic taste for amendment by practice, it was seemly for ~Ir. Nixon to point out that
the War Powers Resolution does attempt a bit of constitutional
definition in Congress's image. That fact has lessened the generosity with which the White House has implemented the
measure.
The steps leading to its enactment were complex and contentious. 6 They began with efforts by Senator Fulbright in the late
1960s to reduce presidential freedom in foreign affairs. On
June 25, 1969, the Senate by vote of 70 to 16 adopted the following proviso, a m.odified version of one that the Senator had
introduced almost two years earlier:
Resolved, That (1) a national commitment for the purpose of this
resolution means the use of the armed forces of the United States on
foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government
or people by the use of the armed forces or financial resources of the
United States, either immediately or upon the happening of certain
events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment
by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the
executive and legislative branches of the United States Government
by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses
of Congress specifically providing for such a commitment. 7

On November 16, 1970, by a vote of 289 to 39, the House of
Representatives took its initial step, passing a measure requir-
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ing the President to report quickly to Congress, in writing, concerning the legal basis, circumstances, and anticipated scope of
any commitment of American troops abroad, whether to enlarge forces already there, make new deployments, or fight.
Later House resolutions leading to ultimate agreement with the
Senate in the fall of 1973 became progressively more severe in
their limits on presidential freedom, but the Representatives
continued to hinge their scheme on after-the-fact reporting by
the Executive.
The Senate, to the contrary, was more interested in preventing the President from acting in the first place without prior
congressional approval, except in a few carefully defined circumstances. Thus Section 3 of the Senators' 1973 bill provided
that
[i]n the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress, the Armed
Forces of the United States may be introduced in hostilities, or in
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is dearly indicated bX the circumstances, only(1) to repel an armed attack upon the United States, its territories
and possessions; to take necessary and appropriate retaliatory actions
in the event of such an attack; and to forestall the direct and imminent
threat of such an. attack;
(2) to repel an armed attack against the Armed Forces of the United
States located outside of the United States, its territories and possessions, and to forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack;
(3) to protect while evacuating citizens and nationals of the United
States, as rapidly as possible, from (A) any situation on the high seas
involving a direct and imminent threat to the lives of such citizens and
nationals, or (B) any country in which such citizens and nationals are
present with the express or tacit consent of the government of such
country and are being subjected to a direct and imminent threat to
their lives, either sponsored by such government or beyond the
power of such government to control; but the President shall make
every effort to terminate such a threat without using the Armed
Forces of the United States, and shall, where possible, obtain the consent of the government of such country before using the Armed
Forces of the United States to protect citizens and nationals of the
United States being evacuated from such country; or
8
(4) pursuant to specific statutory authorization
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As majorities in the House and Senate struggled toward compromise, the dominant issue remained whether to try to define
the occasions on which the President might use force without
prior congressional approval, and if he might, whether the
President had independent constitutional authority to act under
those circumstances or merely delegated authority from Congress. Crucial also was the issue whether to impose time limits
on any presidential action, and if so, what deadlines (30 days?
120?), measured from which tripwire (from the time of an
executiye order committing the troops? from the moment Congress receives the Presidenfs report? and if that, how long to
submit the report after the order?). Also hotly debated was
whether Congress should be able to end an executivE initiative
by inaction-by simply failing to vote one way or another on it,
as opposed to explicitly voting no. 9 Similarly contested was
whether Congress might stop executive action by concurrent
resolution or \vhether it should do so only by a vote subject to
presidential veto. Finally, the nature of presidential consultation with Congress was the subject of much concern. While the
House would not touch the Senate's definitional approach, it
did warm to the notions of a deadline on presidential initiatives
and their termination either by congressional inaction or concurrent resolution. The grO\ving militancy of the House is epitornized by evolution in the consultation language included in
the various House resolutions. The first urged the President to
consult with Congress '''when feasible." The fourth and last demanded that "the President in every possible instance shall
consult with the leadership and appropriate committees of the
Congress . . . . 10
On October 10, 1973, the Senate agreed by a vote of 75 to
20 to a compromise based on the House version. The Representatives concurred two days later, 238 to 123. On October 24
President Nixon vetoed the legislation, finding it "'both unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interest of our Nation."
On November 7 Congress overrode the veto. The text of the
Resolution and veto appear in Appendix C. They are prime
examples of conflicting congressional and executive claims tegarding the war powers.
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Congressional opinion was not monolithic. Though the War
Powers Resolution as adopted did not include the constitutional definition that Senator Jacob Javits had championed, he
nonetheless liked it: "The fact is that never in the history of this
country has an effort been made to restrain the \var powers in
the hands of the President . . . . [I]t will make history in this
country as has never been made before."ll But some other
supporters of the Senate's definitional approach viewed the
Resolution "as a historic surrender," not "a historic recapture." 12
Thomas F. Eagleton and Gaylord Nelson, cosponsors of the
Senate bill, bitterly opposed the final act. In Eagleton's tenns:
If we are reluctant to deal with the constitutional issue of prior author-

ity, then we will continue to be confronted in years to come ~'ith the
prospect of desperately trying to stop misbegotten wars.
War powers legislation that is meaningful has to deal with the
fundamental causes of the constitutional impasse that plagued the
Nation for the past decade. It must . . . in the most precise legal
language, carefully spell out those powers which adhere to the Executive by reason of his status as Commander in Chief and his obligation to act in emergencies to repel attacks upon the Nation, its
forces, and its citizens abroad. For the rest, such legislation must
make clear that all remaining decisions involved in taking the Nation
to war are reserved to the elected representatives of the people-as
the Constitution so says, the Congress. 13

But others equally devoted to congressional prerogative
feared precisely such a spelling out of presidential authority.
Senator Fulbright had cautioned:
I am apprehensive that the very comprehensiveness and precision of
the contingencies listed . . . may be drawn upon by future Presidents to explain or justify military initiatives which would otherwise
be difficult to explain or justify. A future President nlight, for instance, cite "secret" or "classified" data to justify almost any conceivable foreign military initiative as essential to "forestall the direct
and imminent threat" of an attack on the United States or its armed
forces abroad.·"

And, of course, a significant number of legislators saw even the
House approach, embodi~d in the adopted Resolution, as an
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unconstitutional or unwise re ":ction on presidential po\ver.
18 Senators and 135 RepreThese people made up m of
sentatives who voted to smitaJn the President's veto.
eel years did Congress bring
Why after almost two
itself to institutionallegisl
war powers? A variety of
in the Constitution and
factors were at work, s
s is usually the case with
others in passing political
great constitutional issues.
- 'es in Congress felt a need to
war and peace. President
reassert themselves in dec '
Nixon's 1970 Cambodian .
sprung as suddenly on
Congress as on the North , his Christmas bombing
of North Vietnam in 1972..
in the teeth of profound
"nued bombing of Camcongressional disquiet,
bodia in the summer of 1
Congress had forced an end
to American fighting in \- .
against a background of
presidential sway during
\Var, had created serious
constitutional imbalance, so
most Senators and Representatives were concern
Further, it was presid
ative's bad luck that the
u 'on coincided with \Vatergestation of the War Pow
gate. The latter led most Lo~~iSmletl to see constitutional imbalance in many aspects of
. e power, not just those
ti n on the Resolution coalinvolving foreign affairs~ esced with the dismissal
osecutor Archibald Cox
and the ensuing resignati
y General Elliot Richardson, as well as with the
White House tapes controversy.
More mundane factors 'II-lII-g,~o t work. Before the vote on
use in 1973 had sustained
Nixon's veto of the Resol .
five successive executive v
D emocratic majority was
eager to override for the
party. Similarly, the 1972
election had produced
rew members of Congress,
t e against anything N ixonmost of them Democrats
ian. There was also a su
ying effort to win for the
override a number of R
. es who had voted against
the Resolution on the
. was too weak. Five such
votes were turned aro
enide margin in the House
was four votes. Finally,
sentiment in both Congress
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and the country had decisively rejected continued American
involvement in Indochina, thereby removing the inhibitions on
votes against a President and his policy that exist \\'hen the
country is at war. Conditions were prime for Congress to :; ake
an unparalleled claim to the war powers.

Constitutional Definition
In the War Powers Resolution, two-thirds of the Senate J.nd
House defined the Constitution as subjecting to leg· ~v e
control all American involvement in imminent or actual mbat, except perhaps for hostilities on American territory Th us
under Section 5(b) of the measure, the absence of coniJessional approval for such involvement compels its end iter
0
sixty days, unless Congress extends the deadline, is U
meet in the wake of armed attack on America, or the Pr _ ent
obtains an extra thirty days of grace by certifying in \\ mg
that our troops' safety requires their continued use dun _ the
withdrawal process. And under Section 5(c), "at any time that
United States Anned Forces are engaged in hostilities o_tslde
the territory of the United States, its possessions and tern tories
without a declaration of 'var or 5pecific statutory authorization,
such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress
so directs by concurrent resolution." In short, Congress claims
that the President may not constitutionally commit our forces
to foreign hostilities unless the legislators either explicitly authorize combat in advance or ratify it within a set time after its
beginning. Further, Congress asserts that no veto is constitutionally permissible when the legislative process runs in reverse, that is, when the President commits troops without rior
congressional authorization. In that event, Section 5(b) p . its
tive
either the House or Senate to terminate the executive"
simply by failing to ratify it before the statutory dea
and
it at
Section 5(c) permits majorities in both houses to abr
any time by concurrent resolution.
The principal parent of the Resolution, Repr
tive
Clement J. Zablocki, described its potential in these t
s:
Our purpose ... was to provide Congress with a two-b
proach . . . to ending a commitment of troops ordered b y

apesi-
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den . The first of that so-called two-barrel approach involves the 60da·~· period at the end of which the President would have to end the
commitment of troops unless Congress, in effect, exercises its exclusive warmaking powers by endorsing or approving the action
through a declaration of war or a specific authorization. . . .
The second barrel . . . involvestilte conCUJTent resolution which
we regard as a statutorily legal method of ending the commitment of
troops. The thought behind the desirability of the concurrent resolution route is obvious: since the Constitution gives Congress-and
only Congress-the power to d
e war, Congress had to have a
nonvetoable method of demo
. g, ifit"sofchose, that it did not
wish to declare war, even before
. . of the OO-day period.
We recognized that the Consti,
tes that the President
is Commander in Chief but it
e'\"eIl greater clarity that
only Congress can declare war.
Cranted, Congress may have abclica
power over the last
few decades through inaction; as _..AA~~ 'e s.:left,is began to assume
the'power. In time, this assump .
Presidents led to the
~_!1 Presidential power .15
ern9neous idea that it was an inher

Having claimed legislative co
American involveesolution to read the
m t in combat, Congress w
Co titution as requiring prim leg~lti\re approval for such
Section 2( c): "The
involvement except on Avo 0
co titutional powers ofthte
mas\Qer-in-Chief
to introduce 1) nited States
- to hostUiities, or into
- hostilities is clearly
situations where imminent in
indicated by the circumstan
only pursuant to
(l».radeclaration of war, (2~
authorization, or
(3~a national emergency
upon the United
St
, its territories Qr po
ed forces." In the
Ie . lators' view, the Fresid
ority may consti- .
tutionally commit us'
repel ,an attack on
.le Ironically, this
American territory 01\
er even than the
reading of executive"
Iy.
definition in the Sena b
Congress nailed Section
position tighter
in Section 8(d) (2) : "No .
lutitm ... shall
be construed as granting
the Pnesident with
~espect to the introduc:tioD
Annea F o~ces into
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hostilities or into situations wherein an involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority
he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution,"'
And the legislators apparently hoped to force the Preside
either to accept their reading of the Constitution in Section 2( c)
openly defy it, or to plead mea culpa, because Section 4(a) (B)
demands that he explain to Congress "the constitutional . .
authority" for any com~itment of troops to combat, should
do so withaut prior legislative approval.
How do the constitutional conclusions of the War Powers
Resolutions,tarui in relation to those reached in Chapters V
and IX? The jud gment that American involvement in combat is
. tely ubject to congressional control seems sound for re~
s
cleve ed tliere. Equally sound is the act's provision that
Congress
y elld presidential initiatives by concurrent resolution, again fer reasons already noted. 17
But the gis 'on's apparent distinction between combat on
Am rican te . ry and abroad lacks merit. In both instances,
as sugges
eviously, Congress should have authority to
curb exe . e war making. 18 Nor does the Resolution indicate
with suff . nt clarity that Congress may condition, as well as
terminate, executive policy. The distinction between an absolute con
sional ban on American involvement in combat
the .
s~· . n of congressional conditions on it has alread .
been not
E.xp .cit recognition of the distinction is import
to avoid
idential pretense that such conditions are the s
as strate
or tactics and therefore wholly within executi
c trol.
sump tion that Congress must explicitly approve
The act'
e of fo~ce, if the use is to be constitutional, does
,... ....,......rrt>-aly sound. Defects in such a notion, especi ~
by a deadline for ratification, have already b
. ilarly, Section 2(c)'s severe limits on presiden .
commit troops have scant merit. Under this s 's C--r-9'9I'··tionaJ definition, Presidents could never on th .
'ty direct American troops to confront those
d er to protect American civilians or property
O n1~n'"lI!OIrI , to assist international peace keeping
7
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humanitarian rescue, to defend the territorial integrity of
Mexico against foreign attack, and the like.
While the union of Sections 2(c), 4(a) (B), and 8(d) (2), described earlier, suggests ~hat the legislators meant their niggardly reading of presidential war powers to govern American
practice,19 other evidence exists that this was not really con ..
gressional intent. The October 4, 1973, uJ oint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference" hedged: USection
2( c) is a statement of the authority of the Commander.. in .. Chief
respecting the introduction of United States Anned Forces into
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. Subsequent
sections of the joint resolution are not dependent upon the language of this subsection, as was the case with a similar provision
of the Senate bill . . . ."20 Senator Eagleton dismissed the
section as "the pious pronouncement of nothing. "21 Senator
Muskie attempted an explanation that seems as cogent as any,
other than that the provision was included to placate backers of
the Se'nate bill: 22
It is true . . . that this language is not operative language.
Why was it put into the bill?
It was put into the bill as an indication that, in enacting a bill, Congress did not intend to surrender any of its constitutional powers with
respect to the making of war.
The remainder of the bill is a procedural bill. undertaken to insure
consultation by the President with Congress and undertaking to put
in the hands of Congress the procedure for tenninating any hostilities
into which the President may have plunged tls~whether or not his
action in so doing conformed with our view as te what his constitutional powers might be.23

Presidents Ford and Carter ignored the limits of Section
2(C),2.f and their successors are likely to ignore them. The State

Department has concluded that the proviso does notconstitute
a legally binding definition of the Preside's Constitutional
power as Commander-in-Chief. ' ,'25 And while inodest as such
definitions go, the June 1975 formulation of that power by the
Department's Legal Adviser offered no comfort to the provi..
sion:
H
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Besides the three situations listed in subsection 2(c) ... , it appears that the President has the constitutional authority to use the
Armed Forces to rescue American citizens abroad, to rescue foreign
nationals where such action directly facilitates the rescue of V.S.
citizens abroad, to protect V.S. Embassies and Legations abroad, to
suppress civil insurrecti.on, to implement and administer the tenns of
an armistice or cease-fire designed to tenninate hostilities involving
the V nited States, and to carry out the tenns of security commitments
contained in treaties. We do not, however, believe that any such list
can be a complete one, just as we do not believe that any single definitional statement can clearly encompass every conceivable situation in
which the President's Commander in Chief authority could be exercised. 28

To the extent that Section 2( c) does lack binding effect, its
unduly restrictive view of presidential authority is softened.
But, to precisely that same extent, the legislation takes on a
quixotic air, detrimental to the rule of law. Clear, enforceable
constitutional rules, as well as the war-power ends discussed
earlier, would have been better served had Congress foregone
the section.

Implementing Procedures
How does the War Powers Resolution implement the legislators' definition of the constitutional requirements? As just
noted, it provides very few means to enforce Section 2( c). The
legislation is far more thorough about obtaining information
from, and consultation with, the President and about focused,
expedited congressional action on the particulars of any use of
force. President Nixon's veto message did not attack these
aspects of the act. As the State and Defense Departments
pointed out in June 1975, the message uindicated that portions
of.the War Powers Resolution, includingsections5(b) and5(c),
are unconstitutional. No such position was expressed as to section 4,'· concerning presidential reports to Congress. 27 In fact,
one of the few provisions of the Resolution singled out for
praise in the veto message was the third, or consultation, section:
The responsible and effective exercise of the war powers requires
the fullest cooperation between the Congress and the Executive and
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the prudent fulfillment by each branch of its constitutional responsibilities. [The Resolution] includes certain constructive measures
which wauld foster this process by enhancing the flow of information
from the /executive branch to the Congress. Section 3, for example,
calls for consultations with the Congress before and during the involvement of United States forces in hostilities abroad. This provision
is consistent with the desire of this Administration for regularized
consultations with the Congress in an even wider range of circumstances.

Ironically, after the act went into effect, the most bitter congressional charges that uthe executive branch proclivity is toward evasive and selective interpretation" of the Resolution
have concerned consultation. 28
Information
Legislative decisions about the use of force depend on the
timely receipt by Congress of pertinent infonnation, much of it
from the President. Matters relevant to his reporting include
what SQlct:s of circumstances require a report, how rapidly it
must be made, its content, whether it is to be periodically updated, alld the mechanics for laying it before the various legislators. Sections 4 and 5( a) of the Resolution deal with these
questions:
Sec. 4{a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in
which United States Armed Forces are introduced(1) into hostilities or into situations where immine~t involvement
in hostilities is clearly in.dicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for deployn'lents which relate solely to
supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed
Forces equipped for combat already loca~ed in a foreign nation:
the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House
. . . and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth(A) tile circumstances necessitating the introduction of United
States Anned Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such
introduction took place; and
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(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
(b) The President shall provide such other information as the
Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of
United States Armed Forces abroad.
(c) ... [T]he President shall, so long as such anned forces
continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the
Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as
well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but
in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every
six months.
Sec.5(a) Each report subnlitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1) shall
be transmitted to the Speaker . . . and to the President pro tempore
.. . on the same calenc!ar day. Each report so transmitted shall be
referred to the Committee on [International Relations] of the House
of Representatives and to the Cnmmittee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the
Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in
excess of three calendar days, the Speaker . . . and the President
pro tempore . . . if they deem it advisable (or if petit~oned by at
least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall
jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may
consider the report and take appropriate action . . . .

Sections 4 and 5(a) are basically sound, with several reservations. There is no reason for Section 4(a) to dispense with a
presidential report if Congress has declared war, while requiring one if Congress has previously authorized the use of force
by legislation other than a fonnal declaration. 29 Since Section
8(a) of the Resolution indicates that the President is to assume
authority to use force only from the most explicit congressional
statements to that effect, all prior legislative approvals should
be regarded as the same, whether they are clothed in a declaration of war or some other fonn.
There is some ambiguity in. the tenns used by Section 4(a) (1)
to (3) to describe what sorts of circumstances require a report.
The first answer to this ambiguity must come in the Executive's
appraisal of the facts of each case. In October 1974 Secretary of
State Kissinger explained that
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several months ago the Office of the Secretary of Defense instituted
an arrangement whereby the Legal Adviser to the Chairman of the
J oint Chiefs of Staff informs the Department of Defense General
Counsel of all troop deployment actions routed through the Chairman's office which could raise a question as to whether a report to the
Congress is required. In implementation of that arrangement a written instruction was promulgated establishing a War Powers Reporting System within the Operations Directorate of the JCS. Arrangements have been Inade for this Department's Legal Adviser to receive the same information as is supplied to the DOD General
Counsel. Consultations between the two departments' legal counsels
will be arranged as needed. 30

Especially open to disagreement are the meaning of "hostilities" and "imminent involvement." Legislative history of the
Resolution indicates that Congress meant for these words to
cast a broad net: "In addition to a situation in which fighting
actually has begun, hostilities also encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is
a clear and present danger of arm'e d conflict. 'Imminent
hostilities' denotes a situation in which there is a clear potential
either for such a state of confrontation or for actual anned conflict."31 The State and Defense Departments adopted more
restrictive "working definitions'" of these terms:
"[H]ostilities" ... mean a situation in which units of the U.S. armed
forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units
of hostile fort~es, and "imminent hostilities" . . . mean a situation in
which there is a serious risk from hostile fire to the safety of United
States forces. In our view, neither term necessarily encompasses irregular or infrequent violence which may occur in a particular area .
. . . Whether or not ... rifle fire constitute[s] hostilities would
seem to us to depend upon the nature of the source of this rifle firei.e., whether it came from a single individual or from a battalion of
troops, the intensity of the fire, the proximity of hostile weapons
and troops to the helicopter landing zone, and other evidence that
might indicate an intent and ability to confront U.S. forces in
anned combat. 32
.

These interpretative issues matter, of course, because they
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determine whether the President should report at all and, if so,
whether under Section 4(a) (1), rather than under Section
4(a) (2) or (3). Recall that under Section 5 of the act, only Section 4( a) (1) circumstances give Congress the power to end an
executive initiative by inaction or concurrent resolution.
This does not mean that a President can count on avoiding
the Resolution by flatly refusing to report or by declining to
report under Section 4(a) (1) even though hostilities are at
hand. Senator Javits has felt "it . . . timely to remind the
Executive Branch-as was made clear during the floor debate
on the Conference Report-failure properly to label a report
required ... under Section 4, or even a failure to submit a
required report, will in no way delay or frustrate the triggering of the eo-day clock and the provisions of Sections 4
through 7 of the law."33 In 1975 the Legal Adviser to the State
Department did not quarrel with this view, thou~h he noted
that the Executive is just as entitled as Congress to interpret
what the Resolution requires: "[I] t is perfectly within the power
of Congress to decide even if we reported under 4(a) (2) that it
was really 4(a) (1) and treat that as the beginning of the OO-day
or 9O-day period trigger. I don t agree that the competency is
absolute. . .. . [T]he Executive can have an interpretation just
as the Congress can have an interpretation and in the last analysis it would arise on some sort of lawsuit which the courts would
probably decide. "34
Section 4(a) directs that the President report to Congress
"within 48 hours" after "any case [listed in Sections 4(a) (1) to
(3)] in which United States Armed Forces are introduced."35 It
is not likely that the Executive can both manage a crisis and prepare a report in much less time. The Mayaguez !eport anticipated the deadline by four hours. I t reached the offices of the
Speaker and President pro tempore in the middle of the night,
after the President "had to be awakened at 2 o'clock in the
morning in order to read and sign his report . . . ."36 But it is
also true that many American uses of forces will be over before
a 48-hour report makes its way to the legislators. Thus, to the
extent that the Resolution depends on congressional reaction to
formal executive reports, it concedes ·control over short-term
military crises to the President.
7
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As regards Section 4(a) (A&C), a more particularized statement of content would be desirable (since Presidents will be
prone to say as little as possible):3i for instance, requirements
that the Executive set forth (1) the precise objectives of his action, (2) the American personnel, money, and other resources
committed to it, (3) the geographical areas affected by the
action, (4) the length of time that particular resources have
been committed to particular areas, and (5) his projection of
future developments regarding each of the above. If any of this
information might aid- the enemy, procedures could be developed to make reasonably likely its submission and receipt
in confidence. Section 4(a) (B) poses other problems. As already suggested, its requirement that the President state ccthe
constitutional ... authority" under which he acted seems
designed either to force him to accept the stingy reading of his
authority in Secbon 2( c), to defy it openly, or to adnl!t guilt for
having transgressed it. The Section 4(a) (B) requirement that he
state ccthe legislative authority" under which he acted, if any,
presumably refers to statutory approval other than declarations
of war, since no report is required under the latter. This proviso
renews the needless dichotomy between the two just mentioned. There would be merit, however, in requesting the Presi-dent to justify his action under international law, in~luding
treaties. The degree to which the action is or is not legal under
that law is an element Congress must weigh in determining
whether the action's costs to the country outweigh its benefits.
Section 4(b) is little more than hortatory, since it fails to deal
with the extent to which the President in the exercise of his constitutional war powers is entitled to withhold information from
the legislators. If the act means to suggest that the President has
no such right, even as to strategic and tactical data, it strays.
Section 4( c) has greater merit. Periodic reporting by the President during any ongoing use of force is essential to ensure that
Congress remains capable of infonned decision making and
that it is presented with recurrent, unavoidable occasions to
take a position. Whatever the content requirements for the initial presidential report, supplemental reports should update all
pertinent categories. Section 5(a) provides apt means for laying
the facts of American involvement in combat before those con-
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gressional committees most competent to deal \vith them, as
well as apt means for bringing the legislators as a whole together if they are out of session when crisis -develops and the
circumstances warrant their immediate consideration of the
President's action.
The Resolution does not deal with secret reporting, but its
terms implicitly accommodate it. Nothing is said, for instance,
about automatic disclosure of the President's report in whole to
all members of Congress, and certainly nothing is said about its
automatic disclosure to the public. If the President is, in fact, to
report meaningfully in all the circumstances covered by Section 4(a), he must have reasonable confidence that secrets told
Congress will remain secret. On the other hand, the legislators
must be assured that vital information is not withheld from
them simply because it undercuts executive desires; and Congress cannot be bound to keep presidential secrets when it
believes public awareness of them is crucial to the national
interest. Most of these difficulties ~ould be met by a constructive relationship between the Executive, on the one hand, and
the Speaker, President pro tempore, and the Senate and House
foreign affairs committees, on the other. It ought to be possible
for these legisla.tors to receive and keep information in confidence until the President agrees to its disclosure to the rest of
Congress or until a majority of both committees so vote. 38

Consultation
In addition to calling for formal presidential reports, the Resolution seeks to obtain a legislative voice in war and peace decisions by demanding that the President exchange views
\vith the legislators and seek their advice about aU American
moves into or toward hostilities, except when circumstances
utterly preclude consultation. Section 3 states: "The President
in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before
introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United
States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or
have been relnoved from such situations." According to the

,

537
The War Powers Resolution of 1973

245

Resolution's legislative history, this "consultation" is to be a
meaty process:
The use of the word "every" r~f1ects the committee's belief that
such consultation prior to the commitment of armed forces should be
inclusive. In other words, it should apply in extraordinary and emergency circumstances-even when it is not possible to get fonnal congressional approval in the fonn of a declaration of war or other
specific authorization.
At the same time, through use of the word "possible" it recognizes
that a situation may be so dire, e.g. hostile missile attack underway,
and require such instantaneous action that no prior consultation will
be possible. It is therefore simultaneously firm in its expression of
Congressional authority yet flexible in recognizing the possible need
for swift action by the President which would not allow him time to
consult first with Congress.
The second element of section [3] relates to situations after a commitment of forces has been made (with or without prior consultation).
In that instance, it imposes upon the President, through use of the
word "shall;' the obligation to "consult regularly with such Members
and committees until such United States Armed Forces are no longer
engaged in hostilities or have been removed from areas where hostilities may be imminent."
A considerable amount of attention was given to the definition of
consultation. Rejected was the notion that the consultation should be
synonymous with merely being infonned. Rather, consultation in this
provision meaqs that a decision is pending on a problem and that
Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their
advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of action contemplated. Furthennore, for consultation to be
meaningful, the President himself must participate and all infonnation relevant to the situation must be made available. 39

Two defects in Section 3 are somewhat troublesome. First, it
does not require consultation in Section 4(a) (2) and (3) circumstances, only 4(a) (1). The Executive has carefully noted this
distiD'ction, disclaiming any statutory duty to consult about new
deployments or substantial increases in old ones. But as the
State-Department told a House subcommittee, "The President
has not made anything of that; he intends to consult irrespective
~==--- --- of which of these paragraphs an action may fall under."40 From
a "policy viewpoint" influential legislators have urged ·the
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Executive to continue to make nothing of the distinction. 41
Nonetheless, it is alive and well as a matter of law.
Second, Section 3 leaves the President significant discretion
to choose which Senators and Representatives he will consult
and when to talk with them. Obviously, the less often they
meet during a crisis, and the less the chosen legislators know
about foreign affairs, the more trivial the consultation is likely
to be. Triviality is probable when the President inserts into a
continuous process of executive decision making a few episodic gatherings with congressional leaders, chosen without
regard to their foreign affairs expertise and responsibilities.
By way of remedy, one Representative has suggested that
[t]o have a really meaningful advise and counsel procedure involving
legislative action, I would think that it would be almost essential that
[the congressional consul tees ] drop everything else they are doing
and stay with the NSC during this ~'-day period in this instance or
any other unfolding crisis to be there to consider and evaluate the
facts as they are perceived and as they may change during this period
of time.
Otherwise, if they are brought in for advi[ c]e arid consultation at
the time of the first meeting of the NSC with the President, all of that
might be totally outdated by what happens a few hours later. It might
really be well for the President in the f !ture to do his best to insist that
the Speaker of the House and the minority leader as well as the majority and minority leaders in the Senate come and stay there with him
and consider this crisis as it unfolds. 42
1

And one Senator has argued that consultation should draw on
"the expertise of the members of the committee that are pertinent to the issue":
If you call in the leadership, they don't know what they are being
called in for-some general subject dealing with the war in Southeast
Asia or the seizure of the Mayagtlez. Then,you consult with them and
then they have to go back and find out what their particular constituent body thinks, whereas if he consults the substantive legislative
standing committees he is getting the view of that body which is
charged with making recommendations on that subject to its own
House.
So I respectfully submit first and foremost that that should be the
established method of consultation, that is with the Senate Foreign
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Relations Committee and the HouseInte
naI Relations Committee. If the President would also like to cansult with the leadershipthat is fine and that is icing on the cake. ~

Recall the remedy proposed in Chapter X: more delegation of
foreign-affairs authority by Congress toa ifew members who
would be expected to work with the Executive throughout the
course of a crisis.
~Jleaningful collaboration between
President and Congress, from the first through the,eleventh hours, constitutes the
war-power millennium. Sectiom 3 of dte ,Resolution seeks it.
The section by itself, however, does1lUtlem ore than exhort, unless it is backed by a growing congressional capacity for coordinated, informed, timely decision making, by greater congressional will to take and assume responsibility for decisions
about war and peace, and by heightened congressional zeal to
cajole and coerce the President into consultation. As Senator
Javits said, "If Congress sits back passively and merely awaits
Executive fulfillment of the reporting requirements of the law,
the key policy decisidns will continue to be monopolized by
the Executive Branch, as they were in the decades leading up to
enactment of the 'Var Powers Resolution."44

Improved Procedures for Congressional Action
We have already seen how Section 5 ends a presidential initiative when (1) the House or Senate fails to ratify it within 60
days, subject to certain exceptions, or (2) Congress at any point
votes it down by concurrent resolution. As is true of much of
the other implementing detail in the act, there is nothing magic
about the 60 days. They were born of the House's preference
for 120 and the Senate's for 30, and many have disagreed about
the likely effect of any particular tune period. Devotees of congressional prerogative differ, for example, some finding 30
days essential lest the President have time to lock Congress into
his policy by fait accompli, others fearing 30 days would allow
the President to win rally-round-the-flag support. But whatever the time period, it does encourage focused, expedited
congressional attention to the policy at hand.
The 6O-day deadline, however, does more harm than good,
for reasons already discussed. Indeed, the purpose of a series of
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complex procedures in Section 6 of the Resolution seems to be
to lessen the possibility that the deadline will arrive without the
legislators' having voted yea or nay. The provisions of Section 6
do not guarantee a definitive vote, nonetheless, because it can
be blocked if either house shall otherwise determine by the
yeas and nays." It is also well to be clear that the 50-day proviso
is not the only means to focused, expedited congressi al
action. Section 5( c), coupled with the presidential repo
requirements just 'considered, unavoidably focuses the
lators on the pertinent executive action. ·And Section 7
with expediting procedures not tied to the 50-day deadline.
related rather to congressional decision by concurrent res
tion at any time.
The Section 7 provisions "against filibuster, or committees
pigeon-holing,"45 are a significant step toward rationalizing
Congress's handling of war and peace issues. These provisions
ensure prompt but not precipitate action in the respective foreign affairs committees, on the floor of each house, and in congressional conference deliberations, so long as majorities in
each house believe that rapid action is ' desirable. When a
majority in either house does not find it necessary, the pace
slows. Thus, Section 7 is likely to achieve an element essential to
a responsible role for Congress in war-peace decisions: an end
to 'o bstruction of legislative judgment on presidential initiatives.
U

Early Life
The War Powers Resolution did not get off to a brisk start.
More than 17 months passed before the first presidential report was filed under it. During the interim there was at least
one executive initiative that might well have been reported
under Section 4(a) (2), if not4(a) (1). While Greece and Turkey
were struggling over Cyprus in 1974, the American Ambassador to that island requested on July 21 the evacuation of local
Americans. President Nixon responded the next day by sending five naval vessels to the area and by pennitting 22 helicopter sorties from the U.S.S.lnchon to a British base in Cyprus in
order to remove roughly 400 Americans and 80 foreign nation-
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;a11s. On July 23 a joint Britisll-A
ued another
11.35 Americans and foreigm na .
r Eagleton's
this acti . · vioview, the Executive's failure to r
le~ ho wever, to
lated the Resolution. The Senator
b ring others in Congress to take a .
- w of the matterperhaps because no hostili ' sxesult
American armed £Qrces
did not land on any part of Cyprus \~.. hel"€' they were welcome, and the President traditionally has
prerogative to
rescue Americans threateDam :abroad. T
mains that the
report on the
Resolution could have heemread' to r
so" and Congress: s disoperation. The President's re$usal to
... for a generous
inclination to remonstrate, ith him ,
view of the legislation.
Content of sorts for it ca e d .
s of American military involvement in Ind
t Ford sent
three reports to Congress regarding the ev
tion of Americans and foreign nationals. The first report on April 4, 1975,
concerned the removal of thousands of refugees from Danang,
Vietnam, to safer points south. The second on April 12 reported
rescuing Americans and foreign nationals trapped in Phnom
Penh, Cambodia. The third followed on April 30, about the
evacuation from Saigon. No hostilities were involved in the
Danang operation; limited enemy fire seems to have been received during the Cambodian venture, with no American response or casualties; some combat was involved at Saigon and
there were American losses. The Saigon operation was the most
taxing of the three. A naval task force participated offshore,
70 helicopters and assorted fighters flew numerous sorties, and
865 marines landed in an undertaking that lasted 19 hours. Approximately 1,400 Americans, 5,600 Vietnamese and 85 others
were removed by helicopter while 30,000 Vietnamese were
picked up at sea. There was a palpable possibility of heavy
fighting with either communist forces or South Vietnamese
troops desperate for rescue.
The reports submitted by President Ford to Congress concerning these operations were striking in several respects. First,
none was expressly submitted pursuant to Section4(a) (1). The
Danang and Phnom Penh reports cited 4(a) (2), and the Saigon
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report
_ Iy "section 4. ·'~6 Thus the President did not come to
Congr
der
only provision in Section 4 that activates
the dea
on eo; utive action and creates the possibility that
Congr
ay e the vemture at' any time by concurrent resolution.
Seco
the
. (·nt was careful to claim independent
power t ct. The first report was the most cautious, mixing
constitu ' al prerogative \\'ith statutory authority: "This effort
is being
ertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional
Commander-m-Chief and Chief Executive in the
authori .
conduct - foreign relations and pursuant to the Foreign Assist- 1961 . , . which authorizes hUinanitarian assistance A
ance to
'ugees. civman war casualties and other person~
disadv :
ed by hostDities . . . in South Vietnam.~'Thcnext
two reports were more aggressive: "The operation was ordered
and conducted pursuant to the President's Constitutional executive power and authority as Commander·in-Chief of U.S.
Armed Forces." Third, the reports were exceptionally terse,
involving little of 'the detail contemplated by the reporting provisions of the Resolution. Their texts appear in Appendix C.
Fourth, by the time the President reported, each of the operations was over. The Resolution did receive its first substance in
the April 1975 reports, but not much.
It is significant, however, that President Ford reported,
despite the Nixon precedent on Cyprus and despite a long tra. ""Clition of Executives' rescuing Americans threatened abroad.
Ford was encouraged to report because Congress had previously banned the use of federal funds for any military activities in Indochina. While it was not clear that the ban covered the
evacuation of Americans and foreigners inextricably mixed
with them, it could be read to do so (particularly if hostilities
resulted), and the bali' aid seem clearly to cover foreigners not
entwined with Americans. 47 Certainly the evacuation operations involved decisions with "hostilities" implications-for
instance, what nationalities were to be rescued, how many
people should be brought out, by what means, over what
period of time, to what extent reliance should be placed on
diplomacy rather than military operations, and to what degree
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combat would be accepted to achieve the predetf,e nnined objectives. With these considerations in mind, the' President addressed the Senate and House in joint session on ,April 10, 1975:
"And now I ask the Congress to clarify immedia'teiy its restrictions on the use of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia for the
limited purposes of protecting American lives by ensuring their
evacuation if this should be necessary, and I also ask prompt
revision of the law to cover those Vietnamese to whom we have
a very special obligation, and whose lives may be in danger,
should the worst come to pass."48
In response to the President's request, both houses passed
bills, each referring to theW ar Powers Resolution. On April 25
a conference conlmittee reconciled the two bills ast he Vietnam
Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975. The
Senate promptly agreed to the conference report and sent it
to the House, where it was to be considered on April 2~J. But
before it reached the floor, the evacuation of Saigon -was well
underway. Calling from the White House,49 Speaker Carl
Albert requested that the measure be withdrawn. It was considered by the House on May 1 and rejected. In short, the President sought explicit authority to use the military-authority
which Congress might have provided and tied to the War
Powers Resolution. When he had not received prior congressional approval nineteen days after asking for it, he acted nonetheless. And he acted despite a legislative ban on military
operations in Indochina, which covered at, least part of his
initiative. The House then. declined to take a position on the
matter, forfeiting the opportunity at least to ratify what the
President had done and to explicitly involve Congress in its
authorization.
Some in the House had feared that the measure might authorize American reentry into Indochina. By ~Iay 1 others viewed
the matter as moot or wished to avoid too close association with
South Vietnamese refugees. There was strong sentiment
among the foreign affairs leadership of the House and Senate,
however, that the measure be adopted, whether before or after
the fact, to associate Congress with the President in the use of
military force under the War Powers Resolution. Senator
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Eagleton' s postmortem was characteristically dismal, but more
realistic than not:
Congress fumbled the ball. When the President was forced by events
to order the evacuation from South Vietnam on April 29, the House of
Representatives had not yet completed the final stage in enacting the
necessary legislation. Two days later, when the House finally had the
opportunity to express Congressional will and intent, the House
voted overwhelmingly not to act.
This unfortunate decision raises grave questions about the willingness of Congress to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities. The
President obviously had no authority to use the United States forces
to rescue foreign nationals in Vietnam. Yet our forces evacuated
thousands of Vietnamese. Asked to explain, President Ford tried to
justify his action on "moral'· rather than legal grounds. Yet Congress
let the precedent stand. Future Presidents might now conclude that
the Commander in Chief had an inherent right to do what Mr. Ford
did. 50

And as the Milwaukee ] oumal said in a May 23 editorial:
In the spirit of partnership, Ford asked Congre:;~ to provide both
money and clear authority to evacuate endangered Vietnamese along
with Americans. While South Vietnam crumbled, Congress wrangled. Dozens of amendments filled the air. Many a lawmaker played
general, trying to link certain kinds of aid to certain military maneuvers under certain conditions. Finally, Ford was forced to rely on
inherent presidential power and order evacuation without companion action by Congress.
From all this, a pointed lesson emerges. On urgent foreign policy
issues, the presidency is still the govemmenfs decision making center
-if only because it can muve with a crisp singularity that a congressional multitude cannot hope to match. 51

There was some congressional feeling that the President
failed to consult with the legislators during the April crises. 52
The emergencies began while Congress w~s in Easter recess.
Nonetheless, the Executive tried to notify the congressional
leadership about the Danang operation. The President spoke to
Congress about the crisis that evolved into the Saigon evacuation. Four days after Mr. Ford's message to the House and
Senate, he, along with the Secretaries of State and Defense and
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the Army Chief of Staff, met with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia. Other
high administration officials testified before several other congressional committees regarding the impending evacuation. 53
While the full objectives of Section 3 of the Resolution may not
have been met in April 1975, neither were they wholly ignored.
Hardly had the Indochina evacuations ended when the new
Cambodian regime seized an American merchant ship, the
Mayaguez, on May 12, 1975. To recover the ship and its crew,
protect the reSCl!lers, and retaliate against the aggressors, President Ford sent American troops into Thailand, used that country as a staging area, and fought the Cambodians. Eight ships,
11 helicopters, 25 planes, and 300 marines were involved in the
Cambodian hostilities, with the loss of 15 Americans dead, 3
missing, and 50 wounded. During the hostilities the United
States dropped the largest bomb in its nonnuclear arsenal on
the island of Koh Tang, to support marines in battle there.
American forces bombed a military airfield and an oil storage
depot in Cambodia, shortly after the crew of the Mayaguez
had been released. 54
Since hostilities were clearly involved, the President reported to Congress on May 15 under Section 4(a) (1) of the Resolution. But the President chose not to report also under4(a) (3),
although his operations in Thailand were protested by its government. 55 And as in April, he claimed an independent prerogative to use force. Like the Indochina reports, the A-Iayaguez
account was terse, including, for instance, no explanation of the
basis in international law for the operation. Its text is in Appendix C. And like the Indochina report, the Mayaguez account
came after the fact. Finally, the President was not slowed by
the statutory ban on military ventures in Indochina, apparently
because he did not read it to preclude his armed rescue of
Americans attacked abroad.
According to the State Department, "[A]lthough the Mayaguez incident was a rapidly unfolding emergency situation,
four separate sets of communications took place between the
E(xecutive branch and the congressional leadership."56 These
"communications" did not amount to Illuch. Senator Javits
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accurately complained that "[t]he cbnsultation of the Congress
prior to the Mayaguez incident resenlbled to me the old and
discredited practice of inforrlling selected Members of Congress a few hours in a.dvance of the implementation of thedecision already taken within the executive branch."57 Still, on
May 14 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee announced:
"lW]e ,support the President in the exercise of his constitutional
powers within the framework of the War Powers Resolution to
secure the release of the ship and its men."58 Congress as a
whole acquiesced in the level of consultation offered it. So
ended an eight-week period that has been by far the most important in the Resolution's implementation to date.

Post Mayaguez
Several months after leaving the White House, former President Ford frontally attacked the Resolution on both legal and
practical grounds. In an April 1977 speech he said that there
had been six military crises during his presidency: the four discussed already "and two June 1976 evacuations of American

citizens from Lebanon's civil war. No reports under the War
Powers Resolution were submitted on the Lebanese ventures.
Mr. Ford concluded that no reports were legally required
either for them or for his initiatives in Indochina, although reports were in fact filed on the Indochina and Mayaguez rescues: Uln none of those instances did I believe the \Var Powers
Resolution applied, and many members of Congress also questioned its applicability in cases of protection and evacuation of
American citizens. Furthermore, I did not concede that the
resolution litself was legally binding on the President on constitutional grounds. "59
Mr. Ford assessed the act even more grimly from "a practical
standpoint." He focused first on the difficulties of consultation during the early stages of a crisis:
When the evacuation of DaNang was forced upon us during the
Congress's Easter recess, not one of the key bipartisan leaders of the
Congress was in Washington.
. . . [H]ere is where we found the leaders of Congress: two were
in Mexico, three were in Greece, one was in the Middle East, one was
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in Europe, and two were in the People's Republic of China. The rest
we found in t\velve widely scattered states of the Union.
This, one might say, is an unfair example, since the Congress was
in recess. But it must be remembered that critical ~or1d events, especially military operations, seldom wait for the Congress to meet. III
fact, most of what goes on in the world happens in the middle of the
night, Was~ington time.
On June 18, 1976, we began the first evacuation of American citizens from the civil war in Lebanon. The Congress was not in recess,
but it had adjourned for the day.
As telephone calls were made, we discovered, among other things,
that one member of Congress had an unlisted number which his press .
secretary refused to divulge. After trying and failingfo reach another
member of Congress, we were told by his assistant that the congressman did not need to be reached.
We tried so hard to reach a third member of Congress that our
resourceful White House operators had the local police leave a note
on the congressman's beach cottage door: "Please call the White
House."60

The fonner President then went into Hseveral reasons" why,
"[ w ]hen a crisis breaks, it is impossible to draw the Congress
into the decision-making process in an effective way . . . ."
His reasons constitute a classic statement of executive distaste
for measures such as the Resolution. Legislators are not suited
for crisis management, in Mr. Ford's judgment, for a,number of
reasons:
First, they have so many other concerns: legislation in committee
and on the floor, constituents to serve, and a thousand other things.
It is impractical to ask them to be as well-versed in fast-breaking
developments as the President, the National Security Council, the
Joint Cl-iefs of Staff, and others who deal with foreign policy and
national security situations every hour of every day.
Second, it is also impossible to wait for a consensus to form among
those congressional leaders as to the proper course of action, especially when they are scattered literally around the world and when time is
the one thing we cannot spare. Again, we should ask what the outcome would be if the leaders consulted do not agree among themselves or disagree collectively with the President on an action he considers essential.
Third, there is the risk of disclosure of sensitive information
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through insecure means of communication, parti~lJlarly by telephone. Members of Congress with a great many things on their minds
might also confuse what they hear on the radio news in this day of instant communication with what they are told on a highly classified
basis by the White House.
Fourth, the potential legal consequences of taking executive action
before mandated congressional consultation can be completed may
cause a costly delay. The consequences to the President, if he does not
wait for Congress, could be as severe as impeachment. But the consequences to the nation, if he does wait, could be much worse.
Fifth, there is a question of how consultations with .1 handful of
congressional leaders can bind the entire Congress to support a course
of acnon-especWIy when younger members of Congress are becoming increasingly independent.
Sixth, the Congress has little to gain and much to lose politically by
involving itself deeply in crisis management.
If the crisis is successfully resolved, it is the President who will g~t
credit for the success. If his efforts are not successful, if the objectives
are not met or if casualties are too high, the Congress will have seriously compromised its right to criticize the decisions and actions of
the President.
Finally, there is absolutely no way American foreign policy can be
conducted or military operations commanded by 535 members of
Congress on Capitol Hill, even if they all happen to be on Capitol
Hill when they are needed.
Domestic policy-for housing, health, education or energy-can
and should be advanced in the calm deliberation and spirited debate I
loved so much as a congressman.
The broad outlines and goals of foreign policy also benefit immensely from this -kind of meticulous congressional consideration.
But in times of crisis, decisiveness is everything-and the Constitution plainly puts the responsibility for such decisions on the
shoulders of the President of the United States.
There are institutional-limitations on the Congress *hich cannot be
legislated away. 81

Mr . Ford's assessment did not move Congress to repeal or
othelWise limit the Resolution. To the coatrary, in July 19TI the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered amendments
whose aggregate effect would have been to tighten the act's
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restraints on presidential use of force. 52 Three days of hearings ·
were held on these proposals as well as on other aspects of the
Resolution's "operation and effectiveness." No amendments
resulted.
Unlike Presidents Nixon and Ford, Jimmy Carter had kind
words for the war-powers legislation. Early in his presidency
he described it as an "appropriate reduction" in the sort of control enjoyed by some Executives before Indochina. Siinilarly,
Secretary of State Vance indicated during his confirmation
hearings that the Resolution was compatible with the President's constitutional authority and that he anticipated no
problems with its "good faith observance:·63 By the same
token, during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's July
1977 hearings, just mentioned, the Legal Adviser to the State
Department repeated anew: "We believe that conscientious
observance of the procedures set forth in the Resolution, including effective consultation and timely reporting, will assure
that both the Executive and Legislati~e Branches possess the
means to exercise their full and proper constitutional responsibilities."64 A year later, in August 1978, the Legal Adviser assured the House International Relations Committee of Mr.
Carter's continued "strong support of the War Powers Resolu"65
·
t Ion.
Congress constrained Jin1my Carter in matters of war and
peace less than it did Presidents Nixon and Ford when Indochina and Watergate coalesced, but more than has been customary in the twentieth century. Mr. Carter was required to
provide significant secret infonnation to Congress, especially
its intelligence committees. These committees and others concerned with foreign affairs and the armed forces have been
frequently infonned and consulted, often heeded, by the Executive. Despite presidential objections, the legislators have
insisted on the use of concurrent resolutions to disapprove major arms sales abroad. They have cut off or curbed both Inilitary and economic aid to certain countries that the President
very much wished to help. Individual Congressme~ have dealt
directly with foreign representatives-members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee conferring with Moshe Dayan in
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a \Vashington hotel about proposed F -15 sales to Saudi Arabia
and Egypt, for instance, and the House of Representatives
threatening to cut off economic aid to South Korea unless its
former am,bassador to this country were returned to testify
about South Korean influence buying in Congress. The Senate
has coldly scrutinized the President's treaty initiatives, especially those involving the Panama Canal and SALT II, and
many Congressmen reacted severely when the President alone
terminated this country's Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China.
Influenced by such constraints and by his own predilections,
Mr. Carter used armed force very sparingly until late 1979,
even when nothing more than deployment on the high seas was
at stake. He had no need to report_ to Congress under the War
Powers Resolution until spring 1980. Some legislators did feel
that the administration's May 1978 activities in Zaire were reportable. At that time American, Belgian, and French citizens
were threatened by Katangan forces in southern Zaire. Upon
the request of Zaire, as well as Belgium and France, President
Carter ordered U.S. transport aircraft to support rescue operations by Belgian and French troops. From May 19 to 23 the
Air Force flew approximately thirty missions in Zaire, transporting materiel and some French troops to staging areas more
than 100 miles from the site of the fighting. In June, after the
Katangans had been repulsed, the Air Force flew the Belgians
and French out while also transporting into Zaire elements of
. an African peace-keeping force. At one point during the June
flights, as French legionnaires 'w ere loading a Peugeot onto a
C-141, Zairian troops threatened to fire if the car departed with
the French. The Peugeot was left on the runway without further incident. The American pilots and their support personnel
took no weapons into Zaire. Nor did any American infantry or
fighter aircraft accompany them. 88
Under the circumstances, most Congressmen who paid any
attention to the matter concluded that American forces had not
been introduced either into a situation "where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" or "into the territory . , , of a foreign nation, while
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equipped for combat." Thus, no presidential report to Congress was obligatory under Sections 4(a) (1) or 4(a) (2) of the
Resolution. A few Congressmen emphatically disagreed. Their
disquiet led to the August 1978 House hearings mentioned
above.
Events in the Middle East proved to be more trying. Oil from
that area became increasingly central to Western economies
during the late 1970s. As the decade neared its end, Iran spun
from being a force for tranq uility in the area to a source of acute
instability. In November 1979 the Iranians took American diplomats hostage. After the hostages had been captive for almost
a year, Iraq invaded Iran, heightening the threat to Western oil.
Meanwhile the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, putting Russian
troops on Iran's border and within striking distance of the
Persian Gulf.
In response, President Carter became more active militarily.
He deployed powerful naval forces in the vicinity of Iran, sent
radar command aircraft to Saudi Arabia as well as several
hundred military personnel to operate and maintain equipment
and train the Saudis, established an American military presence
in Egypt, created a Rapid Deployment Force for the Middle
East, and declared the United States would keep the oil flowing one way or another. Carter also suggested that anned action
might be necessary to recover the hostages, and sent six C-I30
transports, eight RH-53 helicopters, and roughly ninety combat
troops into Iran on April 24, 1980, in an abortive effort to bring
the captives out. American fighter aircraft from carriers off
Iran were prepared to defend the rescuers against Iranian attack had that proved necessary.
Amid this activity, the President reported under the War
Powers Resolution only once, on April 26, 1980. See Appendix
C. He rejected claims that other reports were necessary when,
for instance, the American military presence in Saudi Arabia
and the Persian Gulf increased during the Iraqi-Iranian War;
Senator Javits agreed with him, as Appendix C indicates.
The April 26, 1980, report was seriously flawed. It said little
and made no mention of Sections 4(a) (1) and (2) of the Resolution, under which it should have been submitted. Tenning
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the rescue effort a "humanitarian mission," Jimmy Carter simply ignored the fact that the mission, while "humanitarian" in
purpose, nonetheless &&introduced" American armed forces into
a situation &&where imminent involvement in hostilities [was]
clearly indicated by the circumstances." Combat with the
Iranians was likely had the rescuers reached Tehran. Combat
with others stIch as the Soviets was ·possible had the rescue
degenerated into a prolonged struggle between American and
Iranian forces. Moreover, t~e rescue effort obviously introduced U.S. forces "into the territory ... of a foreign nation
... while equipped for combat:~
The April 26 report also claimed that Carter acted &&pursuant
to the Presidenfs powers under the Constitution as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Anned Forces, expressly recognized in Section 8(d) (1) of the
War Powers Resolution," as well as pursuant to Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. The report was certainly free to argue
that the President acted pursuant to his constitutional authority
and international law , but it was wrong to suggest that he acted
pursuant to Section 8(d) (1). In the context of the entire Resolution, especially Sections 2( c) and 4, it is clear that Section 8( d)
(1) did not authorize the rescue a.ttempt. Within the tenns of the
Resolution, the April 26 report was misleading and inadequate
-at least as flawed as any report submitted by Gerald Ford. In
practice, though not rhetoric, Jimmy Carter gave the Resolution's reporting requirements short shrift.
He also disregarded its consultation provisions. No one in
Congress was infonned, much less consulted, before the rescue
effort began. Ironically, on the afternoon of April 24, Senators
Church and] avits wrote Secretary of State Vance on behalf of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, insisting under Section 3 of the Resolution that the President consult Congress
before using force against Iran. "We write this letter to you in
the context of the grave international crisis which has been
developing for sqme months in the region of the Persian Gulf,
precipitated by the seizure of the United States Embassy in
Tehran and the holding of American hostages there, and by the
brutal military occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union,"
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said Church and Javits. They noted that Carter had refused to
exclude force as means of reclaiming the hostages from Iran
and had threatened to fight if the Soviet Union moved into the
Persian Gulf. They argued that the legislative history of the
Resolution "makes it clear that the consultations called for do
not necessarily signify at all that a decision has been tnade" to
use force, but rather "the advance consultation provisions of
the War Powers Resolutiqn are intenqed to come into play
before any such decision has been made, in order to ensure that
any such decision, if made, is a national decision jointly entered
into by the President and the Congress . . ;' . Accordingly, Mr.
Secretary, we hereby request that you inform this Committee
at an early date when consultations can begin . . . ."67 The
Senators' invocation of Section 3 was too little, too late. 68 Subsequent congressional unhappiness with Carter's failure to
consult, however, did not lead to steps to strengthen Section3. 69

Inertia
A prior page suggested that it is up to Congress to break the
gravitational pull of executive hegemony over American war
and peace. The War Powers Resolution provided the necessary
initial thrust. But since the legislation has been on the books,
Congress has done little to generate any sustained thrust. ~;lost
members of Congress remain very much result oriented. 70
Their concern with the particulars of any specific policy still
overshadows their concern with the institutional process by
which that policy is made. So long as they and their constituents
applaud an executive initiative, they do not seriously dispute
their exclusion from its development~ .
Congress lost a singular opportunity to give the Resolution
substance in the congressional mold when the legislators failed
to participate in shaping the Saigon evacuation. Consultation
under the Resolution has been minimal) largely because Congress has not insisted that the President meaningfully implement Section 3. Executives will rarely pay much attention to
that section, especially during crises that arise suddenly, require constant, rapid, flexible response, and end quickly, unless
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the legislators designate a small committee of Senators and
Representatives, primed to share the command headquarters
with the Executive and made acceptabl~ to him by a capacity
for informed, responsible advice and by a willingness to keep
tactical secrets. Similarly, there is little reason to imagine that
Presidents will accept Section 2(c)'s view of their authority to
enter hostilities without prior congressional approval. As with
many of their predecessors, Presidents in the future \\-ill very
probably construe the Constitution to permit them to commit
troops whenever they believe it essential to the national
welfare.
Even so, the War Powers Resolution retains a potent bite.
Following President Ford's example, his successors will doubtless report their military initiatives to Congress, usually having
told congressional leaders about their plans and given them a
moment to object. It is also probable that future Presidents
will either accept an end to their military initiatives by the
Section 5(b) deadlines or by the 5( c) concurrent resolutions, or
ask the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality df these
sections. i l Equally important, future legislators will have
guaranteed opportunities to participate in deciding whether
America fights, if the combat lasts more than forty-eight hours.
While the Resolution may have slight impact on quick, surgical
applications of armed force by the President, it should ensure
legislative approval of any long-term commitment of the
country to war.
Secretary of State Haig promised more for Congress during
his January 1981 confirmation hearings. He committed the
Reagan administration to compliance with both the letter and
the spirit of the Resolution. Shortly thereafter several Senators
charged the President with skirting the act while increasing the
flow of American arms and advisers to EI Salvador's civil strife.

Plus

~a

change . : . .
Chapter XI: The War Powers Resolution of 1973

1. Dep·t of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 93-437, §839 (1974).
For other such limits see Glennon, Strengthening the War Power! Re!olution:
The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictioru, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1, 13 n.30 (1975);
Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or
Su"ender? 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823,851 n.l64 (1975).
2. The necessary-and-proper clause received little attention at the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF mE FEDERAL CoNVENTION
344·45 (M. ~arrand ed. 1911). Recan, however, that a prime federalistobjection to Confederation government was the dichotomy between its fonnal
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powers, reasonably ample, and its impoverished authority over means neces.
sary to implement them. Antifederalists during the ratification struggle
strongly attacked the necessary·and·proper language. According to
Hamilton, it and the supremacy clause were "held up to the people in all the
exaggerated colours of misrepresentation as the pernicious engines by which
their local governments were to he destroyed and their liberties exter.
minated." FEDERAUST PAPERS No. 33.
Madison in Federalist No. 44 examined the problem in some detail. He
argued that even without the necessary and proper language, Congress
would control means: "Had the constitution been silent on this head, there can
be no doubt that all the particular powers, requisite as means of executing the
general powers, would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable
implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than
that whereve~ the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a
general power to do a thing is given, every particular powe.r necessary for
doing it is included."
Madison argued, moreover, that it would have been impractical for the
Constitution itself to attempt to deal more explicitly with means: uHad the
convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and
proper for carrying their other powers into effect; the attempt would have
involved a compleate digest of laws on every subject to which the constitu·
tion relates; accommodated too not only to the existing state of things, but to
all the possible changes which futurity may produce: For in every new ap·
plication of a general power: the particular powers, which are the means of
attaining the object of the general power, must always. necessarily vary with
that object; and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same."
Finally, Madison spoke to the possibility that Congress might attempt to
usurp authority through necessary·and·proper legislation: "If it be asked,
what is to be the consequence, in case the congress shall misconstrue this part
of the constitution, and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning? I
answer the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power
vested in them, as if the general power had been reduced to particulars, and
anyone of these were to be violated . . . . In the first instance, the success
of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary departments,
which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last
resort, a remedy must be obtained from the people, who can by the election
of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers."
Since 1789 congressional authority under the necessary·and.proper dause
has been generously read in most instances. As Chief Justice Marshall said in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819): "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the. scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not pro·
hibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitUtion, are constitutional." See also, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961); Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). Note the suggestion that the
necessary-and-proper clause is more sweeping in its grant of authority to
Congress than are the enforcement provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments, in Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Ri~hts, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 99-108 (1966). Congressional
power to prescribe means has been judicially restrained, as a rule, only when
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it impaired civil liberties; e.g., Kinsella v. United States ex rJI. Singleton, 361
LT .S. 234, 247 (1960). See f!.enerally L. HENKIN, FOREICN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 78,331-32 n.54 (1972).
Many have indicated that war-power legislation would be constitutional.
See, e.g., Hearings on War Powers Legislation Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), at 7, 135 (Javits); 551, 554
(Bickel); 653-54 (\Villiam D. Rogers); 708 (Stennis); "n4, 779 (Goldberg). But
cf· William P. Rogers: "The question about whether a statute can change the
President's constitutional powers or affect Congress['] constitutional powers
is a very doubtful proposition."ld. 517. But, as will be noted in the text, there
is a distinction between congressional authority to define the nature of constitutional powers, on the one hand, ~nd the means for their realization, on the
other. Rogers's comments seem to assume that war-power legislation does
only the fonner.
3. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(b) (Supp. 1975). The Resolution as a whole covers §§
1541-48 of the Code and is set out in Appendix C.
4. 119 CONGo REC. 36,194 (1973).
5. 9 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1285-86 (1973).
The text of the veto message appears in Appendix C.
6. Former Senator William B. Spong, Jr., of Virginia actively participated
in these steps until January 1973. He has summarized them in two articles:
Can Balance Be Restored in the Constitutional War Powers of the President
and Congress? 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1971); The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or Surrender? supra note 1, at 824-37. Notable collections of divergent vIews on the wisdom of war-power legislation
were compiled early in the process, during the 1971 Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearings cited in note 2 above and during earlier proceedings in
the House. See Hearings on Congress, the President, and the War Powers
Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Security Policy and Scientific Developments
of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs. 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
7. S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONGo REC. S7153 (daily ed. June 25,
19(9). For further discussion of Congress and national commitments, see 48
CONGo DIGEST 193-224 (1969).
8. S.440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973). Jacob J a\-;ts was the guiding spirit
behind the Senate approach. See note 33 below. See generally J. J AVITS, \\' HO
MAKES WAft: THE PREsIDENT VERSUS CONCHESS (1973).
9. The House of Representatives almost adopted a requirement designed
to preclude congressional inaction. It would have provided that, within 120
days after the beginning of a military initiative by the Executive, Congress
"shall either approve, ratify, confirm, and authorize the continuation of the
action taken by the President . . . or . . . disapprove such action in which
case the President shall terminate [it] . . . . " 119 CONC. REC. 24,685 (1973)
(Whalen amendment). But the most dyspeptic attack on the notion of ending
an executive initiative by congressional inaction came in the Senate. Sam Ervin picked "invasion" to hammer home his point: "This measure is an ~,.bsurdi
ty. It says that when the United States is invaded, Armed Forces of the United
States must get out of the fight against an invader at the end of 30 days if the
Congress does not take affirmative action within that time to authorize the
President to continue to employ the Arm,ed Forces to resist the invasion. The
bill is not only unconstitutional, but is also impractical of operation. In short,
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it is an absurdity. Under it, the President must convert Old Glory into a white
flag within 30 days if Congress does not expressly authorize him to perfonn
the duty the Constitution imposes on him to protect the Nation against invasion." 119 CONG. REC. 25,093 (1973).
10. See Spong, supra note 1, at 828 n.41, 874.
11. 119 CONG. REC. 33,559 (1973).
12. 119 CONG. REC. 36,189 (1973); see Spong, supra note 1, at 823.
13. 119 CONG. REC. 33,557 (1973). Senator Eagleton has described his
concerns at length in a book, War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of
Congressional Surrender (1974).
14. S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1973) (supplemental views of
J. W. Fulbright). See Glennon, supra note 1, at 3-S n.lS.
15. Hearings on War Powers: A Test of Compliance Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on In'"
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (I97S).
16. Section 8(c) further narrows the meager ~ 2(c) discretion given the
President by its broad definition of "introduction of United States Anned
Forces" to include "the assignment of members of such anned forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular
or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such
military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such
forces will become engaged, in hostilities."
17. See pages 197-98. Admittedly, there is controversy over whether
Congress may "legislate" by concurrent resolution when the legislative process runs in reverse. The touchstone for those who think not is Ginnane, The
Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953). Executives especially have questioned
legislation by concurrent resolution. It does deprive them of an opportunity
to veto copgressional limits on their initiatives. As a Congressman asked and
the Legal Adviser to the State Department answered in 1975:
"MR. SoLARZ. . . . [I]s it your position that if the troops were sent in in the
first place under the President's inherent constitutional authority that the
concurrent resolution ordering them to be withdrawn would itself be unconstitutional or do you believe that the President would be constitutionally obligated to act in accordance with the provisions of the War Powers Resolution
and withdraw the troops?
"MR. LEIGH . . . . I think it would be unconstitutional on the simple logic
that if the President had the power to put the men there in the first place that
power could not be taken away by concurrent resolution because the
power is constitutional in nature. There might, however, be all sorts of reasons as to why the political process would force him to wish to comply with
that concurrent resolution.
"There is a further question as to whether a concurrent resolution in this
situation would have the dignity of law under the Constitution. I think a very
strong argument can be made that a concurrent resolution in this situation
would be insufficient and that the Congress must resort to the usual process
for a statute and submit it to the President. If he disapproves it, it must then be
pas( sed) over his veto by a two-thirds vote in each House. " War Powers H earing', '''pm note 15, at 91.
Precedent exists, however, for legislation by concurrent resolution. For in-
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stance, there was provision for ending presidential action by this means in
two prominent war-power measures: the 1941 Lend Lease Act and the 1964
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. It is also a fact of life that, if Presidents wish to
have their constitutional cake by committing troops without prior congressional approval, it is not likely that they will be allowed to eat it too by denying simple majorities in both houses the right to call a halt.
It can be argued that precedents such as those just cited are not applicable
because they "created a concurrent resolution procedure to control the
exercise of authority delegated [by Congress] to the President," while the
War Powers Resolution "does not delegate anything to the President. .. .
It is ... a procedural scheme for arranging an interchange in what is .. .
a difficult area between the two branches . . . ."" Accordingly, "to say that
Congress would later by concurrent resolution take back what it had previously delegated overlooks the fact that nothing was delegated." WaT
Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 96-97 (remarks of Mr. Leigh); cf. Rostow,
Response, 61 VA. L. REV. 797, BOO-Ol (1975): "There are some instances of true
delegation between Congress and the Presidency in' the field of foreign
affairs. The President's discretion to change tariffs is a good example; only a
statute could vest such authority in the President. However. in most cases a
more accurate description is that a statute combines the overlapping powers
of the Presidency and of Congress. In such instances, there is no delegation,
but a pooling of the respective powers of the Presidency and of Congress.
Thus in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the Fonnosa Resolution, and the Middle
East Resolution, for example, language was carefully chosen to indicate that
Congress and the President were making separate and also joint decisions,
each exercising its own authority. Noone attempted to draw a line marking
the exact boundaries between the presidential zone and the congressional
zone."
It is more likely than not, however, that Congress did delegate some
authority to the President in the War Powers Resolution. To wholly disclaim
that possibility, it is necessary to assume that the Executive has a constitutional prerogative to commit troops whenever and wherever he pleases, subject only to later restraint by a two-thirds vote of the Senate and House, overriding his veto. If, as is more probable, Congress has a constitutional right
to vote on at least some troop commitments before they are made, then the
Resolution does delegate to the President congressional approval to act in
these cases if he thinks it necessary, subject to the deadline and concurrent
resolution restraints in tt 5(b) and (c).
18. See pages 198-99. Some assume that the President has a constitutional prerogative to de-fend American soil, perhaps no matter what Congress thinks. Ct. Senator Ervin"s remarks in note 9 above and Legal Adviser Leigh"s testimony to a House Subcommittee in 1975: "I [am] not sure
that the Congress by imposing a condition subsequent on an appropriation
which has not yet been fully expended could limit the President's power to
carry out certain cor~stitutional duties such as to defend the United States
from hostile attack against its mainland territory. There is obviously no
judicial decision on this but 1 would think that there would be a serious doubt
as to the constitutionality of such a limitation if it were applied to rrevent the
President from defending the mainland territory of the United States from
attack." Wat Powers H earlng" supra note 15, at 89.
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19. See also Senator Javits: "If this is a statute, every part means
something, whether it is written in subsection 2( c) or in section 3, as in the
Senate bill."119Cong. Rec. 33,557-58 (1973).
20. 2 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &: AD. NEWS 2364 (1973).
21. 119Cong. Rec.33,555(1973).
22. According to Representative Zablocki, the conference included § 2( c)
"[i]n order to satisfy the Senate conferees"-"but it was intended as a state~
ment of purpose and policy, a sort of sense of Congress. ,. War POwers
Hearings, supra note 15, at 32.
23. 119 CONG. REC. 36,194 (1973). For further appraisal of § 2(c)'s
mysteries, see Spong, supra note 1, at 837-41.
24. See pages 297-306 and note 25 below; cf. the Executive's rejection of
the notion that the Resolution "delegates" any authority to him. note 17
above.
25. 119 CONG. REC. 36,181 (1973); accord, the Legal Adviser to the State
Department in 1975: M[W]e would not agree ... that the specification of
circumstances in which this power [the President's authority as commander
in chief] might be used would be limited by section 2( c) ." War Powers
Hearings, supra note 15, at 11. See also note 26 below and accompanying text.
26. War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 90-91.

27. Id.40.
28. Representative Zablocki's 1975 complaints are typical:
"Clearly, it was not the intent of Congress to be merely infonned of decisions
already made. In the fullest meaning of partnership and shared responsibility
in foreign affairs, it was the desire of Congress to have a participatory role in
thp. "rocess of decisionmaking .

.

"Measured against that clear directive ofintent, it is apparent . . . thatthe
executive branch proclivity is toward evasive and selective interpretation of
the War Powers Resolution." War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at vi.
29. This distinction does make sense on one score under the Resolution as
presently written. Reports by the President pursuant to § 4(a)(1) permit
Congress to end his initiatives by inaction or concurrent resolution. That is not
justifiable if the President is acting with explicit congressional authorization
(whether by declaration of war or some other fonn of approval). Accordingly, if the Resolution were amended to require presidential reports at the
outset of any hostilities, it ought also to be amended to prevent the tennina~
tion under tt 5(b) or (c) of ventures previously approved by Congress.
30. War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 2.
31. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &: AD. NEWS 2351 (1973).
32. War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 38-39. It does appear that the
Resolution was not directed at "hostilities" involving foreign mobs, international criminals, or the like. See, e.g., the June 15, 1973, Committee on
Foreign Affairs report on the House bill that underlay the ultimate Resolu~
tion: "The term 'war powers' may be taken to mean the authority inherent in
notional sovereignties to declare, conduct, and conclude anned hostilities
with other states." 2 U.S. CODE CONG. ~ AD. NEWS 2348 (1973) (emphasis
added). But 50 long as another nation is the adversary, Congress defined
Uhostilities" broadly, as ipdicated in the text.
33. War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 69. The Senator had previouslyelaborated:
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"Now it is perfectly true, that [the Senate] bill which contained an authority
test as well as a performance test was not the bill adopted in the sense that the
House approach was adopted without the authority test. ",'e did adopt the
House approach, the methodology being that it is a performance test, it is not
an authority test. That is, did he or didn't he have constitutional authority?
"The minute he puts trbops into hostilities or imminent danger of hostilities,
the act begins to operate. And he does not have to tell us he is doing it, because
the 6O-day clock starts to tick if a report is required, and even if he fails to do a
report, it still begins to operate and it is up to us to press the button so he loses
all authority if we do not agree with his actions. Now this ~ the key to this
whole legislation. If the President takes emergency action, his action is only
good until Congress acts dispositively because we have the declaration of
war authority." ld. 63.
34. Jd.87.
3..1:). According to the Resolution's legislative history, "[A] commitment
[or introduction] of armed forces commences when the President makes the
final decision to act and issues orders putting that decision into effect." 2 U.S .
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2351 (1973).
36. War Powers H eaTings, supra note 15, at 77.
37. See the terse accounts submitted by President Ford, Appendix C.
"They are brief to the point of being "in minimal compliance with the content
requirements set forth in the law." War Powers Hearings. supra note 15, at 69
(remarks of Sen. Javits); ct.Thomas Ehrlich: "No one can expect preparation
of a carefully reasoned, fully-developed brief within two days after a decision to use military force. But precisely for that reason, the requirement
should have a useful impact. The need for justification to support a decision
should be a strong incentive for a broader analysis of the impact of that
decision than might otherwise be made. By requiring those in the Executive
Branch to articulate the basis for an action, and to defend that basis, the
Resolution will encourage them to think through their decisions more fully."
Response, 61 VA. L. REV. 78.5, 788 (1975).
38. The legislators cannot expect much tactical and strategic information
from the President unless he is confident that it will not leak; e.g., Legal
Adviser Leigh's remarks to a House subcommittee about the Mayaguez.
hostiHties:
"Now let me say a word about this final assault action which involved
movements of troops from various parts of the Far East into a position to be
effective. The President was extremely apprehensive that there be no breach
of security in advance of the time that they actually were landed, so there
, were strong arguments for not revealing that information-even to a select
group of members-very much in advance of the time it was to occur .

..

When I was speaking about the President's judgment of confidentiality, I was
speaking in terms of an assumption on my part. I do not know what the
President actually thought on this subject. I do know that he went to great
pains to request the Members of Congress who came for the briefing in the
Cabinet room that they maintain absolute security about this because breach
of security might prejudice the carrying out of military operations .

..

"Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution has, in my view, been drafted so as
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not to hamper the President's exercise of his constitutional authority. Thus
Section 3 leaves it to the President to determine precisely how consultation i~
to be carried out. In so doing the President may, I am sure, take into accOunt
the effect various possible modes of consultation may have upon the risk of a
breach in security. Whether he .could on security grounds alone dispense
entirely with 'consultation' when ' exercising an independent constitutional
power, presents a question of constitutional and legislative interpretation to
which there is no easy answer. In my personal view, the resolution contemplates at least some consultation in every case irrespective of security
considerations unless the President determines that such consultation is
inconsistent with his constitutional obligation. In the latter event the
President's decision could not as a practical matter be challenged but he
would have to be prepared to accept the -political consequences of such
action, which might be heavy." War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 81.
100. See also Chapter VII, note 38 and accompanying text.
39. 2 U.S. CODE CONe. & AD. NEWS 2350-51 (1973).
40. War Powers Hearings, supra note IS, at 85. But see id. 3.
41. E.g., id. 54, 73 (remarks of Sen. Javits}.
42. Id.57 (remarks of Rep. Findley).
43. Id. 62 (remarks of Sen. Javits};accord, his views at 67-70, 73.
44. Id.67.
45. Id. 63 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
46. Congressional umbrage at the missing references to § 4( a} (1) was met
by Legal Adviser Leigh with various palliatives:
"There was nothing ulterior about this in any sense. We were not trying to
mislead anyone. I think the factual situation was different as between the first
case, the Danang sealift, and the other two. In the Danangsealift we were
confident that we were not going to be involved in a section 4( a) (I) situation
of hostilities, and in fact the President's orders required that the force avoid
any kind of hostilities. We felt certain that that was going to fall under 4( a) (2)
so we specified it in that case.
"Now the other distinction is that we didn't know at the time we were
required to make the report, which has to be within 48 hours, when we would
complete the task of picking up refugees, and as it turned out it went on
longer than either of the other two.
"Now with respect to both the Cambodian and the Saigon evacuations, by
the time the President made his report the last Americans and the last armed
forces had already been taken out so that as lawyers we did not spe that the
specification of which of the three subsections of 4(a} was involved, was
crucial to the operation of the mechanism which is established in section 5 of
the War Powers Resolution because there would be no occasion for the 60da,r period to even begin running.

"It seems that the real thrust of the question is why the President in his April
30, 1975 report referred to section 4 in general, and not to any particular subparagraphs in that section. We presume that the President did so because the
events giving rise to that report did not seem to be limited to just one of the
three subparagraphs in section 4(a).
"Thus, although the events as known at that time indicated that hostilities
may have existed between U.S. and communist forces, t1 .S. forces 'equipped
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for combat' were also introduced in the 'territory, airspace or waters' of South
Vietnam-the situation apparently provided for in section 4(a)(2).
"Furthennore, since the operation had tenninated by the time the report
was prepared, the question of possible congressional action under section 5 of
the Resolution was moot; thus, a specific reference t04(a) (1) was not needed
to ~all attention to possible action under section 5.
"[T]he first three war powers reports contain the phrase 'taking note
of . . . .' You inquire whether this suggests anything other than a full binding
legal responsibility upon the President. This phrase connotes an
acknow ledgement that the report is being filed in accordance with section 4
of the War Powers Resolution. No constihJtional challenge to the appropriateness of the report called for by section 4 was intended. " War Powers
Hearings, supra note 15, at 9,39,40.
47. The evacuations sparked a brouhaha over what was statutorily permitted and over the broader question of the President's constitutional right to
order anned rescues. Compare, e.g., the views of Glennon, supra note 1, with
those of Emerson, The ",~ar Powers Resolution Tested: The President's
Independent Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 187 (1975). See also,
e.g., War Powers Hearings, supra note 15. at 26-32.
48. 121 CONC. REC. 10,006 (1975). In making this request, the President
did not concede any constitutional necessity to do so. The Legal Adviser to
the State Department suggested that Mr. Ford "wanted the political support
of the Congress in what he saw was going to be necessary, and the fact that he
asked for it should not, in my view, be interpreted as an indication of his
belief that in the absence:bf congressional action he could not have done the
things that he did. On the other hand, he obviously wished to have congressional support and there remains the question of the financing of this
evacuation." ~'ar Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 18; cf. Woodrow
Wilson's requests for prior congressional approval of his Vera Cruz and
merchantmen ventures, pages 158-59 above.
49. The Executive disliked restrictions in the bill as it ultimately emerged,
e.g., its severe limits on rescuing non-Americans. See the description of the
measure in Glennon, supra note 1, at 17-19, and Spong, supra note 1, at 852-53.
See also Legal Adviser Leigh's objections, e.g., War Powers Hearings, supra
note 15, at 19-20,34-35.
_
50. Eagleton, Congress's c'Inaction" on War, N.Y. Times, May 6,1975, at
39, col. 2. See also Glennon, supra note 1, at 19-20 n.66.
51. War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 131.
52. E.g., id. 82 (remarks of Rep. Zablocki); Spong, supra note 1, at 855
n.18O.
53. See Emerson, supra note 47, at 193.
54. On May 15, 1975, the legal adviser and legislative assistant to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained the bombing to a House
committee:
"In conducting an operation of this nature, there is only one mission involved ... : To achieve the return of the crew, the vessel. Thereafter you
must execute the safe extraction of the forces that were put in in order to
accomplish the two primary missions.
"The potential enemy had the capability of reinforcing from the places on
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the mainland that were struck. To strike those places . . . in the judgment of
almost every military man involved in the situation-and I say almost
everyone because I have not talked to everybody, everybody I have talked to
shares this view-was essential to save the marines on that island.
"Now, you are forced .. . to make a judgment-between using adequate
force and failing to use sufficient force to protect the men on the ground. That
judgment is a very close one . . . in almost every instance, whether it is a
platoon operation under a sergeant, a division operation under a general. or
an operation of this nature under the direct command of the Commander in
Chief. That is a tactical decision that is easy sometimes to Monday-morning
quarterback. The question has to be what would you do if you were responsible for thp men on the ground at the time the decision was made . . . .
"We recognized that of all the manifestations of power, restraint is one that
is greatly recognized. That fact was constantly a consideration in the minds of
the military planners involved in this operation. Restraint was a goal, but
protecting American lives . . . was the first goal.
"

"Mr. WIl.soN. I would like to comment that as far as the air strikes on the
mainland were concerned, the military judgment was made apparently that it
was necessary, but I think that the strikes on the mainland, and I would like to
hear the Colonel's response, probably in addition to their military
significance served to let the Khmer Rouge know we were serious about this.
"MR. ZABLOCKI. It would serve as a deterrent to any further intentions of any country, including Cambodia.
"COLONEL FINKELSTEIN. We certainly hope it will have that effect."
Hearings on the Seizure of the ,Yayaguez. Be/m'e the House Comm.-on [nfl .
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34,34-35 (1975).
It seems likely that the bombing was meant both to protect American
troops and demonstrate that America "cannot aUow U.S. vessels to be seized
with impunity" (remarks of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in a May 21
interview). Id.l30. See also id. 42-43, 49.
55. According to May 14 testimony of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: "The Thai Prime Minister has called
in our Charge in Bangkok . . . and has in effect given us an aide memo ire
asking that our marines leave Thailand immediately." Mayaguez HeC!rings.
supra note 54, at 16. The President had sent approximately 1,200 marines
from Okinawa into Thailand when the crisis broke. Two hundred of them
had then moved from there to the Cambodian theater. Id. 16,43,58.
56. War Powers Hearings, supra note 15, at 78. But cf. note 38 above, and
Mr. Leigh's recognition that "the congressional leadership under the circumstances of the emergency action had been given an opportunity to
express dissent or contrary views before the [President's] orders were executed [not before they were given]." ld. bl (emphasis added).
57. Id.61.
58. Id.S1; N.Y. Times, May 15, 1975, at 18, col. 7.
59. Address by Gerald R. Ford, Univ. of Kentucky, John Shennan
Cooper Lecture, April 11, 1977, reprinted in Hearings on a Review of the
Operation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 327 (1977).
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61. Id.328-30.
62. See id. 33848. Perhaps most important among numerous proposed
changes was the amendment that would have f given operative effect to ~
2( c) 's presently inoperative view that prior congressional approval is required for American use of force except in very limited circumstances. The
impact of this amendment would have been softened only slightly by its
expansion of the existing ~ 2(c) occasions in which the President may act
alone to include (1) protecting Americans endangered abroad and (2)
forestalling direct, imminent threats of attack on this country.
63. See id.187,322.
·
64. Id.I90. See also 126CoNc. REc. S4114 (dailyed. April 23, 1980).
65. Hearings on Congressional Oversight of War Powers Compliance:
Zaire Airlift Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Security and Scientific Affairs of
the House Comm. on lnt'l Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.lS (1978). See also
Editorial, The War Powers Skirmish, N.Y. Times, May 2,1980, at A26, coLI.
66. See Zaire H eatings, supra note 65, at 24, 16,32.
67. The full text of the Church-]avits letter is in Appendix C. See also,
e.g., Gwertzman, Senators Bid Carter Consult over Iran Under 73 War Curb,
N.Y. Times, April 25, 1980, at AI, col. 6; 126 Congo Rec. S4109-16 (daily ed.
April 23, 1980); id. S4192-93 (daily ed. April 24, 1980).
68. The State Department's Assistant Secretary for Con~essional Relations, however, did write soothingly to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. The Assistant Secretary said in part:
"As you know, your letter was received after the commencement of the
rescue mission in Iran on which the President reported to the Congress on
April 26. For that reason, the letter has in a sense already been overtaken by
events.
"The President did not find it possible to consult with the Congress before
commencing this rescue mission, in view of its extraordinary nature which
depended upon absolute secrecy. Nevertheless, let me assure you that this
Administration remains fully committed to the effective implementation of
the consultation provisions of the War Powers Resolution to which you refer,
and to the maximum possible cooperation between the Executive and Legis-lative branches in decisions which might involve the United States in hostilities." Letter from]. Brian Atwood to Frank Church, May 6, 1980.
69. Cf. Editorial, The War Powers Skirmish, N.Y. Times, May 2,1980, at
A26, col. 2:
"Congress adopted the War Powers Resolution to remind Presidents of
their accountability for the use of troops. It created a formal procedure for
consultation and an as yet untested requirement that Congress consent to
hostilities lasting longer than 90 days.
"But for all its bark, Congress has always been reluctant to bite. Successive
Presidents have committed forces to emergency operations on eight occasions without real consultation with key committee chairmen. President
Ford reported after the fact on the military airlift of Americans out of Southeast Asia and on the rescue of the crew of the Mayaguez. But he did not report on the evacuation of civilians from Cyprus and Lebanon, nor did Mr.
Cartel' report on airlifts into Zaire during an insurgency in 1977.
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"The war powers debate actually flared up before the rescue mission, in
response to Mr. Carter's threats of a blockade against Iran. That is scarcely a
minor matter; it could involve a direct challenge to a warship, including a
Soviet ship. As Senators Church and Javits of the Foreign Relations Committee asked even before the rescue raid, the military options the President keeps
threatening clearly should be discussed with leading members of Congress.
That view will have a sympathetic advocate in Senator Muskie, Mr. Carter's
nominee for Secretary of State.
"The legal scholar Edward Corwin once observed that the Constitution is
'an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy: In that struggle, Congress too often confines itself to tactical details,
ignoring strategic design. If the will is there, Congress can now insist on a
larger role and give real meaning to its War Powers Resc·rution."
70. Eugene V. Rostow has been among the .most.:compelling critics of
war-power legislation, the 1973 Resolution included. S-uch measures treat an
"imaginary disease," in his view, one that resulted when congressional result-orientation was misdiagnosed as "presidential usurpation":
"That popular thesis [that the rules of constitutional balance were somehow violated in Indochina] is a myth. There was no ·presidential usurpation
of Congress' war power in either Vietnam or Korea. . . .
"In the Korean War, and to a much greater extent during the war in Vietnam, we experienced naked political irresponsibility. First, the President and
Congress, acting together in a constitutional mode that'goes back to the time
of Washington, made a series of d~isions involving us in the wars. Later,
when the wars became unpopular, many of the congressmen who had voted
and voted and voted for them suddenly began to say that they were all the
President's fault. They claimed that the President had involved the country in
war through stealth and concealment. They argued that the difficulties were
the result not of human mistakes in carrying out policies duly authorized and
pursued, but rather of some structural imbalance in the Constitution. These
representatives told their constituents, 'The. President has stolen our clothes
while we were swimming; we have never really authorized this Presidential
war.' Then, having created the myth of presidential usurpation, Congress
passed the War Powers Resolution to cure the imaginary disease.
"These events have had a significant effect on the spirit of cooperation between the Executive and Congress. When the Executive Branch deals with
congressmen and senators who continue to vote for a war and then say,
'There's no one here but us chickens' after the war becomes unpopular, a
mood of suspicion develops which is rather hard to allay. I personally have
dealt with congressmen and senators about Vietnam, often reminding them
that the Administration had long been trying to achieve goals which th~y
had recommended in political speeches-reconvening the Geneva Conference, for example. Typically, their response was, 'I know that, but,you
must remember that I have to be elected in my district. The President has to
do what must be done. I must take care of my reelection: In short, a great
many men slithered off the deck when the going got rough. This is simply a
fact, not a reproach, something that happens in life.
··It is the ultimate reason why the War Powers Resolution and other
structural remedies we have been considering are so unrealistic and unreal.
President Johnson was very conscious of President Truman's experience in
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Korea and of the political fact that Korea became 'Truman's War: President
Truman did not seek the support of a fonnal congressional resolution. President Johnson had the advantage of the SEATO Treaty, . . . the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution, and a number of other congressional actions expressly designed
to approve the decisions of four Presidents under the Treaty. This experience
is what President Johnson had in mind when he observed, 'I knew that if I
wanted Congress with me at the crash landing, they had to be with me at the
take-off. But I forgot about the availability of parachutes ...• Response, 61
VA. L. REV. 797, 801-03 (1975).
71. But cf. the executive views in note 17 above. It is quite conceivable
that the Supreme Court would agree to decide such a case if asked, and it is
probable that the President would obey a decision against him. See pages
206-17 above.

